

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION BULLETIN

SEPTEMBER, 1950

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
1. Report on "The Turn in the World Situation and the Tasks of the Fourth International"	1
2. Resolution on the Developments of the Colonial Revolutions in Asia	9

(Adopted by the Eighth Plenum of the Executive
Committee of the Fourth International, April
1950).

Note: This material is reprinted from the May-
July, 1950, issue of "Quatrieme Inter-
nationale" for the information of our
readers.

Published by the
SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
116 University Place
New York 3, N.Y.

20¢

SEPT 7 1950

THE TURN IN THE WORLD SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Fourth International adopted a political report presented by its International Secretariat entitled "The Turn in the World Situation and the Tasks of the Fourth International." In the introduction to this report, the characterization of the present situation as a new turn in world events since 1945 is justified by the extreme aggravation of the crisis of the imperialist system as well as by the outbreak of the crisis of Stalinism.

"The possibility of normalizing the economic and social situation in the metropolitan countries is eliminated by the destruction of the mainstay of this economic security afforded by the colonial countries, the source of the super-profits indispensable for the establishment of a relative social peace in the advanced countries," says the report. On its side, the crisis of Stalinism creates favorable conditions in the labor movement for the construction of mass revolutionary parties. Thus the parallel crises of imperialism and Stalinism open up two perspectives of major importance: on one hand the perspective of a "prolonged reciprocal neutralization between the American bourgeoisie and the Soviet bureaucracy, rendering impossible for long years the outbreak of the Third World War;" on the other hand, "a world revolutionary perspective where the mounting waves of the colonial revolution flow together with those of the social crisis in Western Europe that the bourgeoisie cannot definitively hold down, merging with the currents of radicalization engendered by the growing economic contradictions in the Anglo-Saxon countries and the currents arising from the disintegration of Stalinism."

The World Economic Situation

The report then deals with the analysis of the present world economic situation. This has the following outstanding aspects: the end of the post-war boom in the United States and the attempts made by the American bourgeoisie to avoid the outbreak of a crisis like 1929; the sharpening of international competition; the unequal development of different sectors of world capitalist economy with the result that certain countries are entering into a fullblown depression at the very moment when others such as Germany and Japan have just entered the phase of economic revival.

"Historically," the report declares, "American imperialism can find no other way to escape a crisis like 1929 except through preparation for war and then war itself to reconquer the immense market from Prague to Shanghai which is more and more eluding it today." But the launching of war requires certain political, military, psychological and above all, social conditions, none of which prevailed when the economic recession of 1948-49 got under way. The American bourgeoisie therefore finds itself compelled to defer the maturing of the crisis, that is, to transform the crisis from a menacing collapse into a prolonged and gradual depression. It has employed the following means to achieve this end:

a. A stepped-up policy of rearmament "which creates a vast artificial market, thanks to government contracts and investments, and thus prevents collapse in the sector of heavy industry,"

- b. The policy of supporting agricultural prices,
- c. The underwriting of "the Fair Deal," aiming, like the support to the farmers, at avoiding a collapse in the market for consumer goods, a collapse which would hit light industry,
- d. The financing of American exports aided by American government credits, while seeking at the same time to expand the foreign markets for American products by "abolishing all barriers to a free circulation of capital and commodities throughout the world,"
- e. The quest for an expansion of exports and American capital into the "backward areas" of the world.

This policy of the American bourgeoisie, states the report, "consists first of all in exporting the internal contradictions of American economy into the other capitalist countries." This policy is thus opposed to the long-range aims of American imperialists, to wit: the consolidation of capitalism in Western Europe and the creation of a united world imperialist front indispensable for the launching of war against the Soviet Union. Moreover, this policy of increased government expenditures by the American state will enter a phase of intensified difficulty to the degree that the decreased national income will reduce budgetary revenues." In the last analysis, the American bourgeoisie is in the process of exhausting its reserves in order to get around its present difficulties. Enormous as these reserves are, they are not enough to cover for an extended period all the needs of a world capitalist system in full disintegration.

On the question of the accentuation of international competition, the report underlines the relative successes of British imperialism, thanks to its maintenance of a closed monetary area, and on the consequences of Germany's and Japan's return to the international market. The importance of American penetration into the colonial empires of the smaller imperialist powers is equally emphasized.

The new world economic situation has had serious consequences for Western Europe, the report states. Except for Germany and to a lesser measure Great Britain, all the Western European countries are presently experiencing the beginning of an economic depression characterized by an increase in unemployment, business crises, the falling off in sales of consumers' goods and phenomena of monetary deflation. This depression has not yet been transformed into a critical collapse owing to the state investment in rearmaments and reconstruction, financed in large part by the counterpart Marshall Plan credits.

Confronted with the intensification of international competition and the beginning of economic depression, the European bourgeoisie is replying by "the struggle for productivity, for rationalization, and for reduction of selling prices." This means that the bourgeoisie seeks to shift onto the backs of the working masses the "burden that the American bourgeoisie is trying to place on its own back."

So far as other sectors of world economy is concerned, the report singles out: (a) the important industrial revival in Western Germany, Japan, and certain countries of the Far East where the situation was marked by complete prostration up to 1947; (b) the threat of

a deepgoing crisis weighing on countries producing war materials in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, which has been temporarily delayed by the policy of stockpiling so-called "strategic" raw materials by the United States and the Soviet Union; (b) the protracted economic prostration of Spain which is approaching a total collapse from which only sizeable American aid can save it; (d) the end of the reconversion crisis of Soviet economy which has by now considerably surpassed the production levels of the immediate post-war period; (e) the important structural modifications experienced by the countries in the buffer zone during 1948-49, and the tightening of mutual relations between Soviet economy and the economy of the buffer countries which has been operating with an increasing section being appropriated by the Soviet bureaucracy of the economic advances realized in the buffer zone.

The report then sketches the prospective tendencies of development in world economy. The fundamental tendency is "the attempt of the American bourgeoisie to reestablish the unity of the world market, the ideal framework for the "peaceful" expansion of Yankee imperialism, endowed with overwhelming technical superiority and an overabundance of capital. This tendency will meet with partial successes in the immediate future, says the report. The United States aims above all to "equalize by means of international competition the production prices of most of the countries exporting finished products and to reintroduce a certain division of world labor on a more rudimentary basis than that before 1929. . . it hopes to function by an increase in the productivity of backward countries. . . and of Germany and Japan and by a lowering in the living standards of the masses of the 'advanced' countries in their reconstruction." Finally, "the impulsion of American imperialism toward the reconstruction of the world market will likewise undertake to realize a partial reintegration of the Soviet Union, the buffer zone and China into this market by the peaceful means of increased commercial relations and credits."

