

Ibrahim al-Abid

QUESTIONS

AND ANSWERS  
ON THE  
ARAB  
CONFLICT

127



127 Questions and Answers  
on the Arab Israeli Conflict



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on  
The Arab Israeli Conflict

by  
Ibrahim Al-Abid

Palestine Research Center  
Beirut

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## FOREWORD

The author of this book, in collaboration with a number of researchers, has gone through hundreds of books and articles written by Zionists and has drawn from them questions which have appeared in Zionist writings as either allegations or queries. At the same time an investigation involving dozens of Arab students studying at European and American universities has been carried out and the questions they said they had been asked have been collected. Consequently, the questions included in this book are those which are most likely to be raised in any discussion over the Palestine case with a foreigner.

The answers to these questions are based on facts and they have been written in a calm and balanced style which avoids emotionalism. When drawing up most of these answers, the author has made use of well-known sources to which he has made clear references so that the reader may consult them when necessary. The answers do not so much represent a specific point of view as express the views of the Palestine National Movement in general.

The book does not pretend to be the first or the only one of its kind, for it has been preceded by more than one attempt in the same field. However, the field is still open for further attempts to answer questions that have not been included in previous books and to provide stronger and clearer answers to others. Moreover, work of this kind needs revision and amendment from time to time because the convincing refutation of such questions requires the renewal of the answers and the putting forward of new facts as further research brings them to light.

This is the reason behind a new, revised edition of the book appearing in August 1971. A number of questions have been deleted, several questions added. Most of the answers have been either rewritten, revised or amended.

Ibrahim Al-Abid

Unless otherwise indicated, content and reference footnotes to quotations appearing in this book are those which appeared in the original text quoted.

## CHAPTER I

### THE ARAB CHARACTER OF PALESTINE

#### 1. DO JEWS HAVE A DIVINE RIGHT TO PALESTINE?

Professor Alfred Guillaume, formerly a Professor of Old Testament Studies at the University of London, carefully examined this question in an article entitled 'Zionists and the Bible':<sup>(1)</sup>

The first explicit promise of Palestine to the descendants of Abraham was at Schechem (now Nablus) in Genesis 12:7: 'Unto thy seed will I give this land.' Ch. 13:15, when Abraham is standing on a hill near Bèthel, has the words: 'all the land which thou seest to thee will I give it and to thy seed for ever.' Ch. 15:8 is more explicit: 'Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates.' The promises are repeated to Isaac; and to Jacob in 28:12: 'The land wheron thou liest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed, and thy seed shall be as the dust of the earth and thou shalt spread abroad to the west, and to the east, and to the north, and to the south; and in thee and in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed.' When Abraham made a covenant with God through circumcision (17:8), all the land of Canaan was promised to him as 'an everlasting possession'.

In the same article Professor Guillaume refutes the claim that these promises were made exclusively to the Jews:

Now it is generally supposed that these promises were made to the Jews, and to the Jews alone. But that is not what the Bible says. The word 'to thy seed' inevitably includes Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, who can claim descent from Abraham through his son Ishamel. Ishmael was the reputed father of a large number of Arab tribes, and Genesis records that Abraham became the father of many North African tribes through his concubine Keturah. It cannot be argued that the words of

<sup>(1)</sup> Alfred Guillaume, 'Zionists and the Bible', *Christians, Zionism and Palestine* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970), pp. 3-4.

Genesis 21:10-12, necessarily cancel the promises made to Abraham's seed as a whole: 'Sarah said to Abraham, Cast out this bondwoman and her son; for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son Isaac. And the thing was very grievous in Abraham's sight on account of his son. And God said Unto Abraham, Let it not be grievous in thy sight because of the lad, and because of the bondwoman; in all that Sarah saith unto thee, hearken unto her voice: for in Isaac shall seed be called unto thee. And also of the son of the bondwoman will I make a nation, because he is thy seed'. Moreover, when the covenant of circumcision was made with Abraham (Gen. 17) and the land of Canaan was promised as 'an everlasting possession', it was Ishmael who was circumcised; Isaac had not then been born.

## 2. DO JEWS HAVE A HISTORICAL RIGHT TO PALESTINE?

Moshe Menuhin writes:

More than four thousand years ago, as we know through . . . biblical narratives, the Canaanites<sup>(2)</sup> lived in Palestine. Some of today's Palestinian Arabs, who are now exiled refugees living in tents and huts in camps outside the borders of their homeland, stem from these ancient Canaanites, who were a sort of blending of earlier Semites, Indo-Aryans and Hittite conquerors and settlers. These Canaanites built cities and palaces, used horses and chariots, and built temples and shrines adorned with idols. They worshiped nature. The great storm-god was their lord of gods and creator of mankind. Their homes were well built and well drained, something unique at that time. The Canaanites who survived the wars of conquest of the early Israelites watched their conquerors win and lose their Promised Land twice over. They watched . . . two 'ingatherings' 'redemptions' of the Promised Land, while minding their own business as peasants, workers and slaves.<sup>(3)</sup> Some of the Canaanites undoubtedly embraced Judaism. Others, later on, in the early stages of Christianity, embraced the new religion. And when Mohammed swept out of Arabia to conquer the world and convert everybody (except the Jews and Christians, the people of the Scriptures) to Islam at the point of the sword, most of the natives of Palestine em-

<sup>(2)</sup> 'The Canaanites had been established in Palestine since the Neolithic period and were descended from tribes of Semitic stock whose original cradle was, according to theories generally accepted in the scientific world, in the Arabian Peninsula'. Seminar of Arab Jurists on Palestine, *The Palestine Question* (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968), p. 17.

<sup>(3)</sup> 'The Hebrew tribes did not enter Palestine until the 13th or 14th century BC when, under the leadership of Joshua, they conquered certain parts of it. . . Historically, therefore, the ancient Hebrews were not born in Palestine. And when they did come to Palestine for a brief period of time, they never occupied the whole of what is now Israel. The coastal plain remained in the hands of the Philistines, who gave it their name (Palestine)'. Seminar of Arab Jurists on Palestine, *ibid.*

braced Islam to form one united Arab people, beginning in the seventh century C.E. Thus we have the Arabs of Palestine, the predominant population of the country since those days.

Some Arabs, during the period of the Crusades' expeditions, the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, embraced Christianity. Thus the Christian Arabs of Palestine, since medieval times.<sup>(4)</sup>

### 3. IS A CLAIM BASED ON A POSSESSION WHICH CAME TO AN END TWO THOUSAND YEARS AGO STILL VALID?

If such a claim were valid, then Mexico would be justified in claiming certain areas of the United States, the Spaniards justified in claiming Mexico, and the Arabs justified in claiming Spain which they occupied and ruled for a longer period than did the Jews in Palestine. According to this logic, the United States should be given back to the North American Indians. H.G. Wells, English writer and popular historian, said in this connection: 'If it is proper to "reconstitute" a Jewish state which has not existed for two thousand years, why not go back another thousand years, and reconstitute the Canaanite state?'<sup>(5)</sup> The Canaanites, unlike the Jews, continued to be there all through history.

### 4. WAS PALESTINE 'A LAND WITHOUT PEOPLE' WHEN THE WAVES OF ZIONIST IMMIGRATION Poured INTO IT?

The first modern census of Palestine was undertaken by the British on December 31, 1922. According to that census, Palestine was not unpopulated. Its inhabitants numbered 757,182 persons of whom 83,794 were Jews, mostly European immigrants (or their descendants) who had come to Palestine in the 19th century. An earlier census, taken in 1914 by the Turks, and included in the introductory chapter to the official *Census of Palestine, 1922* (Jerusalem), showed that the population of Palestine was at that time 689,272 persons, of whom there were a maximum 60,000 Jews.<sup>(6)</sup> It is worth noting that the estimate

<sup>(4)</sup> Moshe Menuhin, *The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time* (New York: Exposition Press, 1965), p.7. For further details on the Arab character of Palestine see: Nevill Barbour, *Nisi Dominus* (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), pp. 73-87.

<sup>(5)</sup> As cited in Frank C. Sakran, *Palestine Dilemma* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 204.

<sup>(6)</sup> Government of Palestine, *Census of Palestine, 1922*.

of the Jewish population was made by a Zionist—Arthur Ruppin. Further back, in 1882 (according to the *Israel Government Yearbook* of 1950/51), there were no more than 24,000 Jews in Palestine; and if we go back still further, we find the Jewish population was 13,920 in 1876 and 10,600 in 1856.

Zionists prefer to turn a blind eye to these facts, or prefer not to mention them. The Israeli writer, Amos Elon, noted that ‘Arabs vanish before Zionist eyes’, and Herzl’s report on his visit to Palestine in 1898 did not include ‘a single word about the Arab population’, although, according to Elon, ‘there must have been over 500,000 Palestinian Arabs at the time’.<sup>(7)</sup>

Ahad Ha’am wrote in 1891:

We abroad have a way of thinking that Palestine today is almost desert, an uncultivated wilderness, and that anyone who wishes to buy land there can do so to his heart’s content. But this is not in fact the case. It is difficult to find any uncultivated land anywhere in the country. . . . We abroad have a way of thinking that the Arabs are all savages, on a level with the animals, and blind to what goes on around them. But that is quite mistaken. The Arabs, especially the townsmen, see through our activities in their country, and our aims, but they keep silent and make no sign, because for the present they anticipate no danger to their own future from what we are about. But if the time should ever come when our people have so far developed their life in Palestine that the indigenous population should feel more or less cramped, then they will not readily make way for us.<sup>(8)</sup>

Twenty years later he sounded the same note of warning: ‘Many natives of Palestine, whose national consciousness has begun to develop since the Turkish Revolution, look askance, quite naturally, at the selling of land to “strangers” and do their best to put a stop to this evil.’<sup>(9)</sup>

<sup>(7)</sup> Amos Elon, *Israelis, Founders and Sons* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 159.

<sup>(8)</sup> Ahad Ha’am, as quoted in a footnote on p. 126 of H. Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (London, 1923). The original source is *Am Scheidewege* (Berlin: Judischer Verlag), Vol.1, p. 86 *et seq.*

<sup>(9)</sup> L. Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, p. 90.

## 5. HOW WAS THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTER OF PALESTINE TRANSFORMED BEFORE 1948?<sup>(10)</sup>

According to the first official census of Palestine taken in 1922, the population was 757,182 persons, of which 590,890 were Moslem Arabs, 73,024 Christian Arabs, and 83,794 Jews. Thus, in 1922, the Jewish population constituted only 11 per cent of the total Palestinian population.<sup>(11)</sup> This amount, according to the official census, had risen to 16 per cent by 1931. At that date the total population of Palestine numbered 1,035,821 persons of whom 759,712 were Moslem Arabs, 91,398 Christians (more than 90 per cent of whom were Arabs), 10,101 classified as 'others' (most of these were Arab), and 174,006 Jews.<sup>(12)</sup> This increase in the Jewish population was due mainly to immigration and not to natural increase as was the case with the Arab population. Jewish net immigration between the years 1923 and 1931 (inclusive) totaled 63,695 persons.<sup>(13)</sup>

In the period from the census of 1931 to June 30, 1936, the Jewish population again doubled—an average rate of increase of 19.7% per year. By mid-1936 it had reached the figure of 370,483 or 27.7% of the total population. Within five years (1932-1936) a total of 173,820 Jewish immigrants had entered into Palestine.<sup>(14)</sup> By the end of 1945 the total population of Palestine had risen to 1,810,037 of whom 67% were Moslem Arabs, 3% Christian Arabs and 'others', and 30% were Jewish.<sup>(15)</sup> By March 31, 1947, the total population of Palestine had reached 1,908,775 persons, of whom 1,157,423 were Moslem Arabs, 146,162 Christian Arabs, 15,849 classified as 'others', and 589,341 Jews.<sup>(16)</sup> Thus the Jewish proportion of the total population rose, due almost entirely to immigration, from 11% in 1922 to 31% in 1947.

<sup>(10)</sup> For a detailed account see: Janet Abu-Lughod, 'The Demographic Transformation of Palestine', Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (ed.), *Transformation of Palestine* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 129-163.

<sup>(11)</sup> *Census of Palestine, 1922.*

<sup>(12)</sup> *Census of Palestine, 1931.*

<sup>(13)</sup> *Ibid.* I, p. 45.

<sup>(14)</sup> D. Gurevitch, *Fifteen Years of Jewish Immigration* (Jerusalem: Statistics Department of the Jewish Agency, 1935).

<sup>(15)</sup> Government of Palestine, Department of Statistics, *General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics XII* (December, 1947), Table 1, 686 (cited by J. Abu-Lughod, *op. cit.*).

<sup>(16)</sup> *Ibid.*

## 6. IN WHAT WAY DID LANDHOLDINGS CHANGE IN PALESTINE?

In 1918, the Jews in Palestine owned only two per cent of the land; that is, 548,000 dunums out of a total land area of 27,009,000 dunums.<sup>(17)</sup> In 1935 the area owned by the Jews was, according to Land Registry records, 1,317,000 dunums, which amounted to about five per cent of the land area of Palestine and twelve per cent of its cultivable land.<sup>(18)</sup> By the end of 1946, Jewish land ownership in Palestine amounted to 1,624,000 dunums,<sup>(19)</sup> and by 1947, this figure, according to a Zionist expert, had reached 1,734,000 dunums.<sup>(20)</sup> Thus Jewish holdings of land in Palestine before the partition resolution of 1947 constituted only 6.04% of the total land area of the country. In a statement to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Moshe Shertok, at that time head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, said: 'Today, we possess just over six per cent of the land area of Palestine.'<sup>(21)</sup>

## 7. DID THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT PURCHASE LAND IN PALESTINE FROM ITS INHABITANTS?

The total land area owned by the Jews before the mandate was 950,000 dunums, which constituted 41% of the land area owned by them by the end of the mandate.<sup>(22)</sup>

It should be noted that the political implications of land sales to the Jews were not clear before the mandate. Nonetheless, this land was bought mainly from non-Palestinian owners. The land expert representing the Jewish Agency at the Shaw Commission in 1929 confirmed this point and said that: 'Ninety per cent of lands bought up to that time came from absentee landlords.'<sup>(23)</sup> Marj Ibn Amir, a plain owned by non-Palestinian landlords, whose area is 200,000 dunums, was sold piecemeal to the Zionists between 1921 and 1925.<sup>(24)</sup> The Zionists

<sup>(17)</sup> Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine, 1945-1946*, Vol. I, p. 242.

<sup>(18)</sup> Montague Brown, 'Agriculture' in Said Himadeh (ed.), *Economic Organization of Palestine* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1938), p. 111.

<sup>(19)</sup> *Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, p. 244 and Supplement, p. 30.

<sup>(20)</sup> Abraham Granott, *Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1956), p. 28.

<sup>(21)</sup> The Jewish Agency, *The Jewish Plan for Palestine*, (1947), p. 279.

<sup>(22)</sup> *A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, p. 244.

<sup>(23)</sup> Nevill Barbour, *Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy* (2nd ed. Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), p. 118.

<sup>(24)</sup> *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929*, p. 118.



were able to purchase another 150,000 dunums from Palestinian landlords residing in cities.<sup>(25)</sup> This proves that the Arab areas purchased by Jews as a result of small or medium-sized transactions amounted to not more than one million dunums. Even in this case, a large proportion was transferred as a result of speculation when Arab landbrokers purchased land from Arab smallholders overburdened with debt, and then resold it to the Jews.<sup>(26)</sup>

Thus the thirty years of British rule whose legislation, measures and assistance were all intended to facilitate land transfers from Arabs to Jews, failed to increase Zionist landholdings to more than six per cent of the total land area of Palestine. When Israel was created in 1948, it declared sovereignty over eighty per cent of Palestine.

#### 8. CAN THE BALFOUR DECLARATION BE CONSIDERED A LEGAL DOCUMENT GRANTING THE ZIONISTS A RIGHT TO PALESTINE?

From the point of view of international law, the Balfour Declaration is *not* a legal document entailing rights to Zionists in Palestine. It concerned a territory over which Britain had no competence (Britain was entrusted with mandatory powers by the League of Nations almost five years after the Declaration was made), and promised to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine without giving any consideration to the opinions of the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants. The Declaration thus ignored completely the national and political rights of the Palestinian Arabs in their homeland and referred to them as the 'non-Jewish communities', while it recognized and promised to support the establishment of a political entity in Palestine for the infinitesimal Jewish minority.

