

#2

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION BULLETIN

SEPTEMBER, 1950

CONTENTS

THE YUGOSLAV QUESTION

| | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| 1. Resolution on the Crisis of Stalinism and the Developments of the Yugoslav Revolution | 1 |
| 2. Resolutions on the Class Nature of Yugoslavia | 8 |
| 3. Draft Resolutions on the Development of the Yugoslav Revolution | 10 |

Note: This material is reprinted from the May-July, 1950, issue of "Quatrieme Internationale" and from the Internal Bulletin of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International for the information of our readers.

Published by the
SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
116 University Place
New York 3, N.Y.

RESOLUTION ON THE CRISIS OF STALINISM
AND THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE YUGOSLAV REVOLUTION

(Adopted by the 8th Session of the Executive Committee of the Fourth International, April 1950).

1. Almost two years after the break between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Cominform, signs of the expanding crisis of Stalinism are multiplying the world over and the general tendencies in the development of this crisis can be more clearly defined.

A new period has been opened in the development of the international labor movement. A correct analysis ought to aid intervention in the objective process to crystallize the new revolutionary forces arising from this crisis of Stalinism on a political platform permitting the reconstruction of a powerful Marxist revolutionary international movement.

2. For the first time since the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union and the Third International, it is possible, thanks to new objective conditions, to extend the front of the Marxist revolutionary vanguard and reconstruct the international revolutionary movement on a broad scale.

The fundamental cause permitting such a development at the present time resides in the historical combination of the aggravation of the disequilibrium and crisis of the capitalist system with the aggravation of the crisis of Stalinism in the new conditions created by the Second World War.

Before this, capitalism and Stalinism had attained a relative equilibrium in which they reciprocally reinforced each other. The overturn provoked by the war on an international scale, the upsetting of equilibrium on all levels, the entrance into action or the revolutionary ferment of tremendous masses both in Europe and Asia and in other parts of the world have created a situation of such dynamism that neither capitalism nor the Soviet bureaucracy can effectively control it.

On the contrary, this new situation is basically developing as much against capitalism as against the Soviet bureaucracy. Actually both represent reactionary historical forces at odds with the present dictates of history which can be summarized in the following fashion: the necessity for a rational and harmonious organization of international economic and social life which respects the freedom of the masses in each nation and in the relations of nations with each other.

3. Contrary to the pessimistic theories developed under the influence of the features of social degradation and barbarism inherent in the contradictions of the capitalist system and its advanced decay, and of the so-called omnipotent Stalinist bureaucracy, our international movement bases its revolutionary perspectives and orients its action on the supremacy of the objective revolutionary process in our epoch and its dynamism; on the impossibility of the Soviet bureaucracy to expand and consolidate its control over the ascending revolutionary movement which is constantly nourished by the

objective process. This attitude is fully confirmed today by the various manifestations of the crisis of Stalinism which we witness.

4. In the capitalist countries of Europe and America, as well as in the countries of the buffer zone and Asia, the overt or potential crisis of Stalinism is caused in the last analysis by the fact that the direct and absolute control that the Kremlin aims to exercise to serve the exclusive interests of the Soviet bureaucracy runs headlong into the breadth, dynamism and experience of the mass movement which has known no decisive defeat and no diminution of its international importance since the war.

This fundamental conflict between the reactionary interests of the Soviet bureaucracy (and the bureaucratic means with which it defends them by misusing the labor movement) on the one hand and the free development of the mass movement on the other acquires specific forms in the three categories of countries above-mentioned.

5. In the capitalist countries of Europe and America the crisis of Stalinism manifests itself by the discontent (especially since 1948) of the masses towards the Communist Party or by the loss of blind confidence in the Stalinist leadership. The discontent is chiefly illustrated by the results of all the elections since that date which indicate the stagnation, the retreat and sometimes even the crumbling of certain Communist parties. The loss of trade union positions and influence and the reduction in the income and circulation of the Communist Party press are no less indicative of their widespread weakening in these countries.