But over the long run these partial successes will be more than outweighed by the outburst of an inevitable world agricultural crisis, by the deepening of the contradictions and the elements of unbalance among the various sectors of capitalist economy and above all, by the repercussions of the collapse of the imperialist positions in the Far East. "Outside of a victorious war, which is more remote than ever, imperialism can no longer reconstruct a unified world market," the report concludes. A "normalization" of the world economic situation thus appears excluded. The future is a dark one for imperialism. Toward whatever continent it turns, the bourgeoisie can discover nothing but signs of illness and disequilibrium which keep on accumulating incessantly.

The World Political Situation

"The modifications created in the relationship of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union tend to neutralize each other and produce a situation of equilibrium of forces which for an entire period excludes any possibility of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union." This is how the report approaches its examination of the world political situation. It especially endeavors to indicate this neutralization on the military plane. The consequences of the

stepped-up rearmament of American imperialism have been neutralized by the manufacture of the atom bomb in the USSR and the downfall of Chiang Kai-Shek. On the other hand, "if an equilibrium of military forces is established on the world arena and will be maintained for an entire period in Europe which is the sole serious springboard for a war of aggression against the Soviet Union, the military relationship of forces remains highly favorable to the Soviet Union and the current pace of rearmament by the European bourgeoisie, Marshall Plan deliveries, etc. do not permit envisaging a change in this situation in the near future."

These conditions favor periodic negotiations between the two blocs aiming at the conclusion of a compromise. These negotiations could however very well end only in partial regulation of special problems, such as the settlement in 1949 of the Berlin question. And, in this event, new incidents will serve as new focal points for the war hysteria which both American imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy need in order to maintain a comparative internal discipline within their own camps.

The report then examines the political evolution on the various continents. It especially stresses the important consequences of the victory of Mao's armies in China. This victory, says the report, "expresses both the irresistible sweep of the agrarian uprisings and the ability of the Chinese CP to maintain control of them and to effect its military centralization." After the military victory, new tasks confront Mao, among which the most important are the revival of the economy and construction of a genuinely centralized state apparatus which would realize for the first time the unity of China as a modern nation. "To resolve these two tasks without overwhelming the peasantry under a burden of taxes which will again impel them towards resistance and armed revolt is the essential difficulty confronting Mao's government," states the report. These difficulties could be overcome only if the Chinese revolution, which has not yet resolved all the tasks of the national bourgeois revolution, realizes its growing over into the proletarian revolution by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, supporting itself on the poor peasantry.

The report finally deals with the tremendous repercussions of Mao's victory in all the countries of the Far East where the positions of imperialism are being impaired, threatened, broken. The threat of a crumbling of the positions held by French imperialism in Viet-Nam risks extending the crisis of imperialism throughout the "French Union," that is, in the first place, North Africa which is today a veritable powderkeg. On the other hand, the concentration of imperialist positions in Africa, now the last stronghold of the imperialist powers, has developed a young and vigorous labor and nationalist movement throughout the continent which places the colonial revolution there on the order of the day. It is also necessary to mention the attempts made by American imperialism to block the mounting tide of this colonial revolution in the Far East by seeking support among the native bourgeois forces and by a policy of economic aid on a grand scale (Philippines, Indonesia, India). It cannot, however, evade in the long run a new wave of radicalization in these countries, above all in India where none of the crucial problems have been settled by a national bourgeoisie which nonetheless appears as the most powerful in all Asia.

The report attributes great importance to the political consequences of the economic revival in Western Germany. The German bourgeoisie is becoming transformed from a mere supernumerary into a partner with full rights in the Western Bloc: such seems to be the first results of its revival. This reappearance of an aspiration toward independence by the German bourgeoisie will more than ever tend to upset the very fragile scaffolding of the "Council of Europe," riddled by the contradictory interests of all the participating capitalist powers. "In the perspective of an aggravation of international contradictions, stagnation and economic depression, the old European continent, more and more cut off from its sources of colonial superprofits, divided against itself, the field of battle between the two world blocs, will be more than ever plunged into atrophy and disintegration." This is how the report counterposes its own position to the mystifications and utopias based on a "unification" of capitalist Europe.

The working class solution for the European problem will on the other hand be powerfully reinforced in the future by another consequence of the economic revival of Germany: the reappearance on the political scene of the German proletariat as an independent power, freshly endowed with a considerable potential of combativity. At the same time, the European crisis will find its most acute expression in Great Britain where powerful extra-parliamentary class struggles loom up in the months ahead. The British working class, with tremendous confidence in its own forces, is the only European proletariat that has not experienced an important defeat in the two past decades. It will be carried to the head of the process of radicalization of the European working class. Together with the German workers who will take heart again and with the French and Italian workers whose militancy has not at all been shattered, this will place on the order of the day the revolutionary struggle for the Socialist United States of Europe.

The report emphasizes that one of the essential features of the new world situation resides in the fact that the accentuation of the disequilibrium of world economy tends to inflame social contradictions in Europe. Social and relative economic stability are more than ever excluded in the old capitalist countries. Compelled to pass over to brutal attacks against the living standards of the European workers (unemployment, speedup, lock-outs, wage reductions, firing of trade union representatives, etc.), the European bourgeoisie has itself created conditions for a revival of proletarian activity at the beginning of 1950. While the political offensive of the bourgeoisie aiming to establish "strong governments" made important gains in 1949 (exclusion of the Social-Democrats from power in numerous countries, beginnings of anti-strike legislation, witch-hunt laws, etc), it has encountered a series of important setbacks beginning with 1950: the Royal question in Belgium, the "affair of the Generals" in France, the Greek elections and above all, the return of the Labor Government in Great Britain. Here is how the report sums up the present situation. "The balance sheet of the capitalist offensive in Western Europe is therefore only partly favorable to the bourgeoisie." None of its fundamental objectives has been attained by the bourgeoisie. The inability of the bourgeoisie to win decisive victories permits a periodic renewal of the power of combativity among the proletariat and opens wide perspectives of revolutionary struggles of great scope by the European working class.

Finally, the report reviews political developments in the United States. This development, it says, is characterized by two contradictory phenomena: a leftward evolution, slow but gradual, throughout the country of which Truman's election on a highly demagogic program was an important sign; a brutal rightward swing within the labor movement where a heavy atmosphere of witch-hunting and conformity is being imposed. "These two tendencies express one single fundamental phenomenon: the reinforcement of the union bureaucracy and its accelerated integration into the capitalist state apparatus." This reinforcement is at bottom nothing else but an expression of the prosperity of American imperialism, the only imperialism in the world which can still seek to corrupt the higher layers of its own proletariat.

The report further states that the stoppage of labor struggles after the Taft-Hartley Law now seems to be replaced by a new period of big battles (miners' strike and the Chrysler strike). "The politicalization of the American working class, like the politicalization of the British working class a half century ago, is a contradictory and uneven process which proceeds in a purely empirical fashion." But the enormous contradictions today in the position of the American bourgeoisie, master of the capitalist world, will give this politicalization an infinitely more dynamic and explosive character. The perspective of the American revolution must be placed on the same ground as that of the colonial and European revolution. It will be of decisive importance for the future of humanity.