Moreover, the Balfour Declaration was not the result of an agreement between states. It was no more than a letter addressed by James Balfour to an individual, Lord Rothschild, who had no title to enter into an official contractual obligation. Rothschild, who was a British subject, did not even represent the Jewish community in Britain. One might concede the right of the British Government to approve the establishment of a Jewish national home on its own territory, but Palestine was a territory neither owned nor legally acquired by her.

<sup>(25)</sup> Yusif Sayegh, *Israeli Economy* (2nd ed. Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1965), p. 78.

<sup>(26)</sup> *Ibid.*

Finally, the Balfour Declaration was nullified by later documents of a similar nature which the British Government issued either alone or jointly with other states.<sup>(27)</sup>

9. CAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF THE PARTITION RECOMMENDATION BE CONSIDERED LEGAL?

The report of Sub-Committee 2, which was formed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 22, 1947, included, *inter alia*, the following critique of the partition recommendation.<sup>(28)</sup>

18. The Sub-Committee considered the legal implications of the plan recommended by the majority of the Special Committee as enumerated above, and its views are summarized below.

The question of the partition of Palestine has to be considered in the light both of the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine, as read with the general principles embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of the provisions of the Charter. The United Kingdom took over Palestine as a single unit. Under article 5 of the Mandate, the Mandatory Power was responsible 'for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the government of any foreign Power'. Article 28 of the Mandate further contemplated that at the termination of the Mandate, the territory of Palestine would pass to the control of 'the Government of Palestine'. So also by virtue of Article 22 of the Covenant, the people of Palestine were to emerge as a fully independent nation as soon as the temporary limitation on their sovereignty imposed by the Mandate had ended.

The above conclusion is by no means vitiated by the provisions for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. It was not, and

<sup>(27)</sup> The following are statements from such documents:

a) The Hogarth Message, January 1918: 'Jewish settlement in Palestine would be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population'. (cited by Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 268).

b) The Basset Letter, February 8, 1918: 'The Government of his Britannic Majesty repeats its previous promise in respect of the freedom and emancipation of the Arab peoples'. (cited by J.M.N. Jeffries, *Palestine the Reality*, pp. 216-217).

c) Declaration to the Seven, June 16, 1918: 'The future government of these territories [that were under Turkish rule] should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed.' (cited by Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 343).

d) The joint Anglo-French Proclamation, November 9, 1918: 'France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and to assist the establishment of native Governments and Administrations in Syria [of which Palestine formed the southern part] and in Mesopotamia now liberated by the Allies'. (cited by Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality*, p. 238).

<sup>(28)</sup> General Assembly Document A/AC, 14/32, and Add. 1, Paragraphs 18-23.

could not have been, the intention of the framers of the Mandate that the Jewish immigration to Palestine should result in breaking up the political, geographic and administrative economy of the country. Any other interpretation would amount to a violation of the principles of the Covenant and would nullify one of the main objectives of the Mandate

19. Consequently the proposal of the majority of the Special Committee that Palestine should be partitioned is, apart from other weighty political, economic and moral objections, contrary to the specific provisions of the Mandate and in direct violation of the principles and objectives of the Covenant. The proposal is also contrary to the principles of the Charter, and the United Nations has no power to give effect to it. The United Nations is bound by Article 1 of the Charter to act 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law' and to respect 'the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples'. Under Article 73, concerning non-self-governing territories and mandated areas, the United Nations undertakes to 'promote to the utmost... the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories' and to 'take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples'. The imposition of partition on Palestine against the express wishes of the majority of its population can in no way be considered as respect for or compliance with any of the above-mentioned principles of the Charter.

Moreover, partition involves the alienation of territory and the destruction of the integrity of the State of Palestine. The United Nations cannot make a disposition or alienation of territory, nor can it deprive the majority of the people of Palestine of their territory and transfer it to the exclusive use of a minority in the country.

20. The proposal of the majority of the Special Committee that separate Arab and Jewish States should be created is as invalid as its proposal for partition. The United Nations Organization has no power to create a new State. Such a decision can be taken only by the free will of the people of the territories in question. That condition is not fulfilled in the case of the majority proposal, as it involves the establishment of a Jewish State in complete disregard of the wishes and interests of the Arabs of Palestine.

21. The proposal for the establishment of a permanent international trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem cannot be justified under any provision of the Charter. The trusteeship contemplated under Chapter XII of the Charter, is, by its very nature, temporary in character, and is intended to assist the people of non-self-governing areas to develop progressively towards self-government or independence as speedily as possible. There is no justification for departing from the original intention of the Mandate for Palestine and of the Covenant that the

whole of Palestine, including the City of Jerusalem, should in the course of time become fully self-governing. The only qualification imposed by the Mandate was that under article 28, the independent government of Palestine was required to agree to certain arrangements providing for the protection and maintenance of the Holy Places in Palestine, but it was never intended that that proviso should be used to limit or impair in any way the authority of the government of Palestine over the capital of its country.

22. The same objection attaches to the proposal for an economic union between the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem, to be administered by a joint economic board consisting of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The net effect of this proposal is not only to give the Jewish State a considerable say in the affairs of the Arab State against the wishes of the people of that State, but also to authorize the United Nations to take a direct part in the administration of the economic life of the country. In the absence of any trusteeship agreement duly negotiated, there is no provision in the Charter enabling or empowering the United Nations to exercise such authority in any territory.

23. The plan of the majority also provides that the Arab and the Jewish States shall be granted independence only after they have signed the treaty of economic union. Apart from the intrinsic defects and impracticability of the constitutional proposals of the majority, which have been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the Special Committee did not possess nor does the General Assembly possess the power to grant to or to withhold from the people of Palestine their right to complete independence, or to subject such independence to any conditions or limitations. Even the Mandate and the Covenant of the League of Nations contained no such reservations or permanent limitations on the ultimate sovereignty of the people of Palestine. The object of the Mandate, as read with Article 22 of the Covenant, was to render administrative advice and assistance to the people of Palestine until they were able to stand alone. There was no question of imposing any conditions on them when they were able to stand alone or to take away from them any part of their territory.

## CHAPTER II

### ZIONIST COLONIZATION OF PALESTINE

#### 10. WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE OF THE ZIONIST LEADERS TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN ARABS?

The well-known Israeli writer and columnist, Amos Elon, gives us a useful survey of Zionist attitudes towards the Arabs in his book, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons*. He writes:

At first it hardly penetrated their [the Zionist leaders] minds that the country they wished to resettle was not as under-populated, desolate, or ruined as they thought. They did not imagine that the Arabs who had been living there for centuries could possibly object to becoming a minority... through the advent of massive Jewish immigration from abroad.<sup>(1)</sup>

Elon says later in his book:

After settlement had begun and before World War I there were only a few isolated voices warning the settlers that they might be treading a path more dangerous than appeared through the tinted spectacles of ideology. Achad Ha'am, the writer, in 1891 protested the view that the 'Arabs are wild men of the desert, an ignorant people who did not see and do not understand what is going on around them... in time when our people in Palestine shall have developed to such an extent that they will begin more or less to push aside the natives, the latter will not easily give way'.

The young pioneers after 1905 [the year of the Seventh Zionist Congress], who adored Achad Ha'am, took his words as another reason for fully implementing the policy of *Avoda Ivrit*.<sup>(2)</sup> A Palestinian settler, the teacher and writer Yitzchak Epstein, attended the Seventh Zionist Congress of 1905 in Basel. In a lecture to delegates he complained that

<sup>(1)</sup> Amos Elon, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp. 156-157.

<sup>(2)</sup> 'Hebrew Labour'; i.e. Arabs were not to be given any employment whatsoever in the Jewish State—editor.

the 'Zionists were completely ignorant' of the Arab problem upon whose correct resolution so much depended. 'In its true form there is no trace of it in the literature of the movement.'<sup>(3)</sup>

Elon speaks of Ben Gurion's attitude towards the Palestinian Arabs and says that: 'Ben Gurion continued to dismiss the Palestinian Arabs as politically non-existent. In December 1917 he made the astounding suggestion that in a "historical and moral sense" Palestine was a country "without inhabitants". The blinding effects of national egocentricity could hardly be greater.'<sup>(4)</sup>

Elon continues to trace the Zionist attitude towards the Arabs. He says:

In 1921 the German Zionist leader, Georg Landauer, warned the Twelfth Zionist Congress that all-out war with the Arabs was inevitable unless the Zionists made urgent efforts to reach an amicable accommodation with the Palestinians. In such a war, he said, the Jews would lose. Vladimir Jabotinsky, the right-wing extremist, retorted by ironically asking whether during the colonisation of America or Australia anyone had bothered to beg the natives for permission. But the majority of Zionist leaders dismissed both Landauer's warning and Jabotinsky's retort. Reading the minutes of those long-forgotten discussions, one is amazed to see how many Zionists at that time felt that it was entirely feasible to satisfy the demands of Zionism without unduly annoying the Arabs.<sup>(5)</sup>

Elon gives further examples of this attitude in quoting Menachem Ussishkin and Arthur Ruppin. Ussishkin, he tells us, 'arrogantly dismissed the Arabs as a "negligible quantity"'. He said: "Everywhere in the world there is a Jewish problem. And what are people doing about it? Here there is an Arab problem. *Ma Yesh Laasot?* [So what can we do?]"

Arthur Ruppin, on the other hand,

at first, like most of his colleagues . . . overlooked the national aspirations of the Arabs. He assumed that they could be appeased through economic benefits. But earlier than most he realized the short-sightedness of this approach. By 1921 he was already bitterly reproaching his fellow settlers for wrongly aiming at the establishment of a nation-state ('another Montenegro') while at the same time ignoring the existence of an Arab

<sup>(3)</sup> Elon, *Founders and Sons*, p. 172

<sup>(4)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>(5)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>(6)</sup> *Ibid.* p. 175.

problem. The Balfour Declaration, he felt, was a proper privilege. 'Without a better understanding with the Arabs we shall face such tremendous difficulties as will be almost unsurmountable', he noted on January 21, 1921. But 'our Arab policy is less than non-existent. . . Herzl's concept of a Jewish state was possible only because he ignored the presence of the Arabs.'

Elon commented by saying: '*The Zionists were in no mood to endorse Ruppin's view.*'<sup>(7)</sup>

David Waines, American-born journalist and student of Middle Eastern affairs, summed up the Zionist attitude towards the Arabs in the following words:

In the Zionist field of vision the Arab never appeared in sharp focus as a human being of flesh and blood, but rather as a blurred and shadowy figure, indistinct and unreal, a political factor of negligible importance. Herzl would have had the Arab population 'spirited across the frontier'. The verb itself is suggestive. They were also regarded as too small (although 90 percent of the total population), too poor and backward to merit attention.<sup>(8)</sup>

## 11. HOW DID ANTI-ZIONIST JEWS REACT TO THIS ATTITUDE?

D.L. Alexander and Claude Montefiori, respectively President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and President of the Anglo-Jewish Association, issued a joint manifesto in the London *Times*, May 24, 1917 in which

they attacked the political theories of Zionism as a threat to the religious basis of Judaism because a secular Jewish nationality based on some obscure principle of race or ethnic peculiarity 'would not be Jewish in any spiritual sense'. Moreover, the Zionist demands for certain special rights in Palestine which the Arabs would not enjoy was contrary to the principle of equal rights for all religious denominations which Jews in Europe and North Africa claimed as vital for themselves. If Zionists were to disregard this principle in Palestine, Jews the world over would be convicted of having appealed to it 'for purely selfish motives'.<sup>(9)</sup>

## 12. DID THOSE ZIONISTS IMMIGRATING TO PALESTINE COME AS LABOURERS AND FARMERS, OR WERE THEY IN FACT CAPITALISTS AND CONQUERORS?

It is true that the bulk of Jewish immigrants to Palestine, before 1948

<sup>(7)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 177-179.

<sup>(8)</sup> David Waines, *The Unholy War* (Montreal: Chateau Books Ltd., 1971), pp. 34-35.

<sup>(9)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

in particular, were farmers and labourers. But these were recruited by the Zionist movement and poured into Palestine specifically to 'conquer it'. These farmers and labourers were the inhabitants of the settlements, they were the soldiers in the Hagana, the Irgun and Stern, and they were members of the Histadrut whose main task was the 'realization of Zionism'.<sup>(10)</sup>

Furthermore, it is to be noted that a considerable percentage of capitalists immigrated to Palestine. Lester Hopkins wrote:

The most remarkable feature about this distribution [of immigrants in the years 1932-1936] is the high proportion of 'capitalist' immigrants among Jews. This category accounted for 10.57 per cent of the total Jewish immigration, or, if dependents on capitalists are included, for over twenty per cent. This feature is itself sufficient to mark the recent Jewish immigration as unusual among mass migration movements.<sup>(11)</sup> [The term 'capitalists' refers to immigrants having one thousand Palestinian Pounds and over which, by pre-1948 standards, is a significant amount.]

Following is a table which should help to clarify this subject:

CAPITALIST IMMIGRANTS  
i.e. possessing at least P£1,000  
1930-1941<sup>(12)</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Immigrants</i>	<i>Percentage of Total</i>
1930	178	4
1931	233	6
1932	727	8
1933	3,250	11
1934	5,124	12
1935	6,309	10
1936	2,970	10
1937	1,225	12
1938	1,753	14
1939	2,606	8
1940	802	8
1941	314	8

<sup>(10)</sup> G. Muenzer, *Labor Enterprise in Israel* (New York: Sharou Books, 1947), pp. 68-69.

<sup>(11)</sup> Lester Hopkins, 'Population', in Said Himadeh (ed.) *Economic Organization of Palestine* (Beirut: American University, 1938), p. 22.

<sup>(12)</sup> Figures for 1930-1938 compiled from Palestine Department of Migration, *Annual Report*; Figures for 1939-1941 from *The Other Israel* (Tel Aviv: Matzpen, July 1968), p. 2.



The Jewish Agency estimated that Jewish immigration brought into Palestine 25 million pounds in the period 1920-1929. Of this amount 20 million pounds were private property.<sup>(13)</sup>

13. WERE ZIONIST MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN PALESTINE 'A NECESSARY MEASURE DICTATED BY REPEATED ARAB ATTACKS AGAINST JEWISH SETTLEMENTS'?

The military preparations of the Zionist settlers were indeed necessary—not to repel Arab attacks but to safeguard the eventual seizure of Palestine. Palestinian Arabs had nothing against the early Jewish settlers. It was only when those settlers began to make clear their political aims, consolidate their forces and form military units, that the Arabs began to make preparations for defense of themselves and their territory.<sup>(14)</sup>

14. WAS THE ZIONIST COLONIZATION REALIZED PEACEFULLY?

Zionist colonisation in Palestine was the basic prerequisite and tool for the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine. So much was clear to the Zionists. It was also clear to them that the state would be established against Arab will; this meant that a confrontation with the Arabs was inevitable and indispensable if the Zionist programme were to be implemented. Therefore it would be ridiculous to say that Zionist colonization was realized peacefully—apart from the very early settlements which had a basically humanitarian character. Arthur Ruppin, who was in charge of the colonization programme, said: 'We are doomed to live in a state of permanent belligerency with the Arabs and there is no way to avoid bloody sacrifices. This may not be a desirable state of affairs. But such is reality. If we wish to continue our work in Palestine against the wishes of the Arabs we will have to take such sacrifices into account'.<sup>(15)</sup> Weizmann reiterated the same belief when he said that the establishment of a Zionist state would 'involve a stand-up row with the Arabs, but that is to happen some day;

<sup>(13)</sup> Shlomo Sitton, *Israel: Immigration et Croissance* (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1963), p. 47.

<sup>(14)</sup> For an account of this point see, Waines, *Unholy War*, pp. 58-60.

<sup>(15)</sup> As cited in Elon, *Founders and Sons*, p. 180.

why not now?’<sup>(16)</sup> Ben Gurion did not, as we saw before, think in terms of ‘peaceful colonization’. He insisted rather on ‘armed colonization’, and believed that a battle with the Arabs was essential. The decisive force in that battle was to be the Hagana (the underground Jewish military organization in Palestine).<sup>(17)</sup>

## 15. DID THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT WHILE SEEKING TO CREATE THE JEWISH STATE TRY TO AVOID COMMITTING AN INJUSTICE AGAINST THE ARABS?