This discontent which especially affects the petty-bourgeois clientele of the Communist Party is due on one side to an objective factor: the relative improvement of the economic situation after the Marshall Plan and in a general way to the change in relationship of forces favoring the bourgeoisie in the countries in question; and on the other side, to a subjective factor: the policy followed by the Communist parties since the liquidation of the war.

This policy has been imposed in basic contradiction with the development of the objective situation. It was opportunist and rightist between 1944-1946, at a moment when the potentiality and even the revolutionary action of the masses had attained their culminating point. It became adventurist and sectarian in its methods beginning with 1947 at a time when the revolutionary action of the masses was clearly subsiding owing to a relative improvement in the economic conjuncture and to their distrust of the Stalinist leadership because its preceding opportunist and rightist course had spoiled the exceptional revolutionary opportunities existing at the end of the war.

In both cases the policy of the CP leaderships was subordinated to the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy and its relations with imperialism.

But, contrary to what happened before the war when the passivity and even the prostration of the workers' movement (following the defeats it had experienced) favored the maintenance of the bureaucratic grip upon it, at present the heightened level on which the revo-

lutionary potentiality and activity of the proletariat and colonial masses operate, permit the masses to go through a critical experience with Stalinism and to mature their understanding at each of its opportunist turns.

6. In the buffer zone countries the discontent of the masses with Stalinism is the result of a direct experience with Stalinism in power.

This experience began following the entry of the Red Army into these countries and the bureaucratic strangling of the revolutionary upsurge which occurred at this time. It then passed through the haphazard bureaucratic installation in power of the Stalinist apparatus and its control over the country's economy, which, while eliminating the bourgeoisie from its economic and political positions, worsened the working conditions of the masses by depriving them of any possibility of democratic organization and expression.

In these countries the masses react against the bureaucratic and police regime propped up mainly by the Soviet bureaucracy by a passive opposition. That prevents them from following docilely in the wake of government policy and creates supplementary difficulties for the solution of the problems facing the "People's Democracies."

7. But by far the most important manifestations of the crisis of Stalinism in these countries have been constituted by the trials and purges hitting the leading circles of the Communist parties themselves.

The trials staged at Tirana, Budapest, Sofia have beheaded the CP's of these countries and deprived them of a series of those leading elements most closely linked with the rank and file of these parties and to the revolutionary movement they directed during the war.

On the other hand, a spreading purge has already profoundly disorganized the Communist parties of all the "People's Democracies," especially those which represent a real force: the Bulgarian CP, the Czechoslovak CP, the Polish CP.

In the Bulgarian CP alone, more than 40 first rank leaders of this party, among them the leaders who were most popular because of their activities during the war, as well as 12 members of the Central Committee elected in 1948 at the Fifth Congress, have recently been excluded.

The purge campaign, actively led by men in the pay of the Kremlin, is developed around the theme of the struggle against "nationalist" deviations, which consist in doubting the "progressive" role of the bureaucracy and even opposing the control they exercise over these countries, and in having confidence in the internal forces of these countries alone.

8. What we really have here is the manifestation of a new aspect of the crisis of Stalinism in countries where circumstances have enabled the CP to take power which opens new perspectives on the evolution and the future of Stalinism in general.

This aspect is no less confirmed by the break of the Yugoslav CP with the Kremlin as well as by what is actually happening in the Communist parties of other "People's Democracies" (especially those which have independent strength). It resides in the tendency manifested by Communist parties in power which possess a real force of their own to free themselves from the tutelage of Moscow and to act in an independent manner.

This movement into which the Communist parties are dragged is to be explained by the conflict between the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy and the independent interests of the masses in each country; the Kremlin's policy of exploitation which increases the difficulties encountered by the Communist parties in administering the economy and policy of these countries and hampers their free development; in the fact that the Communist parties, directly responsible for governing these countries, are submitted to the pressure of the masses and can no longer act as before as simple transmission agencies for the directives of the Kremlin without running the risk of being totally deprived of mass support.