The Situation in the Labor Movement

The report points out the important losses felt by the Social Democracy in a series of countries, owing to the rightward swing of the petty bourgeoisie. It likewise states that despite these losses, the Social Democracies in almost all the advanced countries has strengthened its positions within the labor movement owing to the recession of Stalinism in these countries. The interaction between these two phenomena has either called forth a leftward evolution in the policies of the Socialist Party, as in Belgium, Germany, Japan, India or the development of an atmosphere favorable to the flowering of important left oppositions within the reformist parties, as in Great Britain, Austria, Canada. The report underscores the weakness and even the complete disappearance of centrist organizations as well as the crisis currently afflicting such crypto-Stalinist formations as the PSU of France, a Social-Democratic organization with a Stalinist policy.

But the most important factor affecting the development of the workers' movement is the outbreak of a violent crisis within Stalinism. One of the peculiarities of this crisis, says the report, consists in the fact that, first in Yugoslavia, and possibly tomorrow in other countries, the crisis of the Stalinist parties is interlaced with a rupture between state powers and the Soviet bureaucracy. But the dominating trait of the current crisis of Stalinism is the fact that this is the first crisis in that movement which arises not in a period of deepgoing reflux of the international labor movement like the crisis of the Communist International after 1928, after 1933, and after 1939. On the contrary it unfolds in a period of unprecedented upsurge in the history of the struggles of the working masses on a

world scale. This factor renders the present conjuncture exceptionally favorable to the creation of a new workers' leadership and the construction of mass revolutionary parties.

In analyzing the crisis of Stalinism, the report emphasizes the historical significance of the progressive evolution of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of the Yugoslav revolution since the break with the Kremlin, and of its incalculable consequences for the entire evolution of the buffer countries and the Soviet Union itself. Outside the buffer zone, the crisis of Stalinism is especially aggravated because of the rigid application by the Stalinist leadership of the "Zhdanov" line, combining traits of the most vulgar opportunism with manifestations of a blind adventurism, recalling the "Third Period of Errors of the Communist International." Finally, in the Far East the Stalinist movement, drawing in its own manner the lessons of the victory of Mao Tse Tung, is considerably modifying its strategy there.

The examination of the world economic and political development and the new conditions in which the labor movement operates leads the report to conclude that the Fourth International is entering into the first conjuncture since its foundation which is profoundly favorable to it. Important subjective factors contribute to make this present conjuncture propitious to a swifter growth of the Fourth International. "The ideological evolution of the Yugoslav Communist Party, following in the footsteps of Trotskyist thought and theory, has culminated in a genuine historical justification of our movement," says the report. "It has enormously raised our prestige and makes us more than ever appear as the sole pole of attraction around which a new international labor leadership can be regrouped." The report notes that the Fourth International enters on this new stage of its development with solid cadres and consolidated and experienced organizations in most of the big countries of the world and that it has been able to register important successes during 1949.

Finally, the report outlines the principal political tasks the Fourth International will have to resolve to fully exploit this conjuncture so favorable to its development. The principal task of the International at the present stage, says the report, is the defense of Yugoslavia, "which concentrates and contains within itself all the other tasks of our movement. The struggle for the defense of Yugoslavia is the struggle for the building of a new international workers' leadership without which war and a relapse into barbarism will be inevitable. The struggle for the defense of Yugoslavia is the struggle to win hundreds of thousands of Communists in Yugoslavia and in the entire buffer zone to the cause of the Fourth International. The struggle for the defense of Yugoslavia is a struggle against Wall Street and the Kremlin as two poles of the oppression of the masses in the world. . . It is the struggle for the extension of the Yugoslav revolution into the European revolution, it is the struggle for the Socialist United States of Europe."

The report goes on to enumerate a series of other burning political tasks common to the entire International, among which should be singled out the struggle for the defense of the colonial revolution; the struggle against the war danger; propaganda explaining the fundamental causes for the depression and the shrinkage of capitalist economy; propaganda favoring a Socialist and democratic planning of

world economy; the struggle against the division, occupation and plundering of Germany and Austria; the campaign to aid all victims of imperialist terror and workers who have fallen victim to Stalinist terror throughout the world; etc.

In addition to these central tasks, the report cites a series of more specific tasks for the Trotskyist organizations in Western Europe (united front activities, struggle against unemployment, for workers' control of industry, workers' militia, etc.); in Germany, Great Britain and Eastern Europe (against the blockade of Yugoslavia, for a construction plan; for a government apparatus based on democratically-elected committees, like those in Yugoslavia; for a program for consummating the Socialist revolution, etc.

The report concludes with these words: "Thus in the entire world, the sections and militants of the Fourth International, united in a single world organization, full of confidence in their program which has just received brilliant confirmation in recent events, launches itself toward the construction of powerful organizations, capable of leading the oppressed and exploited of all countries toward the glorious end they pursue: the world Communist revolution, the organization of a classless world society. The stage now before us may well be decisive for the history of our movement, if all sections correctly take advantage of and fully understand the possibilities open before us."

#

RESOLUTION ON THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTIONS IN ASIA

Over the last two years important events have occurred in the colonial areas, especially in Asia which have profoundly altered the picture presented by these areas at the time of the Second World Congress. These events are: the bankruptcy of Chiang Kai-Shek's regime and the victory of Mao Tse Tung in China, Indonesia's accession to an "independence" like India's, and the experience it has had with this independence; the deepening of the mass movement throughout South-East Asia; the counter-offensive of imperialism, directed by Washington, which is currently taking shape.

The predominant factor continues to be the revolutionary upsurge of the peoples of Asia, an upsurge which arose during the Second World War, and which, far from being arrested, continues to unfold and acquire ever greater breadth and intensity, contrary to what has taken place in Western Europe.

The revolutionary movement of the masses, which shakes the very basis of imperialist hold upon Asia, constitutes the essential factor now imperilling the reestablishment of the relative stability of capitalism on a world scale and objectively serves as the best stimulant to the struggle of the metropolitan masses against their own weakened bourgeoisie.

A. China -- Reasons for the Victory of Mao Tse Tung

The International has emphasized the importance it attaches to the events in China by characterizing the victory of Mao Tse Tung as the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution (Resolution of the Seventh Plenum).

This victory was made possible for the following reasons:

The Chinese owning classes, particularly the bourgeoisie lined up behind the Kuo-Min-Tang, threatened from its birth by the revolutionary movement of the masses which linked the outcome of the anti-imperialist revolt with the social revolution, was able to govern China only by setting up a dictatorship actively supported by imperialism, particularly Yankee imperialism.

Cut off from the masses, this regime was rapidly plunged into corruption and impotence, confirming by its whole evolution the rapid passage of the colonial bourgeoisie into the camp of reaction and its close alliance with imperialism against the masses.