In fact what happened in Palestine was the opposite. The Zionist movement knew that the achievement of its aims meant that a great injustice would be committed against the Arabs; once it had accepted this fact the commission of such injustice became part of Zionist policy. Max Nordau, on hearing for the first time of the existence of an Arab population in Palestine, apparently ran to Herzl and exclaimed, ‘I did not know of this; but then we are committing an injustice!’<sup>(18)</sup>

Giving evidence before the Haycraft Commission, Dr. Eder, the acting chairman of the Zionist Commission at the time, said that in his view ‘there can be only one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as soon as the numbers of that race are sufficiently increased’.<sup>(19)</sup> Dr. Eder added his belief that Jews, not Arabs, should have the right to bear arms, on the strange grounds that ‘this discrimination would tend to improve Arab-Jewish relations’.<sup>(20)</sup>

Harry Sacher, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, told the Shaw Commission in 1929 that political rights could not be granted to the Arabs if that meant the immediate establishment of representative democratic institutions.<sup>(21)</sup> Jabotinsky said that only when a Jewish majority was achieved could parliamentary institutions be introduced so that, as he candidly put it, ‘the Jewish point of view

<sup>(16)</sup> Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary 1917-1956* (London: The Creset Press, 1959), p. 132.

<sup>(17)</sup> Barnett Litvinoff, *Biography of an Extraordinary Man* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959), p. 258.

<sup>(18)</sup> R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, ‘Israel et Eretz Israel’, Dossier sur le Conflict israelo-arabe, *Les Temps Modernes* (1967), p. 391.

<sup>(19)</sup> *Cmd. 1540*, October 1921, p. 57.

<sup>(20)</sup> ESCO Foundation for Palestine, *A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), Vol. 1 p. 272.

<sup>(21)</sup> David Waines, *The Unholy War*, p. 74.

should always prevail'.<sup>(22)</sup> Chaim Weizmann had this reply to a question about the problem of the Arab majority: 'We expect they won't be in a majority after a few years.'<sup>(23)</sup> Frederick Kisch, head of the Zionist executive in Palestine said that the Jewish Agency's programme for cooperation with the Arabs was not meant to be executed. 'Its fine words were not matched by deeds.'<sup>(24)</sup>

On May 3, 1943, Patrick J. Hurley, personal representative of President Roosevelt in the Middle East, reported to the President:

The Zionist Organization in Palestine has indicated its commitment to an enlarged program for: 1) a sovereign Jewish State which would embrace Palestine and probably eventually Transjordan; 2) and eventual transfer of the Arab population from Palestine to Iraq; 3) Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic development and control.<sup>(25)</sup>

The member of Knesset from the Labour Party and chairman of the Knesset Commission for Foreign and Security Affairs, David Hacohen, gave the following description of matters in the days of the British Mandate:

When I entered [in London] the club of socialist students—Englishmen, Irish, Jews, Chinese, Indians and Africans—all of us well under English rule—I had already then to fight with my friends in intimate society about Jewish socialism; I had to defend the fact that I did not receive Arabs into my trade-union, the Histadrut; that in our country one preaches to housewives not to buy from Arabs, that one preaches to picket citrus plantations, so that no Arab worker could work there, to pour petroleum on Arab tomatoes; to attack in the market Jewish housewives and break the 'Arab' eggs in their baskets; to raise to the skies the Jewish National Fund (Keren Hayemet) which sends Joshua Hankin to Beyrout to buy lands from absentee effendis and to kick out the fellahin. To buy tens of dunams from an Arab, this is permitted, but God forbids that a Jew dare sell one dunam of land to an Arab—this is not allowed. As a socialist to take a symbol of capitalism, Rothschild and name him 'the well-known philanthropist'—this was not so simple. . . . [from the daily Israeli paper '*Haaretz*', 15/11/1968.]

<sup>(22)</sup> ESCO, *Palestine: a Study of . . .*, Vol. 2, pp. 619-621.

<sup>(23)</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 159.

<sup>(24)</sup> N. Bentwich and M. Kisch, *Brigadier Frederick Kisch*, (London, 1966), p. 98.

<sup>(25)</sup> U.S. *Foreign Relations of the U.S., M.E., and Africa* (Washington D.C. 1964), Vol. 4, pp. 776-

## 16. DID ZIONISM HELP RAISE THE EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS BEFORE 1948?

David Waines writes:<sup>(26)</sup>

The mandate administration proposed the establishment of a British university in the city of Jerusalem to serve as the educational apex of the two public school systems [Arab and Jewish]. The Zionist executive informed Sir Ronald Storrs, the author of the scheme, that the Jews would not participate because it 'constituted a threat to Hebrew culture in Palestine'.<sup>(27)</sup> The project was dropped and the only university to be constructed in Palestine was the Hebrew University. . . . The Zionist executive consistently refused to have anything to do with any education program where Hebrew was not the sole language of instruction. An idea for an Arab-Jewish agricultural school was likewise shelved. . .

## 17. WHAT POLICY DID THE ZIONISTS FOLLOW TOWARDS ARAB LABOURERS?

Zionist colonization in Palestine follows a policy based on the conquest of labour. The conquest of labour meant 'the penetration of Jewish Labour into all spheres of work, industry, trade, the public services and most of all into agricultural work'.<sup>(28)</sup> The conquest of labour was accomplished through the establishment of production, marketing and service cooperatives organized by the Jewish Federation of Labour (Histadrut). 'A picketing campaign was launched against private Jewish agricultural settlements where Arab labour was employed; these were generally the older settlements where good relations had developed between Jewish farmers and their Arab laborers.'<sup>(29)</sup>

*Ha Or*, a Hebrew paper, issued a document circulated by the Labour Council of Tel Aviv to all the workers in the building trade<sup>(30)</sup> which gives an example of the policy of the conquest of labour:

Dear Comrade,

As the result of the shortage of Jewish workers, Arab workers have increased in many industries. And in certain secondary trades the increase has become a striking feature and Jewish labour has been expelled and the industries have thus been Arabised.

<sup>(26)</sup> Waines, *The Unholy War*, p. 79.

<sup>(27)</sup> A.L. Tibawi, *Arab Education in Palestine* (London, 1956), p. 103.

<sup>(28)</sup> Palestine Administration, *Memoranda for the Royal Commission*, as cited by G. Mansour, *The Arab Worker Under the Palestine Mandate* (Jerusalem, 1937), p. 27.

<sup>(29)</sup> Waines, *Unholy War*, p. 78.

<sup>(30)</sup> *Ha Or*, No. 7, November 23, 1934.

This is also the situation in two branches of the building trade. These are the zifzif (gravel) and stone trades. In these two trades hundreds of workers are employed and tens of thousands of pounds are paid monthly to Beduins and Hauranis of every sort.

It is quite obviously imperative to consider this important matter. Not only is our situation vitally affected by the low wages, but our other industries are threatened with being affected by cheap labour, industries which provide a living for thousands of our Jewish workers' families.

The Labour Council of Tel-Aviv has started a big campaign against this danger. The Council is negotiating with the owners of Jewish stone quarries to effect the introduction of Jewish labour into this important trade, and has reached a satisfactory agreement in Majdal Yaba quarries. This agreement guarantees to supply Tel-Aviv with Jewish stone. But this demands the immediate consideration of the workers, because without their assistance and help the attempt will encounter serious obstacles. Therefore we have decided to call on those concerned, contractors, masons, labourers and drivers and to demand from them now on to use the Jewish product only. It is the duty of workers to see that these orders are carried out in their spheres of work. It is only through the determination of those concerned that this trade can be brought under the control and into the hands of the Jews.

The employment of dozens of workers in this industry and the prospect of introducing more Jewish labour subsequently makes it imperative for all workers to do their utmost in order to ensure that the stone sold and required in the building trade should be produced by Jewish labour. Most important of all are the workers in the building trade itself. It is in their power to abstain themselves, and to prevent others, from using stones produced by Arabs. It is their duty not to allow the unloading of stone unless they are certain that it is Jewish. Further a special controller's seal is to be seen on the invoice brought by the driver. The absence of the seal indicates that the stone is of Arab provenance. The refusal to unload such stone at the place of work will not only be an important step towards making this industry Jewish, but will also prevent cheap labour from creeping into the other Jewish industries.

With the compliments of your comrades,

The Executive Committee.

G. Mansour, secretary of the Arab Labour Federation in Jaffa cites one of the results of this document:<sup>(31)</sup>

The greater part of the stone used at Tel-Aviv at this period was brought

<sup>(31)</sup> G. Mansour, *The Arab Worker* pp. 30-32.

from the quarry at Majdal Yaba (Migdal Zedek). This was Arab property leased to Jews on long leases soon after the War. As no question had arisen at that time of displacing Arab labour, no stipulations on the subject were put in the lease. In 1934, the quarries employed about 30 villagers and some 400 Palestinian workers from other villages, not Hauranis or Beduins as is pretended in this document. The preliminary step of the Jewish labour agents was to send instructions to the managers of the quarry to accumulate large heaps of stones. When this had been done, they were to dismiss the Arab workers, on the ground that there was evidently no demand for stone at present. The plan was thus to persuade the workers to return to their villages. Once they were safely out of the way, Jewish workers would be introduced and the Arabs faced with an accomplished fact. . .

In general, the year 1934 was distinguished by a tremendous extension of 'picketing'. This was designed to prepare the way for the mass immigration of the succeeding years. The Jews had by now bought a great part of the most fertile land in the country, and the Histadrut was concerned in expelling Arab labour from all those areas in which the Jews had an interest.

Wherever Arabs were working for Jewish contractors or employers, in Hadar Ha Carmel, in Rehavia, in Kfar Saba, in Bait Vegan and elsewhere, or where Arabs were selling material of Arab provenance, as stone in Tel-Aviv, the Histadrut sent its pickets to persuade the Arabs to leave, and if necessary to drive them away by force. If the pickets were arrested by the police for attacking Arabs, they were at once described in the Jewish press as martyrs and heroes of the Zionist cause. This campaign of press incitation continued, week after week, entirely unchecked by the Government.

An example may be quoted from *Davar*, the organ of the Histadrut, which is itself the controlling force in the Jewish Agency. A paragraph in No. 2830 of 1934, dealing with the activities of the Workers Council of Tel-Aviv reads as follows: 'A branch of the Labour Office has been opened in Bait Vegan. The office has begun an important social activity in which it has been helped also by the Contracting Office of the Workers Council of Tel-Aviv during the last five months. The position has changed as follows. In place of 200 Arab workers and 50 Jews, the last count gives 200 Hebrew workers and 70 Arab workers in Bait Vegan. *The work continues.*'

By such means, which often included violence and other illegalities, were created the 'vacancies' for Hebrew workers, to fill which the Government obligingly granted the Labour Schedules which made 1935 the record year for immigration and, incidentally, prepared the way for the disorders of 1936 and the accompanying economic crisis.

## 18. WHAT WAS THE ZIONIST POLICY TOWARDS LAND OWNERSHIP AND TOWARDS EMPLOYMENT OF ARABS ON LAND OWNED BY JEWS?

The Zionists in Palestine followed a policy based on the conquest of land. This conquest was achieved through agricultural colonization, the establishment of communal settlements by both private enterprise and the Jewish National Fund. Land purchased by the JNF became the inalienable property of the Jewish people. The Jewish Agency Constitution of 1929 contained clauses to ensure this exclusivist policy. Article 3 read:

(d) Land is to be acquired as Jewish property and subject to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement, the title to the lands acquired is to be taken in the name of the Jewish National Fund, to the end that the same shall be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people.

(e) The Agency shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish labour, and in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed.<sup>(32)</sup>

The terms of the Keyemet land leases read in part:

Article 23:

... The lessee undertakes to execute all works connected with the cultivation of the holding only with Jewish labor. Failure to comply with this duty by the employment of non-Jewish labor shall render the lessee liable to the payment of a compensation of ten Palestinian pounds for each default. The fact of the employment of non-Jewish labor shall constitute adequate proof as to the damages and the amount thereof, and the right of the Fund to be paid the compensation referred to, and it shall not be necessary to serve on the lessee any notorial or other notice. Where the lessee has contravened the provisions of this Article three times the Fund may apply the right of restitution of the holding without paying any compensation whatever.<sup>(33)</sup>

The result of such a policy and the consequences of not abiding by its provisions were described by Sir John Hope Simpson. He wrote:

The result of the purchase of land in Palestine by the Jewish National

<sup>(32)</sup> As cited in Sir John Hope Simpson, *Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, Cmd. 3686-87 (London: HMSO, 1930), Vol. I, p. 53.

<sup>(33)</sup> Similar provisions are included in the Keren Hayesod agreements (Article 7) and the agreement for the Emek colonies (Article 11); Sir John Hope Simpson, *Palestine; Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development* (London: HMSO 1930), p. 53.

Fund has been that land has been extra-territorialized. *It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage now or in the future.* Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate it, but by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish National Fund, he is deprived for ever from employment on that land. The land is in mort-main and inalienable. It is for this reason that Arabs discount the professions of friendship and good will on the part of the Zionists in view of the policy which the Zionist Organization deliberately adopted.<sup>(34)</sup>

19. IS IT TRUE THAT THE ZIONISTS RENDERED MEDICAL SERVICES THAT HELPED IMPROVE THE HEALTH OF THE ARABS?

G. Mansour cites the following answer given by Dr. Canaan in his book, *Conflict in the Land of Peace* (p. 84) :

The improved health of the peasants, thus the Zionists argue, is the result of their direct and indirect medical and sanitary help and of the improved economic condition of the country. It is true that the Jews have provided extensive medical services but only an insignificant proportion thereof has affected Arabs. We do not deny the authoritative aid of some specialists. But is not by far the greater part of the private income of such excellent men derived from Arab patients?

The Zionists boast, as Mr. Shertok has done lately, that they have built the hospitals. He forgets to mention the great many hospitals run by Christian institutions and scattered all over the country and such institutions as Dr. Dajani's Arab hospital at Jaffa. These are much more numerous than the Jewish hospitals and continue to do a great service to Jews; while the small amount of medical help given by Jewish hospitals to non-Jews may be clearly seen from the following :

In the Government dispensaries and clinics in Jerusalem, Hebron, Jaffa, Ramleh, Haifa, Acre, Beisan, Safad and Tiberias 76,985 patients were treated in 1934; 8,172 or 10.63% were Jews. In the same year 55,877 new patients were treated in Jewish dispensaries and clinics in Jerusalem. Of this number 1,654 were non-Jews. Even if we take the number 1,654 to represent nobody but Arabs, only 3.25% of the total number treated in Jewish dispensaries were Arabs. In the same year 77,328 new patients were treated in non-Jewish clinics and dispensaries in Jerusalem. 21,906, i.e. 28.3% of the whole attendance were Jews. If we deduct from these numbers the patients treated in the Christian English Hospital we still have a total of 61,335 out-patients of whom 6,727 i.e. 10.85% were Jews.

<sup>(34)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.



Let us compare the proportion in the dispensaries and clinics in Haifa. The proportion of non-Jews to have been treated in Jewish dispensaries and clinics is 12% while that of the Jews treated in non-Jewish institutions is 17.3%.

In 1934 the Jewish hospitals in Jerusalem admitted 7,647 patients, of whom 7,623 were Jews and only 24 Mohammedans and Christians. Supposing that all non-Jewish patients were Arabs, the percentage of Arabs admitted to Jewish hospitals is 0.315%. The Christian hospitals in Jerusalem admitted in the same year 6,776 patients, of whom 2,993 were Mohammedans, 2,214 Christians and 1,569 Jews. In other words in the Christian European hospitals 23.25% of all patients admitted were Jews.

More revealing is the proportion in the Haifa Hospital where 34.46% of all patients who entered non-Jewish hospitals were Jews, and only 0.7% of all admissions to Jewish hospitals were Arabs.<sup>(35)</sup>

## 20. IS THE ACCUSATION VALID, THAT ZIONIST COLONIZATION IS RACIALIST?

We have referred in previous questions to Zionist attitudes towards the Arabs, to the policy of the conquest of labour and the conquest of land. Those references are vivid examples of racialism. In his *Road to Jerusalem*, historian Barnet Litvinoff has neatly summarized this Zionist attitude. Theirs was—

a ruthless doctrine, calling for monastic self-discipline and cold detachment from environment. The Jews who gloried in the name of socialist worker interpreted brotherhood on a strictly nationalist, or racial basis, for they meant brotherhood with Jew, not with Arab. As they insisted on working the soil with their own hands, since exploitation of others was anathema to them, they excluded the Arabs from their regime. . . . They believed in equality, but for themselves. They lived on Jewish bread raised on Jewish soil that was protected by a Jewish rifle.<sup>(36)</sup>

## 21. IS IT TRUE THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEASANT IS LETHARGIC?

In 1930 Sir John Hope Simpson reported to the British Government that, as far as he could gather from various sources, the Arab peasant was in a state of despair. He had no money for his farm and he had fallen into heavy debts at unbelievably high interest rates. He had to

<sup>(35)</sup> G. Mansour, *The Arab Worker*, pp. 25-26.