To cope with the menace represented by this tendency to liberate itself from its control, the Kremlin destroys the Communist parties as organisms in any way independent and replaces them by apparatuses of functionaries directly under its command.

The Kremlin finds it impossible to adopt a more flexible tactic or to maneuver with more elasticity, because of the bureaucratic monolithism of its system and thus aggravates the crisis.

Such is the meaning of the events characterizing the situation in all the "People's Democracies" and their respective Communist parties.

In the absence of favorable subjective conditions analogous to those in Yugoslavia, the crisis in the buffer zone countries unfolds in a long convulsive process, trial succeeding trial and purge succeeding purge, without the possible prospect in the immediate future of an assemblage of all the factors necessary for victorious resistance to the Kremlin and detachment from its reactionary grip. However, through this crisis an understanding of the counter-revolutionary role of Stalinism amongst the masses in the buffer countries and in the world as a whole will rapidly ripen.

9. In the Asiatic countries in revolt, Stalinism seems to be passing through an ascending phase, since the colonial masses confuse Mao's victory with a victory for Stalinism.

In reality the organic development of the colonial revolutions now sweeping Asia contains a dynamism which goes essentially contrary to the possibility for Stalinism, that is to say, the Soviet bureaucracy, to identify itself with these movements, to strangle them and to use them exclusively for its own interests. The recent events in the Japanese CP are an index of the latent crisis in the Communist parties in the Asiatic countries.

The crisis of Stalinism in Asia is still latent, but it is inevitable. It resides in the specific development of the Communist

parties of China, Viet-Nam and other Asiatic countries in revolt which have been carried by the very dynamism of the revolutionary mass movement they direct far from the objectives and direct control of the Kremlin. For our movement that implies theoretical and practical considerations which are summarized in the Resolution on the Development of the Colonial Revolutions in Asia.

10. All these manifestations of the general crisis of Stalinism are now dominated by the significance of the development of the Yugoslav revolution. The break of the Yugoslav CP with the Cominform has facilitated the emergence of currents of criticism in all these Communist parties, especially in Europe, which affect even the top leadership.

The repercussions of the Yugoslav affair have already deeply dislocated the German CP, especially in Western Germany, as well as leading elements in the Spanish CP.

In Austria, Greece, France, Italy, the ostensible results of the Yugoslav affair are less spectacular for the moment, but the ferment exists and will open the way for the formation of opposition, and for the emergence of critical currents which are possible for the first time in a long while in these parties.

11. But the major aspect of the Yugoslav affair at the moment is the progressive evolution of the Yugoslav CP itself, resulting from the split, an evolution which potentially contains the greatest opportunity since the Russian Revolution for the rebirth of the international workers' movement on a revolutionary Marxist plane.

Confirming the declaration made by our International upon the outbreak of the Yugoslav affair that the rupture of a Stalinist party with the Kremlin necessarily involves a differentiation from Stalinism, which under certain conditions can be highly progressive, the Yugoslav CP has pursued a course which two years after the break surpasses the most optimistic forecasts.

The ideological advances registered by the Yugoslav CP and the corresponding achievements in Yugoslavia demonstrate the depth of the revolutionary movement which bore this party to power and the remarkable qualities of its leading cadres. This progress has been all the more considerable since it has been achieved in an international situation where the enormous pressure of both imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy is directed against the Yugoslav revolution while aid from the international working class still remains quite weak.

12. The general feature of the evolution of the Yugoslav CP and of Yugoslavia consists in an ever more clear and powerful affirmation (in the field of ideas and of the political and economic organization of the country) of the highly democratic essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat which carries on a persevering struggle against bureaucratic degeneration.

To the degree that the Yugoslav CP persists along this road and, by ridding itself of the last ideological vestiges of Stalinism, it will renew the organic bonds between the unfolding Yugoslav and world revolutions, that will entail the regrouping of revolutionary forces

on an international scale and it will become the most powerful springboard from which to launch the decisive assault against Stalinism in its crisis.