The decomposition of the owning classes of China, incapable of solving even problems of a bourgeois-democratic type, was the most important objective factor favoring Mao Tse Tung's success.

Imperialism, weakened in general after the war and taken unawares by the colossal mass movement in this sector, proved incapable of extricating itself in time from its compromising alliance with the rotten Chiang Kai-Shek regime, and of organizing to this day any effective resistance to the irresistible upsurge of the masses.

The subjective causes favoring Mao Tse Tung's victory are mainly these: the Chinese CP's exploitation of the revolutionary potentiality of the Chinese peasant masses under the banner of agrarian reform; the exploitation of the anti-imperialist sentiments of the masses, and the utilization of military tactics superior to those of the criminal generals of the Kuo-Min-Tang, tactics based on guerillas aided by the peasant population.

Operating in the midst of a backward, essentially peasant population, which furnished most of its fighters and even its own members, led by a crew trained in the school of Stalinist bureaucratism, the Chinese CP assiduously avoided supporting this struggle with simultaneous action on the part of the proletariat in the urban centers, of deepening the social program of this struggle, of filling it with an ever more proletarian and socialist content, and of making a broad appeal to the initiative of the democratically-organized masses.

On the contrary, it conceived of the struggle as above all a military one, and by regimenting the peasants into fighting units on a massive scale has been more easily able to manipulate the whole struggle in China from above in a bureaucratic fashion, and reduce to a minimum the risks of independent outbursts, especially by the proletarian masses.

The purely military effectiveness of such a course is naturally achieved to the detriment of the social and revolutionary content of the struggle.

To the extent that it seeks to push to the fore the essentially military aspect of the colonial revolution, the Chinese CP which has excelled in perfecting the application of partisan war to the concrete conditions of China, has served to reveal the bureaucratic nature of its leadership and of the Stalinist leadership in general.

Where Is the Chinese Revolution Today?

It is difficult to draw up an exact balance sheet of the social transformations which have taken place since the victory of Mao Tse Tung, since the situation is constantly changing and dependable data are very difficult to obtain.

Of the three main immediate tasks of the Chinese revolution, namely, independence, unification, and agrarian reform, only the first seems to have been attained, even though it has not yet been consolidated. It is incontestable that in China as well as throughout the entire colonial world imperialism has received the heaviest blow of its existence. However, this first victory won against imperialism on the political plane can be consolidated only to the extent that China emerges from its present state of economic inferiority and can develop its productive forces. This obviously depends upon the development of the regime established in China in a socialist direction.

In order for the country to acquire genuine independence, it must have not only a proletarian power, but one which is free of Kremlin domination. The mortgages imposed by the Soviet bureaucracy

during and after the war upon the provinces of North China, Sing Kiang and Manchuria, in particular, will actually be lifted only in the event that the Peking regime can avoid the fate of the European buffer countries and through its own resistance and struggle acquire the status of an equal instead of being a satellite of Moscow.

The Sino-Soviet treaty which provides for the return, at a specified time (after 1952), of Manchuria to China, appears to have guaranteed China's independence in respect to the USSR. This treaty makes no reference, however, to the economic hold of the USSR over Manchuria and Sing Kiang through which the Soviet bureaucracy seeks to orient these areas toward integration with Soviet economy and also to divert an important part of their production to the USSR rather than to China itself.

Nor can the unification of the country be achieved merely on the formal administrative plane through the creation of a central power. The problem in China is to combine a single central power with a highly decentralized administration which takes into account the peculiarities of the different regions. In order to be effective, such a unification must rest upon the actual existence of a single proletarian power, which is inconceivable without a democratic organization of the masses taking over the actual administration of the state, and also upon the economic unification of the country through the uninterrupted development of the productive forces.

As for the agrarian reform, which was widespread in the north, it was practically halted in the south at the Yangtse line. This accords with the compromise effected in this section of the country in particular with the bourgeoisie which retains its economic positions. Further, even in the north, there exists the very serious danger of an abortion of the agrarian reform for two important reasons: (a) the failure of the government to give effective assistance to the agrarian reform, because it has been incapable, up to the present time, of supplying the peasantry with the necessary equipment and fertilizer, nor has it enabled the peasants to supply themselves under favorable conditions with industrial products from the cities. This results in the growth of indebtedness and a return to the concentration of land ownership among the richer elements.

This danger, which is inherent in the situation so long as the productive forces remain on a very low level and the state sector of the economy is weak, can be effectively combatted only by a real proletarian power based on a democratic organization of the poor peasants and the proletariat.

(b) But the danger in store for agrarian reform comes above all from its very nature. Agrarian reform has not only been halted geographically; in these very areas where it has been undertaken, it has been carried out very imperfectly and under pressure and instigation of the masses. But the former owners have often retained more land than others, the rich peasants have acquired heavy influence in the peasant committees, and finally, the possibility of repurchasing the lands opens the way to a reconstitution of large-scale landholding. Moreover, it appears that usury, that plague of the Asiatic peasantry, has not been suppressed root and branch, although such suppression should be one of the constituent elements of genuine agrarian reform.

The structure of agrarian reform has also been weakened by the very alliance which the Chinese CP continues to maintain with broad layers of the bourgeoisie.

The industrial policy of the Chinese CP, which consists to some extent in continuing to compromise with a number of bourgeois elements, will not only result in sparing the large landowner in the village, who provides the capital for usurious loans, but also in strengthening the rich peasant who is at the same time the lender.

On the whole, the regime of Mao Tse Tung which has come to power thanks to the support of the peasant masses and the passive sympathy of the proletariat of the cities in the south and of the anti-imperialist intelligentsia, actually derives its strength much more from the collapse of its adversaries and the hopeful attitude of the masses than from their genuine support. With its equilibrium remaining precarious and its further development still undetermined, Mao Tse Tung's victory has opened up a revolutionary period and posed problems which have not yet received any radical solution.

Confronted with enormous objective difficulties (the backwardness of the country, aggravated by years of war and destruction, the great numbers of the peasantry, the limited extent of outside assistance), as well as with the divergent social forces existing in China, Mao Tse Tung's regime is still empirically seeking a base and a program.

The complex and contradictory reality of the Chinese situation is reflected within the Chinese CP itself. By virtue of its composition (in which peasant and petty-bourgeois intellectual elements predominate), as well as the social atmosphere which surrounds it, it cannot be regarded as a party that is purely and simply a vassal of Moscow's (through the medium of its leadership), nor as one deriving its main strength from its own worker cadres and above all from the support of the proletariat. From this point of view, it differs, both in its leadership and in its base, from the Communist parties of the West, and will very probably have a different evolution, depending upon the dynamics of the class struggle in China and throughout the world.

Its leadership has up to now maneuvered between the classes in China and, to a certain extent, it will also tend to maneuver between the Kremlin and imperialism. But an equilibrium of this sort will become impossible in the long run, and the Chinese CP will have to extricate itself from the confused mixture which has thus far constituted its strength, because it has been the party upon which the hopes of the people were focused and must now embark upon a policy of achievement and thus be judged by its acts.