<sup>(36)</sup> Barnet Litvinoff, *The Road to Jerusalem* (London, 1965), p. 132.

pay in addition heavy taxes and increasing wages. Nonetheless, the peasant was intelligent and strove to raise the standards of his agriculture and improve the conditions of his life. But very little had been done to help him. Somewhere else in his report Simpson stated that the peasant was neither lazy nor unintelligent but that he was capable and alert. Were he to practise better methods, he would quickly improve his conditions. However, due to his very low income, he had no opportunity to introduce any improvements whatsoever to his lands. Of the Arab plough, Simpson wrote that it was commonly thought to be unsatisfactory and was the subject of derision. However, nothing could be more suitable for the rocky areas.<sup>(37)</sup> One agricultural expert reported that the Palestinian peasant should be compared to the South European peasant. He saw no reason why the peasant in Palestine could not reach the level of his counterpart in Southern Europe.<sup>(38)</sup>

## 22. WHY WAS THE ZIONIST ECONOMY IN PALESTINE MORE ADVANCED THAN ARAB ECONOMY?

A study of the Palestinian economy prior to 1948 shows

that the productivity of the Arab worker compared to that of the Jewish worker rose from 54 per cent in 1936 to 62 per cent in 1945. . . . [However, since] the percentage of those capable of work among Jews formed approximately 45 per cent in 1936 and 42 per cent in 1945 while this percentage for the Arabs did not exceed 28 per cent in 1936 and 24 per cent in 1945, the national incomes of the Arabs and Jews when each was divided by the total number of each community resulted in lower figures for the Arabs than the differences between the productivity of the Arab and Jewish worker.

The reason for this is first of all that the Jewish inhabitants were better distributed in age groups than the Arabs; a higher percentage of Jews fell in the working age category while a high percentage of Arabs fell in the dependents category (particularly in the infant and children categories). This phenomenon is due partly to the fact that the percentage of births among Arabs is higher, thus raising the percentage of those below the age of 15, and partly to the fact that the Jewish Agency brought in Jews in their prime. Second, the Arab agricultural sector suffered simultaneously from overpopulation and scarcity of capital. This led to a great deal of overt and covert unemployment. Finally,

<sup>(37)</sup> Simpson, *Report*, pp. 64, 66.

<sup>(38)</sup> S.F. Starkland, *Report on the Agricultural Cooperative System in Palestine* (1930-, p. 2.).

the percentage of Jewish workers employed in the industrial sector and in crafts rose from 17 per cent to 27 per cent between 1936 and 1945 while this percentage of Arabs so employed fell from 8 per cent to 6 per cent.

The explanation for this phenomenon is that Jews were able to forge ahead in their industries induced by the following incentives:

- a. the influx of capital during these nine years
- b. the contracts gained through the Mandate administration, to produce vast quantities of various manufactured goods and industrial products
- c. the industrial know-how, technical training and high level of learning enjoyed by the Jewish labor force who had mostly come from Poland, Germany, etc.<sup>(39)</sup>

### 23. DID JEWISH AGRICULTURE PRODUCE A HIGH YIELD IN COMPARISON TO THE CAPITAL INVESTED IN THE LAND?

A close examination of the agricultural sector shows that the Jewish agricultural settlements suffered from several dangerous weaknesses, inspite of their apparent strength. These settlements enjoyed huge capital investments, services, and various highly organized institutions; however they were continuously and heavily in debt. In 1945, for example, the Jewish agricultural debts, excluding those carried by citrus groves, averaged £514 per agricultural laborer, or £13.7 per dunum (1000 sq. meters). The debts accumulated through the cultivation of citrus fruits averaged £27.5 per dunum. The agricultural debt totalled £12.3 million compared to an income from this section which totalled £11 million for the same year. On the other hand the Arab agricultural sector was less heavily burdened with debts. . .

<i>Average borrowing per dunum</i>	<i>Arab groves</i>	<i>Jewish groves</i>
Groves free from debt	82.9%	64.7%
Debts less than £50	13.3%	28.2%
Debts £50-100	2.7%	5.6%
Debts over £100	1.2%	1.5%
	100%	100%

It will be said of course that the excessive borrowing in the Jewish agricultural section is due to the wide reliance on agricultural machinery and technology which requires high capital investment. This is true

<sup>(39)</sup> Yusif Sayegh, *Israeli Economy* (Beirut: Palestine Research Center), pp. 71-74. (In Arabic.)

to a large extent. However, these investments indicate, in addition to borrowing, vast amounts of foreign aid. They indicate also an excessively high cost capital investment encouraged by easy long term credit and low interest rates. These factors, together with nominal land rental rates, should have depressed the cost of production, strengthened Jewish agriculture and increased its profits. . .

In the final analysis the economic measuring rod is the calculations of cost, return and the net income resulting from these calculations. Here we find that the high yield is countered by high production costs of labor, irrigation, interest rates and dead debts. The sum total of all these factors were very low net incomes (4.2 per cent – 6.2 per cent for the year 1952, the only available figures).<sup>(40)</sup>

24. IS IT TRUE THAT ARAB ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN PALESTINE WERE STAGNANT, PARTICULARLY IN INDUSTRY?

The economic growth witnessed by Palestine was not limited to the Jewish sector. In spite of limited investments, a low technical level and the absence of foreign aid (which hampered the growth of Arab economy particularly in the absence of governmental protection and incentives), Arab economy grew greatly. Below is a table which compares the Arab and Jewish economic sectors as they figured in the 1939 and 1942 censuses.

It will appear, upon simple calculations, that the Arabs advanced tangibly between the two censuses in various aspects. The increase in the Arab industrial labor force did not lag too far behind the Jewish growth in this area, and net income and capital growth increased. Further examination will reveal that the Arab rates of net income and capital growth exceeded those in the Jewish economy in spite of the increase of machine horse power and of capital, in absolute figures, per Jewish worker. On the other hand further examination will reveal a greater rise in the rate of capital investment for each Arab worker compared to that for the Jewish worker as well as a higher Arab net income rate.<sup>(41)</sup>

<sup>(40)</sup> Sayegh, pp. 80-82.

<sup>(41)</sup> Yusif Sayegh, pp. 83-86 (abridged).

	Jewish Industry		Concessions		Arab and Other Industries	
	1939	1942	1939	1942	1939	1942
People working at the time of the census	13,678	37,773	2,619	3,400	4,117	8,804
Standing income in £1000's	6,046	29,041	1,251	2,131	1,545	5,658
Net income in £1000's	2,455	11,488	1,106	1,631	313	1,725
Capital investment in £1000's	4,391	12,094	5,799	6,294	703	2,131
Machinery in horse-power	40,694	57,410	13,128	133,673	3,914	3,812
Salaries and Wages in £1,000's	1,008	5,641	274	611	112	511

The Jewish Agency itself confessed that Arab economy in Palestine was not stagnant. *The Jewish Plan for Palestine* said:

In 1928 the total Arab winter wheat crop was 118,978 tons and the summer crop 83,888. In 1942 the figures stood at 234,674 and 488,452 respectively.

In 1928 the Arabs produced 15,678 tons of melons; in 1945 they grew 142,827.

In 1939 the Arabs had £P.379,000 deposited in their two banks; in 1945 this had leaped to £P.6,971,000. During the same period Arab banks increased their capital by about 50%.

In 1931 the Arabs had about 4,000,000 olive trees; by 1945 this figure was nearly doubled.

In 1930 the Arab land planted to citrus was around 45,000 dunums; in 1945 it was about 133,000.<sup>(42)</sup>

These facts are also demonstrated by the tables in *A Survey of Palestine* (2 vols. 1946), which the Palestine Government submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in December, 1945 and January 1946 (see Chapter 10).

25. IS IT TRUE THAT THE ZIONISTS TRANSFORMED PALESTINE FROM A SEMI-DESERT INTO A DEVELOPING, VITAL AND SUCCESSFUL ECONOMY?

George Sandys, the American poet and translator, was one of the first travellers to describe the country [Palestine] in detail. In 1610

<sup>(42)</sup> The Jewish Agency for Palestine, *The Jewish Plan for Palestine* (Jerusalem: 1947), p. 116.

he gave a general account of Palestine, 'the country that overflows with milk and honey in the midst of a habitable area, characterised by a temperate climate, adorned with beautiful mountains and peaceful valleys. Fresh water springs from the rocks and all places are delightful and beneficial.' (George Sandys, *A Relation of a Journey begun A. D. 1610*, second ed., London, 1621, p. 141.)

On his arrival at Lake Tiberias, Sandys observed that 'the surrounding soil is of the finest nature, for the fruits that grow in cold areas, in hot areas and in temperate areas all thrive there.' (*Ibid.*) During his wanderings westwards, Sandys passed through Marj Ibn Amer (The Plain of Esdraelon), which he described as follows: 'We have spent this day in the most fertile and finest valley one could ever lay one's eyes upon. Before your eyes is a chain of lofty mountains (Galilee), and to your left lies the Mediterranean, surrounded by hills adorned with various fruits, and flower-bedecked hills rising not too high above valleys covered with olive groves and fruit orchards that are scattered here and there.' (*Ibid.*, p. 151.)

Further, Sandys describes the road to Jerusalem as 'even, surrounded by curving hills topped by terrace, and valleys planted with trees situated in the most beautiful spot on earth. And although the land is rocky, it is not barren, for wheat and olive trees can be found in the vicinity of populated areas.' (*Ibid.*, p. 154.)

Sandys also found that Bethlehem 'lay in a chain of mountains extending eastwards and westwards into a final piece of land and a pleasant spot.' (*Ibid.*, p. 177.) Later, Sandys headed southward until he reached Mount Carmel which was 'rich with olive trees, vineyards and several kinds of fruits and herbs used for medicinal purposes as well as for perfume.' (*Ibid.*, p. 203.)

Henry Maundrell, the Anglican priest affiliated to the British Levant Company in Aleppo, visited the Holy Land in 1697. His first view of Palestine consisted of Acre's plain which 'enjoys good streams of water at convenient distances, and everything else that might render it both pleasant and fruitful.' (Henry Maundrell, *Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem*, Beirut: Khayyat, 1963, p. 70.) As for Acre, Maundrell mentioned that 'it enjoys all possible advantages both of sea and land. On its north and east sides it is compass'd with a spacious and fertile plain.' (*Ibid.*, p. 72.) Furthermore, Maundrell observes that the city of Sebasta in ancient Sāmāria 'is situated upon a long mount of an oval

figure, having first a fruitful valley and then a ring of hills running around it.' (*Ibid.*, p. 78.) And the field that is situated south of Jacob's Well in the vicinity of Nablus is 'watered with a fresh stream, rising between it and Sychem [Nablus], which makes it so exceeding verdant and fruitful. . . . From Jacob's Well our road went southward, along a very spacious and fertile valley.' (*Ibid.*, p. 84.)

When Maundrell approached Jericho, he mentioned that many rivulets 'divide themselves into several small streams, dispensing their refreshment to all the fields between Jericho and this, and rendering exceeding fruitful'. (*Ibid.*, p. 108.) Finally, Maundrell reached St. John's wilderness west of Jerusalem, 'which was named such because of its rocky, hilly structure; but it was a cultivated land where wheat, vineyards and olive trees grew'. (*Ibid.*, p. 84 [sic.]).

Furthermore, in the 18th century other British travellers visited the Middle East, two of whom were Richard Pocock and Buck Willy. Pocock undertook his voyage between 1737 and 1738. He mentioned that Ramleh was 'located on a fertile hill. . . .' (R. Pocock, *A Description of the East and Other Countries*, 2nd. ed., London, 1740, p. 4.) Further, he noted that in the vicinity of Lydda, 'the entire country had fertile soil and abundant quantities of grass'. (*Ibid.*, p. 5.) And when he approached Marj Ibn Amer he saw one of 'the most beautiful hills' he had ever laid his eyes upon as they were 'made of fertile soil, producing excellent plants, adorned by batches of trees that make them extremely beautiful'. (*Ibid.*, p. 64.) As for Acre, Pocock said that it was 'located in a very spacious, fertile valley, surrounded to the east, at a distance of 12 miles, by mountains formerly called the eastern mountains of Lebanon, and to the west by the beautiful fertile mountains of Galilee'. (*Ibid.*, p. 52.) Pocock proceeded eastward where he found that 'the area of Safad . . . consists of a rich, spacious valley . . . in which wheat and cotton are cultivated'. (*Ibid.*, p. 67.)

Of his wanderings around Jerusalem, Pocock recounts: 'I descended into the eastern valley and ascended Mount Olive which is easily accessible through the wheat fields planted with olive trees. . . .' (*Ibid.*, p. 29.) And on the way south of Bethlehem 'we walked about two miles through this valley which was planted with olive trees, fig trees, apricots and almonds.' (*Ibid.* p. 47.)

Toward the end of the 18th century, the Irish traveller, Buck Willy, arrived in the Holy Land in 1789. His travels were restricted to the

northern part of Palestine, namely the area located between Acre and Mount Carmel westward and Nazareth eastward. Willy mentioned that the surrounding area of Haifa, Shafr Amr in particular, 'was famous for its production of cotton which was regarded as the best production in Galilee'. (T. Willy, *The Memoirs of Buck Willy*, London: A. Morning Ltd. 1960, p. 175.) Then he headed eastward in the direction of Nazareth. He recounted, 'On our departure from Nazareth, we crossed a spacious valley, the chief products of which were wheat and cotton.' (*Ibid.*, p. 185.)

In the 19th century more travellers came to Palestine, some for religious reasons, others merely for touristic reasons. Dr. Maryon, the physician of Lady Hester Stanhope, the niece of Sir William Pitt, recounted that 'the country between Jaffa and Ramlah is undulating and of rich soil as might be judged from the fine crops of barley.' (*The Travels of Lady Hester Stanhope*, narrated by her physician Dr. Maryon, London: Colburn, 1846, p. 201.) As Maryon was overlooking Marj Ibn Amer, he was seized with wonder: 'We had never seen any soil so rich as the Plain of Esdraelon then appeared; its extent fully sufficed to impress the mind with the idea of immense produce to be attained and its fertility was evident from the rich mould under our feet.' (*Ibid.*, p. 272.)

Finally Maryon gave an overall description of Palestine: 'Palestine presents all different varieties of plain and mountain, hill and valley, river and lake, and has likewise an exceedingly fine climate. The luxuriance of vegetation is not to be described. Fruits of all sorts, from the banana to the blackberry are abundant. The banks of the rivers are clothed naturally with oleander, myrtle, arbutus and other flowering shrubs.' (*Ibid.*, p. 319.)

In 1856, Reverend Arthur Stanley wrote that Palestine was not only reputed as being 'the land of wheat and barley, vineyards, fig trees, pomegranates, olive oil and honey, but is decidedly a fertile country, a country of streams and springs that supply plains and mountains with water.' (*Sinai and Palestine*, London: Hazel and Watson, 1910, p. 98.)

Moreover, Stanley's observation was very decisive: 'Palestine, due to its maximal fertility, and not merely its location, can be considered as a gift to the eastern world, a gift the possession of which can be considered an endowment from God, and as the place for which nations



compete.’ (*Ibid.* p. 99.)

Furthermore, the American missionary William Thompson presented the most comprehensive and accurate description of Palestine in the 19th century. Between 1832 and 1876 he had visited all places in the Holy Land cited in the Bible. First, he visited the area between Jerusalem and Bethlehem: ‘In Spring, and currently, the greenery of wheat covers a great part of this hill. This view is so rare a sight in this part of Palestine. . .’ (*The Land and the Book*, New York: Harper Bros., 1882, p. 24.) Thompson also noted that this area comprised a fertile land that produced pears, grapes, figs and almonds etc. . . . in addition to the usual products of olives. . .’ (*Ibid.*, p. 70.) (The exact area is not defined.) When Thompson approached Ramallah he found that ‘vineyards covered the surrounding hills which were filled with figs and olives, while apples, pears, pomegranates and other fruits were abundant in the vicinity of the village.’ (*Ibid.* p. 107.) To the north in the Farida valley, he found that he was ‘crossing a pleasant area which was surrounded with fertile valleys on both sides, descending into similar valleys covered with trees of all kinds’. (*Ibid.*, p. 154.) From there, Thompson headed northward to Jenin where ‘the lake dries up during early summer and its eminently rich, fertile soil is planted with cucumbers, melons, maize and other summer products’. (*Ibid.*, p. 166.)