Such an evolution will on the other hand facilitate the organization of the new Communist opposition arising in the Stalinist parties and with which it is possible to envisage the construction in the near future of revolutionary Marxist formations for an entire series of countries.

13. The revolutionary proletarian vanguard character of our International enabled it to adopt from the very first, alone among all other currents of the workers' movements, a correct and effective attitude toward the rupture of the Yugoslav CP with the Cominform and the evolution of this party.

Thanks to the correct theoretical understanding of Stalinism possessed by our movement, it was able from the beginning to grasp the meaning of the break and to engage in wholehearted action in defense of the Yugoslav revolution.

Far surpassing all other tendencies in understanding the crisis of Stalinism, tendencies which for lack of a serious theoretical basis have displayed the greatest confusion and sectarianism on this matter, our movement has demonstrated in deeds that it is more sensitive to the really revolutionary tendencies emerging from diverse experiences in the mass movement and that it is also capable of learning from the latter as well as adopting an attitude towards them designed to facilitate their advance toward the fundamental positions of revolutionary Marxism.

14. The evolution of the Yugoslav affair which has objectively raised the prestige of Trotskyism in the eyes of the international revolutionary vanguard by demonstrating the historical correctness of its program has likewise enabled us to promote in action our own education regarding the attitude to follow toward progressive movements of the masses, to get a better understanding of the specific stages through which the development of a current of Stalinist origin must pass, and to deliver the most effective blows to the manifestations of sectarianism in our own ranks.

From this viewpoint the evolution of the Yugoslav revolution has fertilized and continues to fertilize the theory and practice of our movement.

15. Underscoring the results already obtained by the action in defense of the Yugoslav revolution of our sections in a number of countries, our International will intensify its efforts in this central campaign it is conducting throughout the world, conscious that in this way it works best under present conditions to give a revolutionary outcome to the crisis of Stalinism and to open the way for the reconstruction of the revolutionary Marxist movement.

To surround the Yugoslav revolution with a widespread and active sympathy by the international revolutionary vanguard and the conscious segment of the working class means to facilitate the existence and progressive evolution of the most important hearth of revolution at

the present time; it means to further promote and regroup the new Communist opposition fermenting in the Communist Party, stimulated precisely by the Yugoslav example.

16. Our sections will make the broadest possible united front with all organizations, groups, or proletarian currents, which agree and have an analogous interest in the defense of the Yugoslav revolution.

It will maintain, amplify and complete the present forms of its campaign, as follows: publish through its press and publications and by the circulation of the Yugoslav CP publications the truth about the Yugoslav revolution, its development, its achievements.

It will maintain, amplify and lead the campaign against the lies of the Kremlin and the Cominform and demand that the economic blockade against Yugoslavia be raised; it will oppose any other hostile action which will be undertaken to extinguish and crush this revolutionary hearth; it will continue to expose the real peril that a compromise between imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy will effect at the expense of Yugoslavia and the hostile action and various pressures the imperialists already direct against Yugoslavia with the aim to subjugate it; it will amplify in factories, trade unions and progressive intellectual circles, movements for the sending of delegations and brigades to Yugoslavia and for their propaganda campaigns upon their return.

It will link the Yugoslav revolutionary movement to the international movement by common actions and united front agreements on such levels as the defense of trade union democracy, reestablishment of world trade union unity, international workers' solidarity, unity of progressive intellectuals, students, women, etc.

17. Having conquered in a small country which is economically and culturally backward and with a peasant majority, and which is squeezed between imperialism and the Kremlin, the Yugoslav revolution will experience difficulties in reaching higher levels by means of its own forces and its own dynamism if it remains isolated for a long time without active support from the international proletariat.

From this viewpoint, only the joining with the world revolution will insure its constant progress and socialist expansion.

Meanwhile, it is the duty of the international revolutionary vanguard to come to its aid on all planes and to understand that its responsibilities are not less than those of the Yugoslav Communist Party so far as the future fate of the Yugoslav revolution is concerned.