Gripped between the proletariat and the peasant masses on the one hand and the city and rural bourgeoisie and attraction of imperialism on the other, the Chinese CP will have to make its way through internal regroupments which will bring about the crystallization of a fundamental class line.

In case the Chinese CP should seek support from the masses of the poor peasantry and workers, it will strengthen its social base

and will be better able to stand up against the bourgeoisie and imperialism, as well as against the Soviet bureaucracy. This orientation would be expressed in the adoption and application of a program corresponding to the fundamental aspirations of the masses, more concretely in consummating and extending to south China the agrarian reform begun in the north; the statification of key industries, banking, and transportation; the defense of the workers' demands in the sector which is still capitalist; above all, the democratic organization of the masses and their effective participation in the administration of the government and in the control of the economy.

It is not impossible that such an orientation could result from the pressure of the masses on the CP and the victory of a left wing within its ranks. In this case, the Chinese CP would gradually experience a development analogous to that of the Yugoslav CP, which would lead within a relatively longer time to its actual independence from the Kremlin and open up new perspectives for the Chinese and world revolution.

The other alternative is the capitulation of the CP under internal difficulties and the joint pressure of the native bourgeoisie and imperialism, while it seeks to prolong a situation of compromises and half-way measures. This could be realized only through recourse to bureaucratic violence against the masses (who would be more and more hostile to such a course) and by internal crises within the Chinese CP and could only lead in the end to the death of the revolution.

It is the duty of revolutionary Marxists in China to adopt a policy which would facilitate the first variant and to work out a non-ultimatistic program of critical support to the Mao Tse Tung regime, placing confidence in the forces of the Chinese revolution itself and taking into account the concrete reality of the country and its difficulties. Moreover, the entire International must avoid taking too negative an attitude toward the events in China by interpreting them purely and simply as a victory for Stalinism, that is, a victory of the Soviet bureaucracy.

Repercussions of the Victory of Mao Tse Tung

The overturn which has taken place in China constitutes the fundamental element causing the instability in the Far East now confronting imperialism. It is a powerful stimulus of revolutionary developments throughout Asia. Its first result has been a considerable stiffening of the anti-imperialist movement in Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, Korea, and the Philippines.

Repercussions from it extend even to Japan where the Chinese revolution acts as a powerful stimulus to the revolutionary struggle of the Japanese proletariat.

During this first phase, Stalinism and the Soviet bureaucracy are clearly profiting from the revolutionary movement of the masses in Asia, since, contrary to the process which has begun in Europe, they still have powerful illusions concerning the real nature and aims of Stalinism.

The Independence of India and Indonesia

The weakening of imperialism following the war, and the permanent revolutionary upsurge of the Asiatic masses, have made possible the formal acquisition of independence by countries like India and Indonesia. Although the economic weight of imperialism continues to be exerted upon these countries with all the consequences that impede their further development and tie the native bourgeoisie to the chariot of imperialism, the importance of the new situation thus created, which transforms the physiognomy and objectives of the class struggle in these countries, should not be underestimated.

The exercise of political power directly by the native bourgeoisie, in both India and Indonesia, permits this bourgeoisie to benefit from all the weaknesses, retreats, and difficulties of imperialism, in order to augment its own economic influence and free its development from a series of obstacles which would be insurmountable under the direct domination of imperialism. This has already been demonstrated by the example of the economic development of India over the past three years.

Moreover, in the eyes of the masses, especially in the case of India, the foremost enemy is no longer imperialism but the native bourgeoisie, which takes upon itself the lead in repressing the masses.

From a certain point of view, the situation is thus rendered clearer and the objective of the struggle becomes the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, which will at the same time permit these countries to rid themselves of the last mortgages of imperialism.

The fundamentally reactionary nature of the native bourgeoisie, which was disguised so long as the struggle had a national and anti-imperialist aspect, becomes more and more obvious to the masses. It remains nonetheless true that the national bourgeoisie has been able to benefit from "independence" by representing it as some sort of achievement of its own opposition to imperialism and its role of leadership in the struggle of the masses against it.

India's Independence

The independence of India is much more genuine and advanced than that of Indonesia. This is essentially a result of the far greater weight of the Indian bourgeoisie. However, in the case of India, in order to give its independence a substantial content, the bourgeoisie will have to abolish the strongest obstacle imperialism has yet raised before it, namely, the arbitrary division of the country between Pakistan and India.

The structure of India is a single unit; its development has created a division of labor which partition, by separating the raw materials from the factories which convert them (the jute industry) or by setting up financial and customs barriers which paralyze inter-India trade, takes no account of whatever.

It is not excluded that, profiting from the increasing weakness of British imperialism and the favors of American imperialism (which

covets the Indian market and appreciates the "stabilizing" role which Nehru's India can play in the Far East), the Indian bourgeoisie can by its own forces soon put an end (by force or by compromise) to the division of India. Meanwhile, the enormous military budget weighs very heavily upon the deficient economy of the country.

Only a proletarian regime capable of realizing a voluntary federation of the peoples of India could truly pacify and unify the country, while any solution employing force would perpetuate an endemic condition of civil strife of which imperialism would be the main beneficiary.

The reactionary nature of the Indian bourgeoisie and of the Congress Party is fully confirmed by its whole domestic policy. Its alliance with imperialism and the native feudal elements has rendered impossible the agrarian reform which is the chief aspiration of the enormous Indian peasant masses. In order to combat the aspirations and demands of the working class masses overwhelmed by poverty, the Indian bourgeoisie has taken the road of severe reaction, constantly strengthening its repressive police and military apparatus (with its constitution largely imitating the reactionary law promulgated in 1935 by the English government of India, anti-union repressive measures, arrests, persecutions, arbitrary police action, etc.)

Thus Nehru's regime is gradually slipping down the same fatal incline as the military-police regime of Chiang Kai-Shek, making inevitable the future gigantic explosions toward which the revolutionary vanguard in India must be continually oriented.

On the international arena India is acquiring more and more importance, with imperialism counting on Nehru's Congress Party to stabilize south-east Asia and furnish a counter-weight to China's influence. Moreover, the real strengthening of the Indian bourgeoisie is manifested by the fact that in foreign policy, particularly in reference to the other Asiatic regimes, it maintains a certain independence of imperialism and at times adopts an attitude of its own (Indonesia, China).

Imperialism counts upon the Indian bourgeoisie to polarize the elements which are inclined to compromise and seek the way of disguised capitulation to imperialism, like the solution a la Hatta in Indonesia, and thus constitute a stabilizing and moderating element in the boiling Asiatic cauldron.

Indonesian Independence

The independence of Indonesia, as realized by the agreements concluded in December, 1949, with The Hague, is the work of American imperialism. It is with justification that the USA has been characterized as the patron of the young United States of Indonesia.