Heading westward, Thompson entered Marj Ibn Amer where ‘the soil was divided into squares of wheat, barley, corn, Indian wheat, maize, sesame and even cotton. Traversed by dark strips of uncultivated soil, and across the hills, groves of fig and olive trees descended into the plain.’ (*Ibid.*, p. 209.) Furthermore, on his way to Acre, Thompson discovered that its plain ‘was cultivated and that it was very fertile as evidenced by the green expanse of meadows.’ (*Ibid.*, p. 251.) As for Galilee, it was distinguished for its olive groves and green hills due to the abundance of water in the Batuf plain where the soil ‘is eminently rich’. (*Ibid.*, p. 303.) Finally, Thompson found that the area located between Nazareth and Tiberias was a fertile area with ‘green valleys, olive groves and corn fields speaking of peace and fertility’. (*Ibid.*, p. 311.)

Mark Twain visited Palestine as a tourist in 1867. In the vicinity of Lake Tiberias near Dan he found himself ‘in a green valley five or six miles wide and fifteen miles long where the so-called sources of the Jordan river flow toward Lake Tiberias. . . which is surrounded by

marshes where cane is grown. Half of the land between this marsh and the mountains, which serve as a wall of the valley from the direction of Dan, is fertile and it is irrigated by the river of Jordan.' (*Innocents Abroad*, Signet, p. 345.) By 'marsh' Twain meant the area that was drained and converted into cultivable land by the first Zionist settlers.

Afterwards Twain travelled to Marj Ibn Amer where Mount Tabor 'rose 1400 feet high above the conifer forest surrounding it, a monument of the famous land, and a delight to eyes grown weary from viewing the monotonous Syrian desert only. We ascended the passage extending from the top of the mountain passing through breezy enclaves of briars and oaks. The view is beautiful from the mountain top, for Marj Ibn Amer lies at the bottom like a chess board, with its square fields, the cluster of white villages appearing like fine dots on the outskirts; and the roads and distant passages look like thin pencil lines.' (*Ibid.*, p. 375.)

Then Twain left Galilee and rode westward until he reached Nablus 'after passing by several hillocks covered with fig trees and vineyards. . . .' (*Ibid.*, p. 396.) He also found 'that the narrow valley in which Nablus lay was furrowed and that the soil was dark and fertile. It was also well-irrigated and eminently green if contrasted with the surrounding barren hills.' (*Ibid.*, p. 390.) Of the Jerusalem valley Twain says: 'We reached orchards rich with figs, apricots, pomegranates and the like followed by an arid mountainous area.' (*Ibid.*, p. 439.)

Claude Conder, in his *Seasonal Report* (periodical) (June-July, 1876) written for the Committee for the Exploration of Palestine, published an article entitled 'The Fertility of Ancient Palestine.' In this article he discussed the physical and natural characteristics of Palestine during that period, comparing them with the Bible's account for the purpose of noting any basic changes. He concluded that 'the valleys, the small plains and the hills have not changed. Wheat, barley, vineyards, olives, figs and pomegranates are still the chief products of this soil. . . and there are hardly any natural crops mentioned in the Bible that are not available in modern Palestine.' (p. 12.)

Conder proceeded to divide Palestine into geophysical areas, studying each separately. He observed that 'the lowland is representative of all the area located between the mountains, rich with water resources, and the plains. This area is basically composed of soft limestone and it is the richest part of the country, full of olives and wheat, exposed to

sea breeze and watered by numerous springs. . . (*Ibid.*, p. 123.) Moreover, these hills can be divided into three parts: 1) Hebron, which is reputed for its vineyards; 2) Jerusalem, which is known for its wheat, olives and figs; and 3) Nablus or rugged Mount Ephraim, whose chief product is figs.

Conder found that the Nablus area was ‘. . . the richest part of the country, where the villages of stone houses were well-constructed, and where the long olive groves were superior to those of Judea, and where the wheat in the Sha‘ir valley was good and abundant.’ (*Ibid.*, p. 126.) Further, on the coastal plains ‘the soil near Gaza was fertile so that one could obtain good crops through mere scratching of the soil. . . and the groves of Eshkelon and Jaffa where oranges, lemons and bananas thrive are well-known.’ (*Ibid.*, p. 127.) He continues to tell us that in Marj Ibn Amer ‘the soil is exceedingly rich. . . and its chief products are wheat, cotton, tobacco, sesame, corn, maize, lentils and all kinds of edible vegetables.’ (*Ibid.*, p. 128.)

The last area studied by Conder was Galilee, ‘the most beautiful and perhaps the most healthy part of Palestine. . . where vineyards are still planted. . . and where the fertility surpasses that of Judea.’ (*Ibid.*, p. 130.)

If this large number of examples has been tedious, one should take into consideration that this is only a part of the whole picture of the period before and after 1875. In short, these examples strongly support the view that the principal areas of Palestine have been fertile and productive over a long period of time. Of course, not all of Palestine was fertile; but, without denying the improvements introduced by the Zionists, the issue becomes simply one of restoring the balance. Sir John Richmond admits in a letter sent to *The Observer*, (September 28, 1969), that ‘Israel’s adoption of scientific methods and principles has actually improved agricultural production in Palestine. But to say that Palestine was a desert before the arrival of the Zionists is senseless. I first saw Palestine in 1923 and I can vouch for the abundance of green Arab territory. The Arabs had planted orange trees in the coastal plains before Zionism was thought of. Even in the Raft plain area, an Arab, Musa al-Alami, was the first to turn it into a green productive area.’

We shall pause at this point, because during Conder’s times, or shortly after, the first Zionist settlements were established in Palestine. There-

fore it became possible to claim (as it has in fact been claimed) that any green spot in the 'desert' since the end of the century is a product of their efforts. As an example of this, in 1895 the American traveller, Edna Brown described Jaffa as being surrounded by 'thousands of acres' of 'orange and lemon groves', and the neighbouring plains of Sharon as 'a beautiful area full of flowers as far as one can see.' (*From Vermont to Damascus*, Boston, 1895, pp. 69-70). But in the following sentence she mentioned 'a Jewish agricultural school to our right', which doubtless accounts for the eruption of this sudden fertility. The same author notes that an American botanist travelling there 'informed us that there are hundreds of wild flowers. The Palestinian plains are filled with them and in several places you will see the beautiful green carpet filled with flowers. The area could be called the flowering kingdom. . . .' (*Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.) We admit that we have our doubts as to whether the Jewish Agricultural School or some of the neighbouring farmers planted all of that area. But since we cannot prove the contrary, we shall gladly eliminate this example from our list.<sup>(43)</sup>

## 26. WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME OF ZIONIST ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN PALESTINE UP TO THE END OF THE MANDATE?

The best way to answer this question is to refer to the figures of the National Income of the Jewish community in Palestine, since these figures include the results of the various economic activities within the framework of the economy and present these results in figures. According to the accounts of the National Income for the years 1936, 1939, 1944, and 1945 that are available, the per capita income (in Palestine) has increased as the following table will show.

These figures give the best answer to the Zionist claim that they (the Zionists) have transformed Palestine from semi-desert into a developing, vital and successful economy. It is shown that the National Income of both the Arab and the Jew did not rise considerably if we consider pre-war prices as a base. If we consider the inflationary prices, then there is an increase equivalent to 19 per cent for the Arabs and 23 per cent for the Jews during the nine years from 1936 to 1945. This increase is reasonable but is not paramount. For if we take the graphic figures of

<sup>(43)</sup> The text of the answer to the above question was originally written as a paper in English, then translated into Arabic for the purpose of publication in *Palestine Affairs*, Vol. 2, 1971. Because of the difficulty in obtaining the original English text, it has been necessary to translate it back into English from the Arabic. Consequently there will be discrepancies between the original quotes (in form but not content) and how they appear in this book.

*Statistics of the National Income for the Years 1936,  
1944, 1945 in Palestinian £s*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Palestinian per Capita Income</i>	<i>Jewish per Capita Income</i>
1936: in current prices	24	44
1944: in current prices	74	139
1944: in pre-war prices (adjusted to a graphical scale of wholesale prices)	22	42
1944: in pre-war prices (adjusted to a graphical scale of the cost of living)	31	57
1945: in current prices	79	144
1945: in pre-war prices (adjusted to a graphical scale of wholesale prices)	23	41
1945: in pre-war prices (adjusted to a graphical scale of the cost of living)	30	54

the wholesale prices as a base, we find a 6 per cent decrease in the income of the individual Arab, and a 7 per cent decrease in the income of the individual Jew during those nine years. We can go further and say that the increase resulting from calculating 1945 prices taking 1936 as a base is not exact because the graphic figures are artificially compressed because they include the prices of certain essential goods that were under control during the war. The goods themselves were also under a ration system because there were not sufficient for the consumption needs, which resulted in an active black market. Thus the graphic figures are, in fact, lower than they should be . . . [Thus] the achievements of the Jewish economy in Palestine, although significant, are less than what they seem to be at first glance before studying them carefully . . .<sup>(44)</sup>

<sup>(44)</sup> Yusif Saycgh, pp. 88-90 (abridged).



### CHAPTER III

## PALESTINIAN ARAB REACTION TO ZIONISM

27. IS IT TRUE THAT NATIONALISM HAS NO DEEP ROOTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE ARABS OF PALESTINE? DID THE PALESTINIAN ARABS DISPLAY A NATIONALIST AWARENESS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY?

Amos Elon, himself an Israeli and a Zionist, repudiates the Zionist argument that nationalism had no deep roots in the history of the Palestinian Arabs by saying that if 'there was little evidence' of Arab nationalism, '*was there much more evidence of Jewish nationalism?*' Zionism was still rejected by a majority of Jews in the Diaspora.'<sup>(1)</sup> (ed's. italics.) Elon goes on to point out some indicators of Arab nationalist consciousness among Palestinian Arabs. He says: 'In 1881 . . . secret societies of Arab nationalists in Beirut and Damascus were distributing illegal pamphlets and revolutionary placards requesting home rule for the Arabs of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. As for the Zionists, *in 1881 a pamphlet was circulating in Rumania presenting Palestine as a virtually deserted wasteland.*'<sup>(2)</sup> (ed's. italics). And in 1905, Elon says: 'The pioneers of the second wave [of Jewish immigrants] were just beginning to arrive in Palestine when Naguib Azuri, a Christian Arab and former Ottoman official in Jerusalem, founded a society in Paris known as the *Ligue de la Patrie Arabe*. The *Ligue* was destined to play a leading role in the development of Arab nationalism. Azuri published a book entitled *Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe*. It contained an attack on Zionism, but at the time few men of the Second Aliya apparently read it.'<sup>(3)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> Elon, *Founders and Sons*, p. 152.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

Palestine at the turn of the last century was still a part of the Ottoman Empire. Thus:

It would be absurd and fruitless, to try to isolate the particular role the Palestinians played in the nationalist movement of the past 75 years' or more . . . But if we examine the names of the pioneers of the movement, we will discover Palestinian names . . . Palestinians were members of political movements and attended national conventions. . . They offered martyrs to the movement too. Jamal Pasha executed a number of Palestinians in Jerusalem and Gaza as well as in Damascus and Beirut.<sup>(4)</sup>

The Zionist ESCO Foundation observed that:

Arab political activity in Palestine between 1917 and 1920 was not distinguishable from that of Syria. It emanated from Damascus and demanded a united Syria, rejecting the policy of the Jewish national home in Palestine, along with the claims for a separate regime in the Lebanon. Palestine was always referred to pointedly as Southern Syria by both Palestinian and Syrian leaders'.<sup>(5)</sup>

This Zionist authority emphasized the depth and effect of nationalism in Palestine and other Arab areas by saying: 'There is no doubt that a powerful social force which may be properly described as Arab nationalism is at work at transforming the life of the people in the Near East, and that this force, besides manifesting antagonism to the alien domination of the British and the French, is also today opposed to the Jewish aspirations in Palestine.'<sup>(6)</sup>

Amos Elon makes reference to an interview once given by Ben Gurion which proves quite clearly the existence of an 'anti-Zionist nationalism among the Palestinian Arabs'. In 1915 Ben Gurion had been arrested by the Turkish authorities as a Zionist agitator, and while awaiting the result of his appeal to the Turkish Governor General, he met a former fellow – student from the University of Istanbul—a young Arab. The two had been 'quite close and friendly', according to Ben Gurion, 'even though we never discussed politics'.

Seeing Ben Gurion under guard, inside the Turkish military fortress, the young Arab anxiously inquired what on earth had happened, and

<sup>(4)</sup> Anis Sayegh, *Palestine and Arab Nationalism* (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1966), pp. 55-56.

<sup>(5)</sup> ESCO Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), Vol. 1, pp. 472-473.

<sup>(6)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 443.



if he could be of any help. 'I told him I was under arrest as a Zionist, that the Turks wanted to expel me from the country. He looked me up and down silently. "As your friend," he said, "I am deeply sorry. But as an Arab I am pleased." It came down on me like a blow,' Ben Gurion recollected. 'I said to myself, "so there is an Arab national movement here" [and not just in Lebanon and Syria]. It hit me like a bomb. I was completely confounded...'

Elon comments: 'If the sudden discovery of a nationalist mood among natives, bitterly opposed to Zionist settlement, had shocked Ben Gurion and confounded him, as he later claimed, he seems to have remained strangely quiet about it.'<sup>(7)</sup>

## 28. WHEN DID THE PALESTINIAN ARABS BECOME AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF ZIONIST COLONIZATION?

The Palestinian Arabs accorded the early Jewish immigrants a hospitable welcome, believing them to be 'pilgrims' or else 'refugees fleeing persecution in Eastern Europe'.<sup>(8)</sup> Amos Elon relates that the Arabs of Sarafand, a village close to Rishon le-Zion, told the first settlers of 1883, 'We are brothers with our neighbours, the Children of Israel, from time immemorial [and] as brothers we shall live with them.'<sup>(9)</sup> But Arab friendliness began to give way to suspicion and resentment. The methodical ousting of Arab farmers, labourers and watchmen from the new Zionist colonies, and the systematic boycott of Arab produce, aroused Arab anger. The first official Palestinian protest against Zionist intrusion was made on June 24, 1891 when some Jerusalem notables sent a petition to Constantinople asking for the prohibition of entry and land purchase by Jews.<sup>(10)</sup> 'After the fall of Abdul Hamid and the proclamation of the Constitution matters took a new turn... and the Arabs began to fight in the Turkish Parliament for their nationalist aspirations. They looked upon Zionism as an enemy that was trying to invade districts which they considered purely Arab.'<sup>(11)</sup> 'Despite official Zionist declarations (1913) to the contrary,

<sup>(7)</sup> Elon, *Founders and Sons*, p. 155.

<sup>(8)</sup> Rabinowicz, *Fifty Years of Zionism* (London: 1950), p. 131.

<sup>(9)</sup> Elon, p. 162.

<sup>(10)</sup> See Neville Mandel, 'Turks, Arab and Jewish Immigrants into Palestine, 1882-1914', *Middle Eastern Affairs*, No. 4, (Oxford 1965) pp. 76-108.

<sup>(11)</sup> *Jewish-Arab Affairs* (Jerusalem, June 1931), pp. 11-14.

Arab leaders in Palestine and elsewhere were convinced that the sole object of the Zionist Movement was to establish a Jewish state which centered in Palestine, might even extend as far as Iraq.<sup>'(12)</sup>

In 1914 the Zionist leader Sokolow came to Palestine with the object of examining Arab-Zionist relations. He used the usual Zionist arguments that the Jews were fellow Semites 'returning home', that they could be of use to the Arabs in improving the land and would respect Arab culture. One Arab leader retorted that Sokolow's words were 'very, very nice' but that the Jews did not act by them: they were an economic threat to the local people and—as the vanguard of a Great Power invasion—a political danger as well.<sup>(13)</sup>

Tawfik Ali Burro states that the Palestinians were already campaigning against Zionism in 1911:

In the first half of 1911 two Arab envoys (Shukri al-Asali, the representative from Damascus, and Rohi al-Khalidi, the representative from Jerusalem) stood up in the House of Representatives and raised the question of Zionist colonization in Palestine, and Jewish immigration. The first, by way of an introduction to his campaign, 'distributed among the members postal stamps bearing the names of Herzl and Nordau which the Zionists in Palestine stuck on their letters sent through the foreign Post Offices. . . . ' He then spoke of 'the clubs, and courts which look into non-criminal cases, the flags they raise on their holidays and the national hymns they sing. They wish to buy the land over-looking the Hijaz railway and intend to expand into Syria until Iraq.' The other representative spoke of the aims and purposes of Zionism in Palestine citing the text of a letter written by one 'Uzbitchki' known as the Jewish prince, a member of the Zionist Organization (possibly Menahem Ussischkin, the Zionist leader), dealing with the means necessary to bring the Zionist movement to fulfill its goal.<sup>(14)</sup>

Amos Elon relates the following incident that clearly indicates early Arab opposition to Zionist immigration and settlement. (*Founders and Sons*, pp. 151-152).