#

RESOLUTIONS ON THE CLASS NATURE OF YUGOSLAVIA

(Presented at the 8th Session of the Executive Committee of the Fourth International, April 1950)

Resolution adopted (Passed by 8 votes against 3): Although there are different appraisals of the stages in the development of the Yugoslav revolution, the Eighth Plenum considers that because of the victory of the proletarian revolution in Yugoslavia, a workers' state and a regime of the proletarian dictatorship exists in this country; observes that, in the special conditions of the Yugoslav revolution, bureaucratic deformations continue in this state; declares that a serious struggle is being conducted by the Yugoslav Communists against these deformations. Our campaign for the defense of Yugoslavia ought to be concretised along these lines. The discussion will continue on the appraisal of the stages of the Yugoslav revolution, including the present stage.

Resolution rejected (Rejected by 8 votes against 2 with one abstention):

1. The IEC states that Tito's Yugoslavia is a capitalist state reconstructed after the strangling of the Yugoslav proletariat revolution by Tito, his bureaucracy, his party and his regime, against the working masses who have pushed and are still pushing for the constitution of a dual power in their struggle for the creation of their Soviet state.

2. The IEC declares that the Titoist Communist Party of Yugoslavia rejects on principle Trotskyism, the world proletarian revolution, proletarian internationalism and the revolutionary proletarian International, and that its entire policy functions in practice on the fundamental basis of "Yugoslav socialism in one country." The anti-Stalinist criticism of the PCY and the apparently leftist words and deeds of its leadership should not deceive the sections of the Fourth International and the masses regarding the fundamentally national "communist" line, that is to say, anti-revolutionary, anti-Trotskyist, and anti-socialist line of Tito's party, his bureaucracy, his government, and his Yugoslavia.

It is illusory to think that Tito's party is "a force developing along the road of Leninism" or that either he or his regime can consciously facilitate and promote the proletarian revolution in Yugoslavia. The Fourth International, by its program, has the duty to pursue a revolutionary policy. The IEC consequently rejects illusions of this kind and places all comrades on guard against their anti-revolutionary consequences.

3. The IEC declares that it is necessary to exploit the crisis of Stalinism over the Yugoslav question for the construction of a proletarian class party. The sections of the Fourth International should not, however, support Tito's regime or his party, but ought to call upon the working masses of all countries

(a) to support the workers and poor peasants of Yugoslavia in their struggle for the right of proletarian democratic self-determination, the power to decide freely their own fate as well as their state existence, and in their struggle for the constitution of proletarian democracy, that is to say, of the Soviet state in Yugoslavia;

(b) to support the popular masses of Yugoslavia in their struggle for national independence.

They should also give them this support against the world bourgeoisie as well as against the Kremlin bureaucracy and the "Popular Democracies," while always taking account of the fact that the main struggle ought always to be directed against the world bourgeoisie. Starting from this fundamental orientation, they ought also to support the regime and the bureaucracy of Tito.

#

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV REVOLUTION

Resolution No. 1 -- presented by Gabriel (5 votes for; 4 against; 2 abstentions).

1. The Eighth Plenum of the IEC believes that in view of the progress of the discussion in the International on the question of Yugoslavia, that the orientation to which our sections have more and more been turning in favor of the defense of Yugoslavia, permits and even obliges settling the question of the class character of Yugoslavia without further delay.

2. Even before the break of the CPY with the Cominform, the International tended to consider the case of Yugoslavia as not being absolutely identical with that of the rest of the buffer zone and on several occasions since 1943 had taken note of the revolutionary character of the mass movement which lifted the CPY to power as well as the scope of the economic and social transformations which marked the life of the country between 1944-48.

After the break, special attention was given the case of Yugoslavia, and in the resolution of the Seventh Plenum on the buffer zone the analysis made of this country should have logically led to the conclusion that Yugoslavia, even before the break, had ceased to be a capitalist country. However, the International, restrained by considerations bearing on the buffer zone as a whole, hesitated to place the proper value on the specific characteristics of the Yugoslav case and to draw from them at the time the radical conclusions which were incumbent on it.