The very direct and pressing manner with which Wall Street intervened under cover of the United Nations to liquidate the conflict has a direct relation to the situation in China. The meaning of the agreement was indicated with utmost clarity at the close of the negotiations by the spokesman for the Netherlands government: "The Netherlands did not in the beginning envisage that complete sovereignty would be granted so rapidly to Indonesia. They were brought

to it by international pressure (read "American") and by the desire to convert Indonesia into a rampart against Communism."

The last big military operation attempted at the end of 1949 by the Netherlands' army terminated in a severe defeat on both the military and political planes. The offensive rapidly faded out and the forces of resistance remained master of the major part of Java. As for the arrest of the republican government, its only effect was a considerable radicalization and stiffening of the political positions of the resistance movement. It became necessary and urgent to liberate the arrested republican leaders so that, by regaining their control over the masses, they would be able to check this radicalization. In order to assist them in this task, it was necessary to grant as broad a nominal independence as possible. Washington knew how to put constraint upon the Hague government.

The agreement which was concluded paralleled in its main features the Dominion statutes. The government of the United States of Indonesia constitutes an amalgam of the former republican government and the phantom governments set up by Dutch imperialism in the territories it had conquered. The Indonesian parliament consists of 50 republicans and 100 federalists (ex-puppets).

The agreement stipulates, moreover, that nationalizations must be restricted to a minimum and must include obligatory indemnification of the owners. The Netherlands will retain control over Indonesian finances. The directors of the Central Bank of Issue can be chosen only with approval of The Hague. Finally, Indonesia recognizes a debt of 4.5 billion florins. New Guinea remains a Dutch colony until agreement is reached on a special statute.

The military clauses which place the naval base of Sourabaya at the disposal of the Dutch navy and provide for the presence of a Dutch military mission for constructing an Indonesian army restrict the scope of this independence in a singular manner.

Moreover, by surrounding the Indonesian Republic with federated states where deliberately fomented separatist movements break out at regular intervals, the Netherlands have further restricted this independence.

This agreement has met with hostility from a large part of the Indonesian partisans who intend to carry forward the struggle for complete independence.

It is necessary to emphasize the extremely high level of consciousness displayed by the resistance movement. Unlike Viet-Nam, where Stalinism by its undemocratic procedures, its calumnies, terrorism, and assassinations has succeeded in stifling all ideological opposition or free discussion within the liberation movement, the movement in Java is characterized by an intense political life of which the diversity of tendencies and parties give manifest proof. The most important fact is the existence of an important revolutionary vanguard in this country free of Stalinism and with a position approaching Trotskyism (characterized, in any case, as Trotskyist by national and international public opinion). It is said that the Partai Murba of Tan Malakka is generally considered as the most dangerous opponent of the government.

The limited nature of the independence thus granted in the face of the high level of consciousness of the Indonesian masses renders impossible any stabilization of the Indonesian situation. A new chapter in the anti-imperialist struggle is beginning and violent struggles are inevitable which as they develop will favor the resistance of the masses to the national bourgeoisie, the strengthening of the revolutionary vanguard of Indonesia and the anti-imperialist struggle throughout south eastern Asia.

The Revolutionary Movements in Southeast Asia

In Korea, Malaya, Burma, Viet-Nam, and even in the Philippines, imperialism, despite all its efforts, has not yet succeeded in subduing the revolutionary mass movement and in stabilizing to any extent the positions which are so important to its economy, to its strategy of encirclement and assault on the USSR, and to its isolation of the Chinese revolution.

This inability of imperialism to make any effective counter-thrust comes from the fact that in these countries it does not derive any weighty support from the national bourgeoisie which is too weak, and therefore cannot divide and disorient the mass movements.

Moreover, the military forces which are actually in the direct service of imperialism have not up until now been adequate to cope with the constantly improving guerilla organizations operating in these countries which receive effective support from the population.

It is characteristic that the direct intervention of the Americans in occupied South Korea and of the English in Malaya (two spots where imperialism hoped for a quick victory only a year ago) have not been sufficient to check the development of the revolutionary movement of the masses. In fact, imperialism finds itself in a more critical situation than ever in these two countries.

It is in Viet-Nam, however, that imperialism now runs the risk of a grave defeat which would irretrievably damage the weak bulwark it hastily attempted to construct in order to curb the revolutionary upsurge of the Asiatic masses. This explains the precipitousness with which an imperialist united front, directed by Washington, is being welded around the defense of Viet-Nam.

The Viet-Nam War Becomes an International Conflict

The astonishing advances made by Mao Tse Tung's armies have rendered altogether futile the attempts to split the Viet-Nam resistance bloc by using Bao Dai who is under the thumb of French imperialism.

Galvanized by this victory and the endurance manifested by the guerillas of Ho Chi Min, the mass revolutionary movement now evinces a new vigor characterized above all by the active resistance of the proletariat, and the student and small merchant elements among the petty bourgeoisie of the cities against the puppet regime of Bao Dai and his imperialist protectors.

Extensive as the concessions have been to meet the needs of the ex-emperor's cause, they have not succeeded in winning over the

bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements who sympathize with Ho Chi Min.

Although Bao Dai's setback is evident and recognized by official personages, imperialism has no other choice and finds itself obliged to pursue a futile course. Unable to detach the bourgeois elements from the resistance movement and bargain with them, there is nothing left but to resort to negotiations with Ho Chi Min, since no military decision can be obtained with the forces at France's disposal.

The hopeless and inextricable situation of French imperialism arises precisely from the fact that it can negotiate a compromise like that of Holland, only with a Stalinist partner. This would be tantamount to guaranteeing in Viet-Nam the rule of a government with a Stalinist leadership. This is impracticable at the present international juncture of "cold war," and would actually mean its cession by France in the absence of any link between the interests of imperialism and those of the Stalinist elements subordinated to the Kremlin.

With the Chinese Red Armies at the frontier of Tonkin, French imperialism confesses its inability to sustain the war much longer by itself and is calling American imperialism to its rescue, and thus turning the colonial war into an international conflict.

The situation today is such that world imperialism has no other choice than to lean upon a broken reed, the fabulously corrupt emperor, Bao Dai, the ever-ready creature of colonialism, for whom the people of Viet-Nam feel only hatred and contempt.

The United States, having had to give up China, considers Viet-Nam as one of the important sectors of the "cold war" in the Far East.

However, the US leaders have not yet overcome all their hesitations about engaging in a vigorous military action to cut away the Viet-Nam abscess. They are more disposed to send limited financial aid. There are several reasons for this:

1. Viet-Nam seems less important to them in the cordon sanitaire against communism which they wish to erect in Asia than Japan or the Philippines. In these countries the United States holds solid bases and doesn't intend to relinquish its prey for an uncertain quantity, especially since the internal situation in the Philippines, where a latent civil war prevails, is far from reassuring.