A typical incident took place in 1909. Ben Gurion, Ben Zvi, and the rest of the *Poale Zion* leadership were attending a regional party confer-

<sup>(12)</sup> Neville Mandel, 'Attempts at an Arab Zionist Entente, 1913-1914', *Middle Eastern Studies* (London: April 1965), Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 240.

<sup>(13)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 253-254.

<sup>(14)</sup> Tawfik Ali Burro, *The Arabs and the Turks, 1908-1914* (Cairo: Institute of Higher Arab Studies, 1960), p. 282-283. See *Al-Ahram*, No. 10092, 25 May 1911 and *Al-Mua'yyad*, No. 6309, 8 March, 1911.

ence in the Galilee at Segera, a little settlement at the foot of Mount Tabor. The land had been purchased a few years earlier at a very high price from an absentee Arab landlord in Beirut. The transaction led to serious clashes with dispossessed Arab serfs, who had not been compensated by the seller. At a later stage, the Jewish buyers paid the former serfs additional sums over and above the legal purchase price, in order to facilitate better neighborhood relations. But by then the problem was already overshadowed by the politics of nationalism. Rashid Bey, the Turkish Governor General who resided in Beirut and apparently did not care whether Arab, German, or Jewish settlers were living in Galilee, had approved the transaction. At one point he even sent troops to enforce it. But his deputy in Tiberias, Amin Arsalan, the scion of a well-known local Druse family, was already caught up by nascent Syrian-Arab nationalism. Arsalan sided with the serfs. A feudal landowner himself, his reasoning was neither social nor humanitarian, but nationalistic. He told Chaim Kalvarisky, Rothschild's agent in the Galilee, that he was opposed to Jewish settlement because he objected to the 'de-nationalization of the Galilee'.

## 29. HAVE THE ARABS EVER AGREED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JEWISH NATIONAL HOME IN PALESTINE?

The various investigating commissions sent to Palestine in the wake of every outbreak of disturbances all came to the same conclusion with regard to the Arab position towards the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. A sample of the findings of these commissions can be taken from the report of the Royal Palestine Commission investigating the disturbances of 1936, which said:

43. After examining this and other evidence and studying the course of events in Palestine since the War, we have no doubt as to what were the underlying causes of the disturbances' of last year. They were:—

- 1) The desire of the Arabs for national independence
- ii) Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

44) We make the following comments on these two causes:—

- 1) They were the same underlying causes as those which brought about the 'disturbances' of 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1933.

- ii) They were, and always have been, inextricably linked together. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate under which it was to be implemented involved the denial of national independence at the outset.

The subsequent growth of the National Home created a practical obstacle, and the only serious one, to the concession later of national independence. It was believed that its further growth might mean the political as well as economic subjection of the Arabs to the Jews; so that, if ultimately the Mandate should terminate and Palestine become independent, it would not be national independence in the Arab sense but self-government by a Jewish majority.

iii) They were the only 'underlying' causes. All the other factors were complementary or subsidiary, aggravating the two causes or helping to determine the time at which the disturbances broke out.<sup>(15)</sup>

30. HAVE THE ARABS OF PALESTINE EVER AGREED TO UNLIMITED JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE OR SHOWN ANY WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE A SELF-GOVERNING JEWISH STATE IN PALESTINE?

The King-Crane Commission entrusted with the task of investigating the situation in Palestine based its recommendations on the following findings:

If that principle [President Wilson's principle of self-determination] is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine—nearly nine-tenths of the whole—are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed upon than this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the forms of the law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than seventy-two per cent—1,350 in all—of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests—those for a united Syria and for independence—had a larger support. This general feeling was duly voiced by the General Syrian Congress in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of the statement.

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-

<sup>(15)</sup> British Government, *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (London: HMSO, 1937), pp. 110-111.

Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. . . . That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria.<sup>(16)</sup>

Amos Elon relates that Weizmann realized that the Jewish state 'was unacceptable to the Arabs'. He told an American Jewish meeting: '*In Palestine there is a people which resists our coming*,'<sup>(17)</sup> and Elon observed further that the Arabs immediately interpreted 'the vague, moderate wording' of the Balfour Declaration 'in the most extreme possible context'.<sup>(18)</sup>

### 31. DID THE ARABS WELCOME THE SETTLEMENT OF JEWS IN PALESTINE IN THE BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD BENEFIT ECONOMICALLY?

The Palestine Royal Commission of 1937 reported on its conference with the Arab Higher Committee, and presented its views on the Arab position:

Thus it is clear that the standpoint of the Arab leaders has not shifted an inch from that which they adopted when first they understood the implications of the Balfour Declaration. The events of 17 years have only served to stiffen and embitter their resistance, and, as they argue, to strengthen their case. And the core of their case, it must be stressed again, is political. There has been no doubt a sense of economic rivalry between the races; and the Arabs have been alarmed at the business capacity the Jews have shown and the financial resources they can command. But so far (as we have just explained) they have not suffered. On the balance the National Home has meant a substantial material gain to them.<sup>(19)</sup> Not unnaturally they deny it. But even if they could

<sup>(16)</sup> George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Beirut: Khayats, 1956), pp. 449. (See ESCO, pp. 471-473).

<sup>(17)</sup> Elon, p. 176.

<sup>(18)</sup> Elon, p. 174.

<sup>(19)</sup> Actually the commissioners failed to indicate how the National Home meant 'a substantial material gain' to the Arabs. In the previous section of their report, 'Arab Progress' (pp. 125-130), they conceded that 'since, until a year or so ago, the technical equipment of the Palestine Government for exact sociological inquiry was deplorably inadequate, our judgement must be taken as only a rough, though we believe it to be fair, opinion on a complicated question' (p. 125). This 'fair' 'opinion' was based on a 'wealth of arguments and statistics' presented by the Jews (p. 125) which the commissioners found themselves obliged to qualify at every turn.

be persuaded to admit it, we are quite convinced it would not appreciably weaken their antagonism. Their feeling on the matter has been put in some such figurative language as this: 'You say we are better off: you say my house has been enriched by the strangers who have entered it. But it is my house, and I did not invite the strangers in, or ask them to enrich it, and I do not care how poor or bare it is if only I am master in it.'<sup>(20)</sup>

Amos Elon likewise refutes this Zionist claim in speaking about Arthur Ruppin. He says that 'at first, like most of his colleagues, he [Ruppin] overlooked the national aspirations of the Arabs. He assumed that they could be appeased through economic benefits. But earlier than most he realized the short-sightedness of this approach.'<sup>(21)</sup>

### 32. WAS THERE, PRIOR TO 1948, A PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE FOR CLEAR POLITICAL AIMS?

The ESCO *Palestine Study*<sup>(22)</sup> tells us:

The major and direct motivation of Arab political policy in Palestine was the achievement of national independence under the control of the Arabs; consequently, the major Arab political parties were opposed to the Balfour Declaration and to the Mandate based on it.

In January 1919, Arab notables in Palestine met in Jerusalem in what was termed an 'All-Arab Palestine Conference'. The resolutions of this Congress...expressed the following demands: 1) repudiation of the promise of a national home to the Jews; 2) rejection of the French claims on Syria; 3) establishment of a united independent Syrian Government 'within the Arab nation'.<sup>(23)</sup>

In June 1919 Moslem, Christian and Jewish elected representatives from Syria, Lebanon and Palestine met in Damascus in the General Syrian Congress.<sup>(24)</sup> The seventh resolution, voted unanimously, declared:

7. We reject the claims of the Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that part of Southern Syria which is known as Palestine, and we are opposed to Jewish immigration into any part of the

<sup>(20)</sup> *Report of Palestine Royal Commission*, pp. 130-131.

<sup>(21)</sup> Elon, p. 177.

<sup>(22)</sup> ESCO *Palestine Study*, Vol. 1, p. 471.

<sup>(23)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4/3.

<sup>(24)</sup> For the connection between Damascus and Palestine see citation from ESCO *Palestine Study, Handbook*, p. 46.

country. We do not acknowledge that they have a title, and we regard their claims as a grave menace to our national, political and economic life. Our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities which are ours in common.<sup>(25)</sup>

These aims and demands were reiterated in the Third Palestine Arab Congress in Haifa (December 1920); in the Fourth Congress in Jerusalem (June 1921); in the Fifth Congress in Nablus (August 1922); in the Sixth Congress in Jaffa (June 1923); in the Seventh Congress in Jerusalem (June 1928); and in the First and Second Palestinian Arab Youth Congresses which met in 1932 and 1935. These same aims and demands were included in the political platforms of the various Palestinian political parties (the Arab Independence Party, the National Defense Party, the Arab Palestinian Party, the Reform Party, the Nationalist Bloc).<sup>(26)</sup>

Following are examples of such resolutions:

I) The Seventh Arab Congress which convened in Jerusalem in the year 1928 took *inter alia* the following resolution:

The people of Palestine cannot and will not tolerate the present absolute colonial system of Government, and urgently insist upon and demand the establishment of a representative body to lay its own Constitution and guarantee the formation of a democratic parliamentary government.<sup>(27)</sup>

II) In the year 1935 an Arab delegation, called the United Front, submitted the following demands to the British High Commissioner Wanchope:

1. The establishment of democratic government in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 2 of the Palestine Mandate.
2. Prohibition of the transfer of Arab lands to Jews and the enactment of a law similar to the Five Faddan Law in Egypt.
3. a) The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration . . .  
b) Legislation to require all lawful residents to obtain and carry identity cards.

<sup>(25)</sup> George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 441.

<sup>(26)</sup> For details see Issa Sifri, 'Arab Palestine between the Mandate and Zionism', in ESCO *Palestine Study* (Jaffa, 1937).

<sup>(27)</sup> League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the 14th Session*, October-November, 1928, annex 9, p. 246.

c) Immediate and effective investigation into illicit immigration.<sup>(28)</sup>

III) These demands became the political aims of the succeeding 1936 all-out revolt in Palestine when the Supreme Arab Council, formed from the various political parties, endorsed them on April 25, 1936 in a slightly altered form:

1. Stoppage of Jewish immigration.
2. Prohibition of land sales to Jews.
3. Formation of a national government responsible to the representative council.<sup>(29)</sup>

The Palestinian conference that convened in Jerusalem on May 7, 1936 and included 150 representatives of the various national strike committees and the militants reiterated the demand for a halt to Jewish immigration.<sup>(30)</sup>

### 33. DID THE ARAB PALESTINIAN WORKERS REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES DURING THE ARAB-ZIONIST CONFLICT IN PALESTINE?

They did not. The Arab Palestinian workers sided with their brethren and struggled against Zionist imperialism in Palestine. The Arab workers took an active part in all the revolts by which the Palestinian people expressed their rejection of both British and Zionist imperialism.

Moreover, it should be emphasized that the Arab Palestinian workers based their participation on a clear understanding of the dimensions of the battle they were involved in. Testifying before the Anglo-American Investigation Commission in 1946, Sami Taha, head of the Arab Workers Union, emphasized 'the participation of the Arab workers in the national struggle'. Speaking of the atmosphere in which his Union was founded he said:

Our labor movement has grown in a political atmosphere whose only aim is to oppose Zionism and Imperialism. We, as Union members, have had no other aim than opposing Zionism and Imperialism. Hence

<sup>(28)</sup> Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report by HM Government in the U.K. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1935* (Colonial no. 112; London, 1936), p. 15.

<sup>(29)</sup> *The Times* (London), April 29, 1936, p. 14.

<sup>(30)</sup> Matiel E. T. Nogannam, *The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem* (London, 1937), pp. 300-301.



workers, as individuals, have continued to struggle politically with their people, and as a group, they struggle economically to raise their standard.

Sami Taha affirmed further that ‘political and economic colonization of any country, and the competition for such colonization have always been the cause of unrest in the world. Consequently, it has become important to wipe out imperialism in all its shapes and colors in order to establish peace.’ Of Zionism he said, ‘It is a reactionary capitalist movement; therefore we struggle against it’.<sup>(31)</sup>

#### 34. WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE OF ARAB PEASANTS TOWARDS ZIONISM?

One Royal Commission observed that ‘the Arab peasants and villagers are probably more politically minded than many people of Europe.’<sup>(32)</sup> David Waines adds to this observation that ‘peasant parties, organized mainly by lawyers, sprang up throughout Palestine in the mid-twenties. A large conference of about 1,000 farmers was held in tents near Hebron in 1929 and several resolutions were passed relating to their needs. . . .’<sup>(33)</sup>

#### 35. DID THE PALESTINIAN WOMEN PARTICIPATE IN THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT?

David Waines says: ‘The growing nationalist movement was further supported by Arab women. In October 1929, a Palestine Arab Women’s Congress was held in Jerusalem.’<sup>(34)</sup> Women from all over the country presented reports to the congress on the unsatisfactory conditions in their communities. Resolutions were handed to the high commissioner *and a demonstration against the mandate policy* [ed’s italics] was staged through the streets of the Holy City. It was the first time in Palestine’s long history that women had indulged in political activities.’<sup>(35)</sup>

<sup>(31)</sup> Jamil Shukairi, *Collected Testimonies and Memoranda* presented the Anglo-American Investigation Commission concerning Palestine (1946), pp. 63-74.

<sup>(32)</sup> Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929, *Cmd. 3530*, p. 129.

<sup>(33)</sup> Waines, p. 73.

<sup>(34)</sup> F.F. Andrews, *The Holy Land under Mandate* (New York, 1931), Vol. 2 pp. 206-210 (cited by Waines).

<sup>(35)</sup> Waines, p. 73.

36. WHAT STAND WAS TAKEN BY THE CHRISTIAN ARABS OF PALESTINE DURING THE PRE-1948 PERIOD OF THE ARAB-ZIONIST CONFLICT?

A feature of the [1917-1920] period was the organization of the Moslem-Christian societies in the leading towns of Palestine, with the purpose of exercising pressure on the Peace Conference and the British Government to abrogate the Balfour Declaration. The Moslem-Christian societies like the Arab nationalists also demanded the inclusion of a united Syria. The organization of these joint societies is significant in that it . . . is indicative of the growing strength of the national as against the purely religious tie. . . .<sup>(36)</sup>

And Anis Sayegh, in his book *Palestine and Arab Nationalism* (pp. 11-21), informs us:

From the moment that the inhabitants of Palestine recognized the Zionist designs on their country, the Christian Arabs never ceased to participate in all aspects of the national struggle. They have joined the Resistance; they have participated in forming parties and political organizations bearing along with others the responsibilities of leadership; they wrote; they contributed to the field of education and national guidance; they campaigned for the Palestine cause and helped finance the national movement.

37. WERE THE NON-PALESTINIAN ARABS AWARE OF THE ZIONIST DANGER WHEN IT WAS STILL AT ITS INCEPTION?

In the summer of 1891 . . . [a] group of Jerusalem notables cabled to the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul demanding that a Firman (decree) be issued forbidding Zionists to own land in Palestine. . .