3. The revolutionary mass movement which arose back during the war in Yugoslavia and was led by the CPY, played the role fundamentally of a proletarian revolution which progressively undermined the former state apparatus of the bourgeoisie and radically transformed the relations of capitalist property.

The CPY was carried to power by this revolutionary mass movement to which it has remained constantly connected.

The fluctuations experienced by the Yugoslav Revolution in its development, and particularly the interim of the agreement and the Tito-Shubasitch government, is to be explained principally by the pressure exercised jointly by imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy between 1944-45 upon the leadership of the CPY which was still strongly influenced by its Stalinist training.

4. The completion of the revolution begun during the war in Yugoslavia is situated in the period 1946-48, during which there was achieved the replacement of the old state apparatus by one based on Committees as the sole organs of power over the entire territory, as well as by the radical transformation of property relations.

Far from the period of 1946-48 being one of inertia or prostration in practice of the masses and the committees, it was on the contrary a period of the accomplishment of the revolution, the CPY maintaining and strengthening its ties with the masses precisely through the accomplishments of the revolution.

This is what explains the break to the left which occurred in 1948 with the Cominform and the Kremlin, and the victorious resistance organized at the time by the CPY with the unreserved support of the masses.

5. The break permitted the victorious Yugoslav Revolution to rise to higher levels, characterized above all by the more and more conscious struggle undertaken since then against the danger of the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution through the broadening of socialist democracy.

Yugoslavia, as a workers' state and a regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat even before the break, is evolving under the objective and subjective conditions created by the break towards the constant broadening of socialist democracy, of the active and effective participation of the masses in the management of the state and of the economy.

This evolution more and more eradicates the bureaucratic deformations of this state which were created before the break when the pressure of the Soviet bureaucracy, exercised through the apparatus of the CPY itself characterized by its Stalinist training, limited the organization and the democratic development of the masses.

6. However, this progressive evolution which is reflected in the ideological sphere as well as in the economic and social measures taken since the break, has objective limitations inherent in the isolated character of the Yugoslav revolution in a small backward country with a peasant majority. In the event that the dynamic of the international revolutionary movement proves incapable in the years to come of easing or even of breaking the enormous pressure now being jointly exercised on proletarian Yugoslavia by the Soviet bureaucracy and imperialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country can begin a new descent into bureaucratic retrogression which will rapidly endanger its very class character.

Hence it is the duty of the international revolutionary vanguard not to stand aside and separate itself from the Yugoslav revolution but to consider it as a phase in the realization of the world revolution and to regard its destiny as organically connected with the progress of the world revolution.

* * *

Resolution No. 2 -- presented by Germain (1 vote for; 7 against; 2 abstentions).

1. The events which have occurred in Yugoslavia since the split between the Kremlin and the CPY, require the International to revise its analysis of the class character of the Yugoslav state. There is no need to make this revision retroactive but on the contrary it can be based on new developments in this country since the inauguration of the blockade by the "Cominformist" countries and the Rajk trial. Fundamentally, these developments consist of a mobilization of the Yugoslav working masses by the CPY for the defense and completion of the conquests of a proletarian revolution. This completion is con-

firmed by the following facts:

(a) The state structure has come to be genuinely based on the people's committees. The functioning of these committees is contrasted to their inertia in practice between 1945 and 1948. Since 1948 the leaders of the CPY themselves have been re-evaluating the significance and the role of these committees in the field of practice as well as on the theoretical plane.

(b) Workers' control over the management of industrial enterprises is beginning to be instituted on the initiative of the CPY, and a great degree of control and even of direct management by the masses is being introduced into the farm cooperatives.

2. These measures, which are being carried out under conditions of a new revolutionary upsurge, more deepgoing than that of the partisan war both in the number of workers participating and in the level of socialist consciousness of the masses involved, have been accompanied by a tendency toward the democratization of all social life which manifests itself in the following manner:

(a) By the relaxation of bureaucratic control over the political thinking of the communist militants and the advanced workers in general, by the creation of an atmosphere of free discussion within the communist movement, resulting in the evolution of the political regime in Yugoslavia toward genuine proletarian democracy.