2. Kuo-Min-Tang China has swallowed up so much American aid that the United States is not disposed to repeat the experience. They now see the extraordinary weakness of the Viet-Nameese bourgeoisie represented by Bao Dai.

Moreover, they hesitate to bestow all their aid directly upon French imperialism, desiring rather to supplant it than to assist it effectively. They also fear to unmask themselves completely before the Viet-Nameese masses and thus strengthen their resistance. To follow a policy of giving military aid on a massive scale to Viet-Nam would mean embarking upon a long drawn-out enterprise with uncertain results, and the United States takes this into its calculations.

That explains the evasive moves we are witnessing. It is therefore necessary to take into account these reservations on the part of the Americans in order to appraise the possibilities of the Viet-Nameese conflict.

The recognition of Bao Dai by the USA, England, and other powers is small consolation to France. Its effects will not be miraculous and her situation in Viet-Nam will not thereby be ameliorated. On the contrary, it can be considered that the position of France will be further compromised. For, even if American intervention could some day achieve results, it is by no means certain that France would be the beneficiary. Thus France will be the loser, no matter what happens.

The logic of an unfavorable relationship of forces leads French imperialism to plunge headlong into ever greater expenditures and numberless sacrifices. In spite of its desperate efforts, it finds itself obliged to yield before the nationalist movement on the one hand, to which it must give ever more concessions in an attempt to restrain its ardor, and to American imperialism on the other in exchange for its indispensable assistance. This process has been unfolding relentlessly ever since 1945, not only at the expense of French imperialism but also that of its Dutch colleague. In these days the same process continues to unfold with ever greater scope, speeding the inevitable decline of both imperialisms.

The French bourgeoisie is going through a profound crisis on this question. In desperation it is driven to pursue an infinitely unpopular war which is bringing about its ruin. Its obstinacy is to be explained, however, by the fact that in clinging to Viet-Nam, its main aim is to ward off the complete collapse of the whole of an already badly damaged empire. The bourgeoisie cannot but be aware that the chances of preserving its domination are very small, if not non-existent, no matter what road it follows. In fact, it can do no more than postpone the day of reckoning.

Various solutions are periodically put forth -- mediation, arbitration through some neutral armistice, recourse to the UN -- which bear witness to the deep-going disorientation prevailing in ruling circles.

Perspectives of the Viet-Nam Conflict and Recognition of Ho-Chi Min

Thanks to the new revolutionary upsurge of the Viet-Nameese masses and the assistance, though limited, already received from the Mao Tse Tung regime, Ho Chi Min is modifying in his favor the equilibrium which existed between his forces and imperialism. If American imperialism were not at the moment actively intervening in the conflict, if it were not supporting the imperialist military forces and the puppet regime of Bao Dai with arms, munitions, and finances, we would perhaps witness in the coming months a collapse as sudden and extensive as that of Chiang Kai-Shek's regime in China. The time when Ho Chi Min, on instructions from the Kremlin, tried to negotiate a compromise within the French Union, is over. The Kremlin at that time still hoped to neutralize the French bourgeoisie and prevent its active participation in the camp of American imperialism. Since then the situation in France and internationally has undergone impor-

tant changes which exert influence upon the prospects of the Viet-Nam conflict.

The negotiations between Ho Chi Min and French imperialism present an essentially different aspect today than in 1946. This is due, not to any change in the nature of Stalinism, but rather to the following factors: (a) The change in the relationship of forces arising from the Chinese revolution; (b) the change in the international situation characterized by the aggravation of the "cold war" between the United States and the USSR; (c) the Stalinist policy flowing from this new situation.

It follows that a new edition of the March 6, 1946 agreement is out of the question today.

The agreements concluded with Bao Dai very definitely go far beyond the March 6, 1946 agreement. These agreements themselves are outstripped by the statute of "independence" obtained by Indonesia. Ho Chi Min could not, under penalty of seeing himself left behind, accept conditions inferior to those conceded to Hatta.

Besides, would not negotiations with Ho Chi Min at the present international juncture, after three years of war due precisely to refusal to accept him as mediator, be virtually a capitulation on the part of imperialism, especially after the Bao Dai experience which was conducted with such obstinacy? This possibility seems excluded in the present period.

Moreover, the recognition of the Ho Chi Min government would actually assume a progressive character since it would check the international recognition of the puppet emperor Bao Dai sought by French imperialism.

What is involved here is a form of anti-imperialist struggle which weakens French imperialism and contributes to the victory of the Viet-Nam people. This action by no means runs counter to the struggle which the revolutionary vanguard does and must conduct against the policy of the Ho Chi Min government. When we demand recognition of the Ho Chi Min government, what we demand is recognition of Viet-Nameese independence, the recognition of the resistance movement which is headed by this government. This is a manifestation of our unconditional support of the anti-imperialist struggle, which in no way binds our freedom to criticize Ho Chi Min's policies. Our criticism and the political struggle conducted by our Viet-Nam section will have increasing weight in line with the consistent and unstinting nature of the support we give to this government in the anti-imperialist struggle.

In order to struggle against Stalinism and against narrow petty-bourgeois nationalism, our movement will derive its essential strength from the fact that it will show itself to be the most resolute and efficient fighting force in the struggle for genuine independence.

Our General Tasks

Before the uninterrupted anti-imperialist development in Asia, which for the first time in history has lifted up tremendous masses

heretofore terribly exploited by imperialism and by the native reactionary classes who now seek to free themselves from this exploitation, our International must show an attitude of profound understanding, free of all sectarianism, of the progressive character of these movements. The worst mistake that our movement could make would be to confuse this movement with its leadership which is more or less obedient to Stalinism, and in this way to minimize the deep-going mass character of these movements and their largely spontaneous origin due to the overturns brought about by the war, the weakening of imperialism and the native owning classes.

Moreover, it would be equally erroneous to consider the Communist parties which more or less lead these movements from which they draw their present strength, their effective force, and their cadres, as Stalinist parties of the classic type, that is, primarily docile transmitting mechanisms for Kremlin directives, defending at any price the momentary interests of the Soviet bureaucracy. Every Stalinist party which finds itself caught up in a real revolutionary mass movement, is liable to deviate from such a road and to begin acting under the pressure of forces other than those of the Kremlin.

With regard to China and the Chinese Communist Party in particular, it is necessary to understand correctly the dynamics of this situation which likewise exerts influence on the Chinese Communist Party, dictating to it a course other than the one that the Kremlin either could or would wish to chart for it.

The attention of all our sections operating within the Asiatic countries in revolt and of the whole International, must be concentrated on assisting to the maximum degree the development of the tendency toward the autonomy of these movements in regard to the Kremlin and toward the democratic organization of the new power. In reality, the principal question which will determine the whole future evolution of the revolutions begun in these countries is that of the class character of the power and of its organization. The main task at the present time is to support and strengthen everywhere organisms based on the poor peasants and the proletariat, elected and functioning democratically, which will serve to accentuate the proletarian class character of the revolutions in progress and guarantee the consolidation and strengthening of the progressive conquests already realized.