As time went by, the Arabs in neighbouring areas moved along a parallel path in their struggle against land sales to the Zionists. In Transjordan the inhabitants perceived the Zionists' attempt to infiltrate into the area. They expelled a group of Zionists, who had established near Jerash the first colony in Transjordan. Houses, crops and farm animals were destroyed and the Zionists were never allowed to return. This occurred in 1898. In the Spring of the same year, the nationalist Egyptian newspapers took to warning against the dangers of the resolution of the Basle Congress as soon as news of the event reached Egypt. Led by the Lebanese expatriate Muhamed Rashid Rida, the Egyptian papers began to run articles exposing the Zionist plot. . . Another Lebanese

<sup>(36)</sup> ESCO, *Palestine Study*, pp. 472-473.

newspaperman, Najib Nassar, led a campaign in the Palestinian newspapers against the Zionist infiltration. He devoted his newspaper in Haifa, *Al Carmel*, to this end. A Syrian, Shukri al-Asali, led the Arab campaign in the Turkish Parliament against the land sales. A large number of Arab members, mostly non-Palestinians, backed him until he succeeded in forcing the Turkish authorities to ban anew the sale of land.<sup>(37)</sup>

38. WHAT ROLE DID THE PALESTINIANS PLAY IN THE ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR?

The role played by Palestine in the Arab cause during the late thirties had several facets:

1. The growing Zionist and imperialist danger to Palestine intensified the anger of the Arabs outside against the sources of these two dangers and led them to take quick action.

2. The Arab revolt in Palestine, and the brave deeds of the Palestinian men and women, became models of the kind of action to be taken against imperialism.

3. Many Palestinian leaders left Palestine for neighbouring states and steered the course of the national struggle in some of the Arab capitals (Baghdad mostly; Damascus, Beirut and Cairo to a lesser degree). They were a major influence in shaping the events that took place in the Middle East during the first twenty months of the war. For the first time since the Arab Revolt a quarter of a century earlier, Arabs from one state led the Arabs of another in their revolt against developments.

... Thus we can say that the Palestine problem played a major role in the liberation movements and national revolts in the area at the time. We can go further even and say that those revolts and movements were a direct reflection and a necessary result of the Palestinian developments. In Syria, for example, where fugitives from Palestine sought refuge, there were held the first three popular and broadly representative congresses for the support of the Palestinian people.

[In Baghdad] since the middle of 1939, gathered representatives of the various national movements in Western Asia. The majority were Palestinians, revolutionaries and politicians, who had fled to Baghdad *via* Damascus and Beirut. In recognition of the leading role of the Palestinian Revolt and of the right of the Palestinian people to liberation,

<sup>(37)</sup> Anis Sayegh, *Palestine and Arab Nationalism*, pp. 30-35.

and in affirmation of the oneness of the Arab struggle, the Iraqis were not satisfied merely to welcome their Palestinian brethren, but went to the extent of forming with them national committees entrusted with the task of supervising Arab action. These committees worked to mobilize the people, contacted foreign powers, drew plans, armed the Arab Forces and formed chapters of themselves in the Arab states. These committees, composed mostly of Palestinians, were responsible for the Iraqi higher foreign policies for twenty months.

Meanwhile the majority inside 'the Arab Legion' (the small Trans-jordanian army composed of a Palestinian majority, a Jordanian minority and British command) refused to follow British orders to take part in a military campaign against Iraq designed to topple the national regime there.<sup>(38)</sup>

<sup>(38)</sup> Ibid., pp. 62-79.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE DISPLACEMENT OF PALESTINIANS

#### 39. DID THE ZIONIST FORCES MOUNT ANY MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PALESTINE BEFORE MAY 15, 1948?

At the end of March 1948 the Chief Operations Officer at Haganah headquarters summed up the situation in Palestine thus: 'The only solution is to take the initiative into our hands, to try to achieve a military decision by going over to the offensive.'<sup>(1)</sup>This decision was motivated by the desire of the Jewish Agency to establish a Zionist state in Palestine through a simple *fait accompli* in order to put an end to the attempts that were taking place in the United Nations to suspend the partition plan and replace it by a trusteeship plan. The conclusion that was reached by the Haganah high command was actually preceded by the preparation of a comprehensive offensive operational Plan D, whose objective was 'to gain control of the area allotted to the Jewish State and defend its borders and those of the blocs of Jewish settlement and such Jewish population as were outside those borders, against a regular or pararegular enemy operating from bases outside or inside the area of the Jewish State'.<sup>(2)</sup>

On April 1, the Haganah, which by April was in full control of all the Jewish fighting forces, including the Irgun group, started the first of thirteen military campaigns that comprised Plan D; eight of these were conducted against Arab villages outside the area allotted to the Jewish state. (These operations were: Nachshon, April 1, 1948; Harel, April 15; Misparayim, April 28; Matateh, May 3; Maccabi,

<sup>(1)</sup> Netanel Lorch, *Israel's War of Independence, 1947-49* (Hartford: Hartmore House Inc., 1968), p. 84.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

May 7; Gideon, May 11; Barak, May 12; Ben Ami, May 14; Pitchfork, May 14; Schfilon, May 14.) The net results of these operations were: the occupation of Haifa, the occupation of the villages surrounding Jaffa, the 'purification' of Eastern Galilee of Arabs, the occupation of villages connecting Tiberias with Eastern Galilee, the occupation of Beisan, the occupation of the Arab villages in the neighbourhood of Acre and the 'purification' of Western Galilee of Arabs and the occupation of Arab residential quarters in the New City of Jerusalem.<sup>(3)</sup>

It is quite clear now that these operations were not minor skirmishes but major military operations that resulted in the occupation of the majority of Palestine before the Arab armies intervened and before the British evacuated Palestine.

#### 40. DID PLAN D CONSTITUTE A DRASTIC DEPARTURE FROM HAGANAH'S PREVIOUS STRATEGY?

The Zionist military historian, Lorch, refutes this claim in his book, *Israel's War of Independence*. He says:

At first sight, it would seem that Plan D, which for the first time in Haganah history dealt with the capture of Arab villages and cities, constituted a drastic departure from Golomb's policy and a revolutionary change in the methods and objectives of Haganah. . . . Yet such contradiction is illusory. In his policy statement Golomb had gone on to say: 'Our function is to defend by force of arms, wherever and whenever and against whomever such defense will be required, our freedom of settlement, of immigration, of development and of self-determination. We do not envisage a force which will dominate others. . . , but a force which will defend the right of Jews to come to their country, to settle it and to lead in it a free and sovereign existence.' *Such defence was now required, and there was no room for hesitation. If Jewish Jerusalem could not continue to exist without capture of the Arab village of Kastel blocking its approaches, then Kastel must be captured; if Jewish Haifa was not allowed to 'coexist' peacefully with Arab Haifa, Arab Haifa must be captured. Only Arab bases inside the Jewish State were destined to be permanently held; others would be held only temporarily as the need existed.*<sup>(4)</sup>

Is this not the same strategy, supported by the same words, that

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 90-154. See also Walid Khalidi's article, 'Plan Dalet', *Middle East Forum*, Volume 36, November 1961.

<sup>(4)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

still prevails in Israel to justify all acts of aggression against the Palestinian people and the Arab countries?

41. WERE THE ARABS THE INSTIGATORS OF THE 1948 WAR, THUS FORCING THE JEWS TO FIGHT BACK IN SELF-DEFENCE?

1. Following is a list drawn from the *New York Times* of the major military operations mounted by the Zionists before the British evacuated Palestine and before any soldier from any Arab state had entered it.

<i>Place</i>	<i>New York Times Edition</i>
Qazaza	Dec. 21, 1947
Sa'sa	Feb. 16, 1948
Haifa	Feb. 21, 1948
Salameh	March 1, 1948
Biyar Adas	March 6, 1948
Qana	March 13, 1948
Qastal	April 4, 1948
Deir Yassin	April 10, 1948
Lajjun	April 15, 1948
Saris	April 17, 1948
Tiberias	April 20, 1948
Haifa	April 22, 1948
Jerusalem	April 25, 1948
Jaffa	April 26, 1948
Acre	April 27, 1948
Jerusalem	May 1, 1948
Safad	May 7, 1948
Beisan	May 9, 1948

2. On 12 December, 1948, David Ben Gurion confirmed the fact that the Zionists had started the war in Palestine.

As April began, our War of Independence swung decisively from defense to attack. Operation 'Nachshon' . . . was launched with the capture of Arab Hulda near where we stand today and of Deir Muheisin and culminated in the storming of Qastel, the great hill fortress near Jerusalem.<sup>(1)</sup>

David Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel* (N.Y. : Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 106.

In an address delivered to American Zionists in Jerusalem on September 3, 1950, Ben Gurion said :

Until the British left, no Jewish settlement, however remote, was entered or seized by the Arabs, while the Haganah . . . captured many Arab positions and liberated Tiberias and Haifa, Jaffa and Safad . . . So, on the day of destiny, that part of Palestine where the Haganah could operate was almost clear of Arabs.<sup>(6)</sup>

3. Menachem Beigin, leader of the *Irgun Zvei Leumi* terrorist group, one time head of the Herut Party and minister in the Israeli Cabinet, admitted in his book, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, that the Zionists started the war before the creation of the state: 'In Jerusalem, as elsewhere, we were the first to pass from the defensive to the offensive. . . Arabs began to flee in terror . . . Haganah was carrying out successful attacks on other fronts, while all the Jewish forces proceeded to advance through Haifa like a knife through butter. The Arabs began to flee in panic shouting "Deir Yassin."'<sup>(7)</sup> He added: 'in the months preceding the Arab invasion, and while the five Arab states were conducting preparations, we continued to make sallies into the Arab area. . . The conquest of Jaffa stands out as an event of first rate importance in the struggle for Hebrew independence.'<sup>(8)</sup>

4. Yigal Allon, head of the Palmach in 1948, spoke of this fact in *Ha Sepher Ha Palmach*. We quote: 'There were left before us only five days, before the threatening [sic] date, the 15th of May. We saw a need to clean the inner Galilee and to create a Jewish territorial succession in the entire occupied area of the upper Galilee.' (Vol. II, p. 286).<sup>(9)</sup>

#### 42. WERE THE ZIONIST TERRORIST OPERATIONS BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE MOUNTED ONLY BY DISSIDENT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS?

No, they were not. The mandatory authorities issued a 'Statement of Information relating to Acts of Violence (Jewish)' in which it declared

<sup>(6)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 530-531.

<sup>(7)</sup> Menachem Beigin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun* (New York, 1951), p. 165.

<sup>(8)</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>(9)</sup> Cited by W. Khalidi, 'Plan Dalet', *Palestine Collected Papers* (1963), p. 77.



that 'the Haganah and its associated force the Palmach (working under the political control of prominent members of the Jewish Agency) have been engaging in carefully planned movements of sabotage and violence under the guise of "the Jewish Resistance Movement"; that the Irgun Zvei Leumi and the Stern Gang have worked since last Autumn in cooperation with the Haganah High Command on certain of these operations; and that the broadcasting station "Kol Israel", which claims to be "the Voice of the Resistance Movement" and which was working under the general direction of the Jewish Agency, has been supporting these organizations'. (Cmd. 6873.) The statement then outlined the evidence on which it based the aforementioned conclusions.

Menachem Beigin said of this Memorandum: 'I must record that this particular White Paper, on "Violence in Palestine", was one of the few British documents on Palestine that I have read in which there were scarcely any distortions.'<sup>(10)</sup>

The collaboration between the Haganah and the other terrorist organizations continued. In February 1948 talks towards the co-ordination of Irgun and Haganah military operations were initiated. In May 1948 the final agreement was signed.<sup>(11)</sup>

Even before any formal talks were held, this cooperation existed. Menachem Beigin emphasized that the massacre of Deir Yassin, for which the Irgun and Stern gangs were jointly responsible, was carried out with the knowledge of the Haganah and the approval of its leader. In a letter to the Jerusalem Commander of the Irgun before the attack on Deir Yassin, the Haganah Regional Commander wrote: 'I wish to point out that the capture of Deir Yassin and holding it is one stage in our general plan. I have no objection to your carrying out the operation provided you are able to hold the village.'<sup>(12)</sup> Three days after the Irgun occupied the village it was turned over to the Haganah.<sup>(13)</sup>

Finally, there is the official recognition by the State of Israel that members of the terrorist gangs were engaged in its 'legal' military service. (The Fallen Soldiers' Families Law, Part I, Number 1.)

<sup>(10)</sup> Menachem Beigin, *The Revolt*, p. 185.

<sup>(11)</sup> *New York Times*, February 3, 1948 and May 7, 1949.

<sup>(12)</sup> Beigin, *Revolt*, p. 163.

<sup>(13)</sup> *New York Times*, April 13, 1948.

43. WERE THE ZIONIST MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF 1948 UNDERTAKEN IN SELF-DEFENCE AND NOT DIRECTED AGAINST CIVILIANS?

Jon and David Kimche had this to say on the nature of the Haganah military operations in 1948:

But there was increasing pressure from the field Commanders, and also from Ben Gurion and Galili, against the limitations on the retaliatory actions. They argued that the fears and scruples of the supporters of restricted retaliation were both unreal. . . Retaliation had become a national issue; it was no longer a purely personal matter. Its purpose now, was rather to warn and intimidate rather than punish. Typical of the new policy was the raid on Sassa on February 15th, 1948, an almost inaccessible village in Central Galilee, some 12 miles from the nearest Jewish settlement. If any Arab village was known to feel safe in the heart of Palestine Arab territory it was Sassa. But on that night a Palmach column of sixty under Moshe Kelman moved across country through the gluey Galilean winter mud, reached Sassa, blew up twenty houses, and withdrew again 12 miles through 'enemy territory'. It was meant to demonstrate that no Arab village was beyond the long arm of the Haganah. And to make doubly sure, a number of other operations of the same kind were executed that night against Arab villages and road bridges according to a carefully calculated scheme. It did convince many of the Arab villagers if not their leaders.<sup>(14)</sup>

Moshe Kelman himself confirmed the details in a statement that he made in the Israeli paper *Yediot Ahronot* (May 2, 1972).

44. DID THE REGULAR ZIONIST FORCES REFRAIN FROM INDISCRIMINATE KILLING OF ARAB CIVILIANS DURING THE 1948 WAR?

The young Israeli historian Arie Ytshaki participated in the discussion on 'The Operation of Deir Yassin' presented by *Yediot Ahronot* (April 14, 1972). The paper stated that Ytshaki was qualified to speak on the subject 'as a researcher of many years, through his services in the History Department affiliated to the Israeli Army and, recently through his experiences as a free-lance historian.' The paper added that Ytshaki would soon publish a book of 1200 pages dealing with the 1948 war.

In his article, Ytshaki confirmed that the Palmach organization

<sup>(14)</sup> Jon and David Kimche, *A Clash of Destinies* (N.Y : Frederick Praeger, 1960), pp. 82-84.

performed operations similar to that of Deir Yassin and that the execution of such operations was not the prerogative of Etzel and Lehi. He stated:

Upon weighing the facts, one realizes that the battle, to a large extent, exemplified the kind of strategy adopted in 1948 for the purpose of occupying Arab villages; for during the first few months of the War of Independence the Palmach and the Haganah soldiers carried out scores of operations in this fashion. Their tactics consisted of attacking the enemy village and destroying as many houses there as possible. Consequently, a great number of old people, women and children were killed wherever the attacking force faced resistance.

In this connection I shall cite a few operations of this sort executed by Ba'il's comrades in arms, the Palmach soldiers, who were carefully instructed in the 'sanctity of Hebrew arms.'

On the eve of January 30-31, 1947, miscellaneous forces of Palmach's first regiment and 'Karmel Brigade,' under the leadership of Haim Avinoam, attacked the village of Sheikh (currently Tel Hanan). As a result, 60 of the enemy, mostly civilians, were killed inside the houses. The leader of this operation wrote in his report: 'The attacking units, opening heavy fire, silenced the raging gun-fire in the village.' Then, these units infiltrated into that village and began operating inside the houses. Thus, the heavy firing directed at these houses deemed it impossible to spare the lives of women and children (Cf. *The Palmach*, p. 55).

On the eve of February 14-15, 1948, a force of Palmach's third regiment attacked the village of Sa'sa'. In the course of this operation which, due to excellent execution, was appraised as an exemplary operation, a total of twenty houses were destroyed over the heads of the occupants, causing the death of 60 people, mostly women and children.

Further, during a battle that took place in the vicinity of St. Simon's convent in Katamun, Arab women who resided there as servants were killed as a result of the attack undertaken by the fourth regiment of the Palmach. . .

It has been stated that several operations of this kind were performed—not to mention the indiscriminate reprisal attacks on the Arab civil transport system causing the death of numerous innocent citizens.

The most well-known Palmach operation of this type was the suppression of the uprising in Lydda, July, 1948 performed within the framework of the 'Dani' campaign. At 11.30 on that date, a tank platoon affiliated to the Arab [Jordanian] Legion broke through Lydda which had surrendered to the third regiment of Palmach's Yafah brigade. In the

wake of this breakthrough, an uprising of the local Arab inhabitants took place. Consequently, instructions were issued to shoot anyone seen on the streets. Moreover, the Yaftah soldiers opened heavy fire on all pedestrians and brutally suppressed this insurrection within a few hours. They moved from one house to another firing at any moving target. As a consequence, 250 Arabs were killed, according to the report of the brigade's commander.