(b) By important economic measures (decentralization of industry), political measures (real participation of the masses in the organs of power), and ideological measures (speeches and articles of the CPY) taken against the danger of bureaucratism which, in the tradition of the ideas of Lenin and Trotsky on this question, is recognized as a social danger inherent in every workers' state.

(c) By important reforms in the field of education, cultural and artistic life, etc., where there has been manifested a will to reject regimentation of the Stalinist type.

Consequently, it is the duty of the Fourth International, in conformity with all these facts, to characterize the Yugoslav state as a non-degenerated workers' state (dictatorship of the proletariat). Important bureaucratic deformations remain, due above all to the backward character of the country and to its narrow material base, but also due to the past and to the remnants of Stalinism in the theory and practice of the CPY.

3. The special conditions in which the proletarian revolution in Yugoslavia has triumphed flow from the peculiar historic conditions existing in the country for 10 years, namely:

(a) The physical and social destruction of the major section of the former propertied classes during the partisan war and the civil war of 1941-44;

(b) The establishment of an international relationship of forces between the classes and between imperialism and the soviet bureaucracy

which precluded the success of any intervention by the international bourgeoisie against the Yugoslav revolution;

(c) The fact that the only factor which arrested this revolution on the threshold of its final victory in 1944-45 was the counter-revolutionary intervention of the Soviet bureaucracy.

(d) The fact that during the years 1945-48, no bureaucracy succeeded in detaching itself from the Yugoslav proletariat and poor peasantry as a distinct and separate caste, possessing important social privileges and subordinating the defense of the revolutionary conquests to the defense of these parasitic privileges.

For all these reasons, the completion of the proletarian revolution in Yugoslavia, that is to say, the transformation of the workers' and peasants' government into a dictatorship of the proletariat under conditions of the complete prostration of the former ruling classes, has taken peculiar forms different from those of a "classical" completion of the proletarian revolution in opposition to a bourgeois state which is not degenerated from the viewpoint of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the events which have unfolded in Yugoslavia since 1948 embody profound social transformations on all planes (state, economy, social relations, ideology, customs, jurisprudence, culture, etc.), much more profound in any case than anything witnessed in any other European country since the October Revolution, and in this sense fully justifies their characterization as a completed social revolution.

4. This definition of present-day Yugoslavia is entirely in accord with the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state. The International correctly characterized the state apparatus of the other countries of the buffer zone which did not emerge from a proletarian revolution as a hybrid state apparatus still coming within the purview of the definition of bourgeois states, degenerated from the viewpoint of the bourgeoisie, while characterizing the tendency of the evolution of these countries as that of structural assimilation to the USSR. This peculiar character of the state apparatus of the other countries of the buffer zone expresses itself in the purely administrative and bureaucratic merger of the old state structure with the fiction of new state forms. From the beginning Yugoslavia took a different road as a result of the radical destruction of the old state structure in the course of the civil war. The Yugoslav state between 1945 and 1948 can be characterized as a peculiar form of dual power in which the recreated old forms of power were progressively emptied of all content because of the disappearance of the former ruling classes, while the new forms remain fictitious in the absence of real participation of the masses. It is the transformation of these new forms (committees) from fictional to real ones which has led to a disappearance in fact of all functions of the vestiges of the old state structure rebuilt in 1944-45, and which constitutes the dialectical "leap" transforming Yugoslavia into a dictatorship of the proletariat. This transformation was possible only through a new and powerful upsurge of the activity of the masses, confirming thereby again the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state.