Radical industrial transformations will necessarily take place slowly in these countries, all of which start with a very low level of productive forces and where a backward peasantry constitutes the enormous majority of the population. This consideration does not in every case exclude the possibility of limiting, halting, or postponing agrarian reform, which is the immediate central task in all these countries. It is inevitable, in China as well as in the other Asiatic countries, that even a proletarian power would engage in a NEP policy on a larger and more flexible scale than that which was needed in the USSR, on condition, however, that this power be definitely based on the democratic organization of the poor peasants and the proletariat, and that the state retains a series of key economic positions in heavy industry, the banking system, transport, and foreign trade.

Our sections in these countries must above all focus attention upon the democratic and proletarian nature which ought to be assumed

by the new power, favoring the extension of every democratic mass organism, the amplification of its functions, and the elimination from them of all kulak or bourgeois elements. The basic criticism which our sections should direct at the Stalinist leaderships pertains to the ambiguity left open by the theory of the "new democracy," relative to the class nature of the regimes which are being established in the Asiatic countries, and the whole practice of class collaboration which is being applied in the composition and above all in the leadership of the mass organs which are taking over the new power.

Our sections must combine unconditional defense of the Asiatic revolutions against imperialist attacks with a flexible and non-ultimatic policy toward the regimes in the course of establishment in these countries; this policy, while remaining intransigent on the class nature and democratic organization of the new power, will also take into consideration the objective difficulties in each one of the countries as well as the peasant problem which interfere with the rate and extent to which economic and social measures can be applied.

Instead of isolating themselves by criticism from outside the mass movement, our sections must integrate themselves in it as deeply as possible by engaging in constructive activity, adequately expressed in their program.

In countries like South Korea, Malaya, Burma, Viet-Nam, where a struggle for power is being waged, our sections will participate actively in this struggle, will advance their fundamental criticism concerning linking the purely military aspect of the war with a social program which will henceforth meet the needs of the poor peasants and the proletariat and will fulfill their democratic aspirations; any sacrifice of these demands in the name of maintaining the national unity of the anti-imperialist front can only benefit the native reactionary classes and the bureaucratic leadership of the movement, and will, in the long run, discourage the masses who are the main support of the war effort.

In countries like India, Indonesia, and Ceylon, which apparently have acquired their independence and where the native bourgeoisie governs directly, the struggle of our sections is essentially the same as in the imperialist countries. At the same time they must always take into account the fact that the bourgeoisie has proven itself incapable of solving the tasks of the democratic revolution and that agrarian reform, particularly in India, still remains to be accomplished.

Our metropolitan sections, conscious that the development of the anti-imperialist revolution in Asia actually constitutes the principal factor aggravating the disequilibrium of the capitalist world in general, will unconditionally support these revolutions and will mobilize the masses in their respective countries against every imperialist effort to prime an effective counter-offensive aimed at reconquering the fundamental sector of the colonial domain which is escaping from it.

Our Special Tasks

The Second World Congress of the International has emphasized that the development of our ideas and our organization in the colonial world ought to be one of our main concerns. The weakness of our means has not permitted us, however, to devote all the necessary efforts in this direction.

The theses of the World Congress still remain only a preface to our work and to our extension in the colonial field. Moreover, the establishment of a sub-secretariat in the Far East has been delayed up to the present through lack of technical and financial means.

Numerous signs indicate that a relatively rapid development is now open to us. But we will be able to harvest its fruits only on condition of realizing the efforts necessary for this purpose. That first of all implies the existence within the International of highly specialized bodies composed of experienced militants devoting themselves entirely to this task. A work of study and continuous elaboration is required by the numerous and very diverse problems raised by the peculiarities of the colonial lands. Mere repetition of the theory of the permanent revolution does not suffice. It is necessary to apply this theory to the special conditions of historical and social development and to existing reality.

The most important task consists in forming firm colonial cadres, armed not only with our general program but understanding above all how to apply this program in the given conditions of their countries. This work conditions the entire development of the International's action in the colonial field, which tends to convert it into a political force and the rallying center of the oppressed masses. The formation of the above-mentioned sub-secretariat will considerably contribute to this end.

The creation of a sub-secretariat in the Far East is, however great its difficulties of realization, more and more indispensable both for the future of our movement and of the revolutionary developments in Asia where the possibility of a crisis within Stalinism of decisive proportions is opening up. We ought to understand that in advance and prepare ourselves henceforth for the historical task which will fall upon us.

We ought to bring to bear all our forces to give genuine revolutionary Marxist support to the colonies for upon this will depend in the last analysis the fate of the revolution now in progress.

Our participation in the Congress of the Peoples is situated within this effort and is justified by the condition of the colonial movement, above all in the countries of the Middle East and Africa.

In these countries, contrary to what is happening in Asia, the treachery of reformism and of Stalinism which has stabbed the national movements in the back has led instead to notable ideological recession. These movements have been impelled to look for roads of emancipation outside aid from the proletarian revolution. Their nationalist character has been considerably accentuated. The leadership devotes themselves to diplomatic parleys, hoping to gain from

the disagreements amongst the imperialists. They cannot help viewing with considerable reservations and skepticism everyone who claims to be for socialism and communism.

In the present situation of acute crisis of revolutionary leadership -- that of the proletariat helping to engender that in the colonial movement -- the existence of an inter-colonial organization represents an undeniably progressive fact. From this viewpoint, the Congress of Peoples, despite its numerous weaknesses, is without doubt the broadest and most advanced anti-imperialist regrouping possible at this time. It seems difficult to go much further at the present stage.

The objectives we seek through our participation are as follows:

a. To enter into broader contact with all the colonial movements. To establish relations of cooperation within a single organization so as to facilitate reciprocal confidence. To demonstrate that the Fourth International is unconditionally on their side, that it is not only a proletarian tendency in the metropolitan countries, but also a tendency in the colonies, which even now disposes of colonial cadres and colonial organizations which are right on the firing line.

b. To frustrate any reformist or centrist attempts seeking to utilize the movement for its own aims which are foreign to the interests of the colonial peoples. To maintain the Congress on an anti-imperialist basis entirely free of equivocations.

c. To get into closest contact with groupings or individuals evolving to the left with the view to winning them over to the program of the International.

We emphasize that, in the existing relationship of forces within the workers' movement, we are fairly well represented within the leadership of the Congress. We ought not to try to make it adopt the whole of our program by means of a conference. That however should not prevent us from setting forth our program when that is useful. Too precipitate an action on our part would run the risk of aiding the development of forces seeking to break up this grouping.

One should not expect rapid results from our collaboration. What is involved is a work of long duration which even immediately can be the source of important new connections and of general propaganda for the program of our International in colonial circles.

#