5. The revolutionary transformation effected in Yugoslavia since the break with the Kremlin could take place in so rapid and radical a

fashion thanks only to the leading role played by the CPY in this process. In retrospect, it must be recognized that since 1941 this party has not been a Stalinist party in the accepted sense of the word, servilely subordinating the interests of the Yugoslav proletariat to those of the Kremlin. Because of the influx of the revolutionary masses into this party during the partisan war and because of the ideological evolution of the leaders of this party, the CPY, beginning with the civil war in Yugoslavia, became transformed into a party which attempted to find a compromise in its policy between the interests of the Yugoslav socialist revolution and these of the Soviet bureaucracy. This evolution of the CPY caused a differentiation within its ranks, a right wing (Zuyovich and Hebrang) tending to represent the defense of the interests of the Kremlin in the CPY, and the rest of the leadership tending objectively to represent the interests of the Yugoslav proletariat as against the Kremlin. With the break in 1948, this transformation was completed on the objective plane. Beginning with this time, the PCY, no longer represents a party which, like other reformist and Stalinist organizations, serves social interests other than those of the proletariat (like the trade union bureaucracy of the capitalist countries or the Soviet bureaucracy), but a party which objectively attempts to represent the interests of the proletariat of its country. The ideological transformation which is still in process, like all development of consciousness, lags behind the objective process which it reflects and can still go through several intermediary stages.

6. In the light of the position that the Fourth International is now adopting towards the problem of the class character of the Yugoslav state, it is obliged to submit its past analysis of Yugoslavia to a thoroughgoing self-criticism. This self-criticism should cover the following ground:

(a) An underestimation of the scope of the revolutionary movement of the masses and the transformations produced by it in that country between 1943-45. Although this factor was singled out on several occasions in official documents of the International (article in Quatrieme Internationale at the end of 1943, Russian Theses of the Third Congress of the PCI, 1946), the necessary conclusions were not drawn from it and the International continued to regard the buffer zone as a unit without injecting into its official documents the fundamental difference between Yugoslavia and the other countries, a difference flowing from the fundamentally different character of the origin of the CPY's state power.

(b) A lack of understanding of the specific character of the CPY which, both by its role during the civil war and by its composition, was demarcated from the beginning from the other communist parties of the buffer zone and of the rest of Europe.

The International's lack of understanding of these two phenomena prevented it from foreseeing the Yugoslav developments in the way they occurred. Although the International unceasingly defended the thesis of the instability of the Soviet bureaucracy and of Stalinism, and the inevitable differentiation in the Communist parties in conditions of revolutionary upsurge, it always envisaged this differentiation as occurring against the leaderships of the national CP's and did not

foresee the possibility of a differentiation between a CP as a whole and the Kremlin. The cause of this lack of information is not to be sought in theoretical inadequacy, but rather in a lack of information and of a deepgoing analysis of the specific Yugoslav phenomena. The lesson which should be learned from this experience is that political analyses should above all be specific and concrete, keeping in mind in each case the peculiarities of national development, and that all substitution of such specific analyses by general formulas paralyzes the elaboration of a correct political line.

The fact however that the International, as the only tendency of the workers' movement, has from the beginning of the Yugoslav affair been able to take a correct position towards it, and that it alone has been able to understand the historic significance of the break between the CPY and the Kremlin is a confirmation that, despite errors of particular analysis, the general line of the International has been correct, and especially its understanding of Stalinism and of its relations with the proletariat have been brilliantly confirmed. That is why the necessary self-criticism coincides perfectly with our general programmatic conceptions and reinforces their unique validity as the only basis of revolutionary policy in the world today.

7. The future of the Yugoslav workers' state and of the CPY depends fundamentally on the action of the international proletariat and of its revolutionary vanguard in their behalf. Only constant and unceasing aid of the international proletariat to Yugoslavia will permit the CPY to arrive at positions of proletarian internationalism. Only an international extension of the Yugoslav revolution will definitively assure its material bases and its evolution in the direction of socialist proletarian democracy. The possibility of a bureaucratic retrogression of the Yugoslav revolution, in the event of the isolation of this revolution and a retreat of the international workers' movement, is nevertheless limited. Conditions for such a retreat would rather rapidly lead to the crushing of workers' Yugoslavia between Wall Street and the Kremlin.

#