In this connection, Arab sources speak of a collective massacre. For according to Hajj Muhammad Nimr Al-Khatib in his book *After the Disaster*, the number of martyrs killed by Israeli Tommy guns in that town amounted to 1700. Aref al Aref mentions in his book *The Disaster* the figure of about 500 killed—more than 150 of whom were murdered inside the Grand Mosque which was converted to a prison for the captives.

Further, the report presented by the brigade commander, Mola Cohen, confirmed that the suppression of the Lydda insurrection featured some 'distressing aspects'.

The following appeared in the same report which constituted part of the Palmach book (p. 885): 'Beyond doubt, the Lydda and Ramleh events, the flight of the inhabitants, the resulting rebellion and expulsions left a great imprint on all those who witnessed these events; for the monstrosity of warfare had reached its culmination there; and the occupation of the city [Lydda] which served as an enemy base, fanned the feelings of revenge that should have been otherwise extinguished.' Moreover, it is worth noting that none of the 'people with a good conscience' of the Yishuv leaders, those whose anger was aroused by Deir Yassin, uttered a single word [about the incident]. Hence, Nathan Alterman [a poet] was the only person who condemned the Lydda operation (along with a similar operation carried out in Bir Al Sab').

#### 45. HOW WAS THE DEIR YASSIN MASSACRE EXECUTED? DID THE HAGANAH HIGH COMMAND KNOW ABOUT IT BEFOREHAND?

In commemoration of the 24th anniversary of the Deir Yassin massacre, *Yediot Ahronot* (4/4/72/) published a report written 24 years ago by a young soldier of the Palmach [shock-troops], Meir Filbsty, currently reserve colonel Meir Ba'il. *Yediot Ahronot* stated that Ba'il was probably the sole eye witness outside the ranks of Etzel [The Irgun] and Lehi [Stern] organizations, who followed up the clandestine operation in Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948 and later wrote what he had seen and heard in a report which he then presented to Israel Galili,

the leader of the Haganah.

*Yediot Ahronot* continued:

For 24 years Ba'il had recalled 'the most terrible day in my life'. A few months ago, he was exempted from his uninterrupted service in the Israeli army (some of the prominent positions he occupied were: Supervisor of the Israeli Army Officer's School, prominent leadership position, Commander of the Infantry Brigade). He was apprehensive and hesitated long before giving his consent to an oral rendering of the report he had written then. [He] stated in his report: In April 1948, the most decisive battles raged around Jerusalem; and the blood of the Haganah and Palmach forces was shed in the battle of Kastal, which aimed at gaining control over the city. At the height of the efforts to realise this objective Etzel and Lehi were vacationing in Jerusalem. Moreover, these two organizations were operating as separate entities and did not participate in the the total battle for freeing the city. Further, the feeling on the part of the underground organization, particularly Lehi, that they were forgoing the opportunity to participate in a great event likely to alter the history of the Israeli capital—motivated them to plan for a major military operation in conjunction or arrangement with the Haganah.

As far as I know, Lehi suggested to Etzel that the latter should occupy Sheikh Jarrah or Sha'fat east of the city, since gaining mastery of these two localities would enable them to establish communications with the beleaguered Muccaber Mountain. But Etzel refused to carry out the operations in the areas designated. Instead it retreated to Deir Yassin. This was, in my opinion, a dubious move; probably there was a desire on the part of Etzel to settle previous accounts with the Arab village [Deir Yassin], accounts dating back to the events of 1936-39 in Gafat Shaul quarter. . .

After planning for the Deir Yassin operation, the leaders of the underground organizations came to David Shaltiel, the commander of the Haganah in the city, and requested his approval. David, who was surprised at their selection questioned, 'what business do you have in Deir Yassin? This is a peaceful village and there is an agreement between Gafat Shaul and the Mukhtar of Deir Yassin to the effect that the village will not be attacked. Moreover, this village does not pose a security hazard. Our problem resides in the battle in Kastal. Therefore, I propose that you join forces with us and participate in carrying out operations around that area. I shall give you Beit Degin as a point of departure from which you can proceed to Ain Makarem quarter from which Arab reinforcements are pouring into Kastal.

However, the leader of the underground organisation rejected this proposal and commented that the proposed operation was 'too complicated.'

Shaltiel said :

'I shall propose an easier operation. Take Motsa as a departure base and proceed from there to Colonia where the bandits attacking the Motsa are gathered. Do what you like there: occupy, destroy, explode'.

But the leaders of the underground organisations refused this proposal. They insisted on attacking Deir Yassin. Hence, Shaltiel was compelled to approve of their plans since he realised that if he vetoed this operation he would have to use force in order to prevent them from carrying it out. This would have caused 'wars among Jews' whose predicament was already critical. Nevertheless, before the end of the meeting, the leader of the Haganah told the leaders of the underground organisations: 'If you occupy Deir Yassin keep it.' But the leaders in question refused to commit themselves.

On the eve of April 8-9, while the Palmach units were engaged in a 'battle of life or death at Kastal,' units of Etzel and Lehi were approaching the village. During the briefing that preceded the battle a number of soldiers proposed to carry out the massacre in the village but the major officers rejected this proposal.

An armed force of Etzel came from the Beit Hakerem quarter and attacked Deir Yassin from the south-east; concurrently, an armed force affiliated to Lehi attacked it from the north-east. And at dawn the two forces arrived in the outskirts of the village; the Lehi unit sent an armoured car equipped with loudspeakers in the direction of the village requesting the inhabitants, by means of a loudspeaker, to surrender and to evacuate the village. But the car failed to fulfil its mission as it fell into a defensive trench the Arabs had dug there; due to the collision, the loudspeaker was impaired.

The inhabitants of Deir Yassin had detected infiltration of the soldiers of the underground movement to the village before the attackers shot the first bullet. The inhabitants themselves then shot the first bullet. And when the assailants charged into the village, they faced tough resistance. Most male inhabitants fled from the village taking their weapons with them. Only a few men remained inside the houses along with a host of women and children. Before long, the assailants had gained control over most of the village excepting the western part.

In that part stood a tall building from which the resistance forces had fired on the assailants. The soldiers of Etzel and Lehi reciprocated from positions they had occupied in the usurped houses. During the onslaught, four soldiers were killed and scores wounded. And the battle reached an impasse. Moreover, the fighters were beginning to run out

of ammunition. Therefore, during the impasse that prevailed, one of the fighters decided to ask for reinforcements. He left the battle-field hastily and headed for the Schneller encampment in Jerusalem where a squadron of the Palmach's sixth regiment was stationed. The soldier, gasping for breath, entered the room of Ya'ki the commander of the squadron from the Kibbutz of Marhavia and said: 'we are attacking Deir Yassin. Baruch [their friend] is there. You must help us.'

Ya'ki launched some of the members of his squadron into a truck, took a 2 inch mortar and headed quickly with them toward Deir Yassin. A few hundred metres away from the village, Ya'ki's men erected the mortar and shelled a house in the western quarter of the village. When I saw the Palmach men in the area, I went up to Ya'ki suggesting that he and his men should depart at once lest they should become implicated. They listened to my suggestion and left the area hastily. However, the mortar had already helped the other fighters to accomplish their task.

It was noon-time when the battle came to an end and the gun-fire subsided. Consequently, stillness prevailed but the village hadn't surrendered yet. The Etzel Lehi soldiers left their hide-outs and embarked on combing the houses. For this purpose they used all weapons in their possession and hurled explosive material into the houses. Moreover, they fired indiscriminately at all those they saw inside, including women and children. Their commanders did not lift a finger to prevent the atrocities that were being committed.

I, along with several residents of Jerusalem, implored the leaders to issue orders to their soldiers to halt the shooting, but to no avail. In the meantime, about 25 men were rounded up from the houses, and put into a truck. These men were taken on 'victory parade' in the streets of Mahnia Yehuda and Zikron Yosef quarters in the fashion of a 'Roman victory'. When this was over, the men were brought to a stone quarry and were shot there in cold blood. The surviving women and children were placed in a truck and taken to the Mandelbaum Gate.

In the afternoon, David Shaltiel arrived to the area and asked Murdchai Ra'nan, the commander of Etzel, and Joshua, the commander of Lehi, about their intentions regarding the village, and they informed him: 'We shall withdraw. We are a striking occupying force, we shall not keep the village.'

Moreover, the leaders of the underground organisations rejected the request proposing that their soldiers should bury the 254 victims strewn 'throughout the village. Consequently this unpleasant task fell to the two squadrons of the Gadna' that were brought from Jerusalem to the village.

On the morning of Saturday, April 10, 1948, the soldiers of Etzel and Lehi withdrew from Deir Yassin. And rumours spread in the area to the effect that the British Air Force was intending to bomb the village. But this news merely served to accelerate the withdrawal.

#### 46. DID THE ZIONISTS APPEAL TO THE ARABS TO REMAIN IN THEIR HOMES DURING THE 1948 WAR?

The British writer, Erskine Childers, went through an extensive process of monitoring Zionist radio broadcasts of that period in order to investigate the reasons for the exodus of Palestinian Arabs. Here is what he says in one of his articles on the subject:<sup>(15)</sup>

Official Israeli history is that, for this period as for later periods, Zionist authorities were actively appealing to the Palestine Arabs to stay and become partners. Making due allowances for spontaneous reaction to Arab guerrilla attacks, a distinct pattern of limited but powerful intimidation and preparatory terrorization emerges from the evidence. Monitoring records of Zionist radio broadcasts in the period show repeated psychological warfare designed to break Arab confidence in their own leadership, to spread panic about imminent dangers of epidemic diseases, and to relay stories of terrified Arab communities.<sup>(16)</sup> At the same time, both Haganah and Palmach units—the ‘official’ Zionist military units—were engaged in palpable and now-acknowledged intimidatory raids on Arab villages, significantly including raids announced as reprisals for Arab violent reactions to ‘unofficial’ (Stern Gang and Irgun) Zionist attacks on civilian Arabs.<sup>(17)</sup>

One of the techniques that was to become increasingly familiar was the night raid on an Arab village, in which Haganah men would first silently place explosive charges around the stone houses and drench the wooden window and door frames in petrol, and then open fire, simultaneously dynamiting and burning the sleeping inhabitants to death.<sup>(18)</sup> Among the difficulties Zionist historians have in dealing with this period is that while some say the Haganah policy was not to attack

<sup>(15)</sup> Erskine Childers, ‘From Citizens to Refugees’, *Transformation of Palestine*.

<sup>(16)</sup> Namely, Haganah Radio, February 19, 1948, 1700 hours, telling Arabs they would be ignored in the conflict of ambitions between Arab leaders; March 10, 1948, 1800 hours, reporting that the Arab states were conspiring with Britain against the Palestinians; February 18, 1948, saying that Arab Liberation volunteers ‘had brought smallpox with them’; February 27, 1948, saying that Palestinian doctors were fleeing; March 14, 1948, 1800 hours, reporting that ‘the people of Jaffa are so frightened they are remaining indoors’.

<sup>(17)</sup> For example, the raid on Balad al-Shaikh after the Haifa Refinery incident.

<sup>(18)</sup> See, for example, Major R.D. Wilson’s *Cordon and Search* (New York, 19[?]).



Arab areas‘ that have remained quiet hitherto’<sup>(19)</sup> others openly describe ‘deep-penetration’ raids against completely ‘quiet’ Arab villages ‘to impress and intimidate the Arab villagers by demonstrating to them that the Haganah’s long arm could reach out even into the remotest Arab districts and hit back.’<sup>(20)</sup>

U.N. mediator Count Bernadotte, in his report published before he was assassinated, gave two descriptions: ‘The exodus of the Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their communities, by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion.’ ‘Almost the whole of the Arab population fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish occupation.’<sup>(21)</sup>

Israeli editor Uri Avneri, who fought in the 1948 war has given the following two accounts: ‘The reorientation of Zionist policy would seem to have intervened in the second phase of events. It is possible that one of the Zionist leaders became convinced that the massive exodus of the Arabs could be a positive phenomenon. At that moment, no uniform policy had been established. Certain cases are known in which the local Jewish leaders tried to persuade the Arabs to remain in the conquered towns—for example, Haifa. But, as a general rule, they encouraged the Arabs to evacuate their towns and villages.

‘I believe that during the third and last phase of the war, the evacuation of Arab civilians had become a war aim.’<sup>(22)</sup>

The British military historian Major Edgar O’Ballance... [gives] the following description of Zionist policy: ‘It was the Jewish policy to encourage the Arabs to quit their homes, and they used psychological warfare extensively in urging them to do so.’<sup>(23)</sup>

Some of the psychological-warfare techniques acknowledged even by Zionist writers have been mentioned for the pre-April first phase. The single most devastating psychological blow to civilian Arabs was the massacre of some 250 old men, women, and children in the non-belligerent village of Deir Yassin. The mutilation of corpses, the parading of Arabs not killed in open lorries through nearby Jerusalem to be spat upon, and the deliberate press conference called to announce the deed were the work of a unit of the ‘unofficial’ Zionist Irgun Zvai Leumi.<sup>(24)</sup>

<sup>(19)</sup> Lorch, *Edge of the Sword*.

<sup>(20)</sup> Kimche and Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill* (London, 1960), p. 83.

<sup>(21)</sup> *U.N. Progress Report*, September 16, 1948, Part one, paragraph 6; Part three, paragraph 1.

<sup>(22)</sup> *Le Monde*, May 9, 1964. Avneri defines the third phase as after May 15, 1948.

<sup>(23)</sup> Edgar O’Ballance, *The Arab-Israeli War, 1948* (London, 1956), p. 63.

<sup>(24)</sup> For accounts of Deir Yassin, see Jacques de Reynier, *A Jerusalem un Drapeau* (Paris, 1950), pp. 72, 213; R.M. Graves, *Experiment in Anarchy* (London), p. 179; Menahem Beigin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, trans. Samuel Katz (New York, 1951), pp. 162-165; Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment: Palestine: 1917-1949* (New York, 1949), p. 160; Kimche, *Seven Fallen Pillars*, p. 227; *Daily Telegraph* (London), April 12, 1948; *New York Times*, April 10, 1948; and *Herald Tribune*, April 10, 1948.

Yigal Allon recounted in *Ha Sephor Ha Palmach* the ‘tactic’ he used to empty Galilee of its Arab inhabitants:

I gathered all of the Jewish Mukhtars, who have contact with Arabs in different villages, and asked them to whisper in the ears of some Arabs, that a great Jewish reinforcement has arrived in Galilee and that it is going to burn all of the villages of the Huleh. They should suggest to these Arabs, as their friends, to escape while there is still time. And the rumor spread in all the areas of the Huleh that it is time to flee. The flight numbered myriads. The tactic reached its goal completely . . . The wide areas were cleaned. (Vol. II, p. 286.)

On May 15, the Jewish writer Harry Levin wrote down in his diary the message he had heard being broadcast from the Zionist loudspeaker vans:

Nearby a loudspeaker burst out in Arabic: *Haganah, broadcasting to Arabs urging them to leave the district before 5.15 a.m. : Take pity on your wives and children and get out of this bloodbath . . . Get out by the Jericho road that is still open to you. If you stay, you invite disaster.*<sup>(25)</sup>

All of this was before May 15, 1948. After that date the Zionists continued their policy of forcible evacuation of Arabs. Major O’Ballance, a British war historian, wrote: ‘No longer was there any “reasonable persuasion”. Bluntly, the Arab inhabitants were ejected and forced to flee into Arab territory, as at Ramleh, Lydda, and other places. Wherever the Israeli troops advanced into Arab country, *the Arab population was bulldozed out in front of them.*’<sup>(26)</sup> (ed’s. italics.)

Erskine Childers cites the following two incidents that took place in Lydda and Ramleh:<sup>(27)</sup>

On July 11, Moshe Dayan led a jeep commando column into the town of Lydda ‘with rifles, Stens, and sub-machine guns blazing. It coursed through the main streets, blasting at everything that moved . . . the corpses of Arab men, women, and even children were strewn about the streets in the wake of this ruthlessly brilliant charge.’<sup>(28)</sup> The adjoining city, Ramleh, was occupied the next day. Israeli loudspeaker vans toured the two towns announcing that neither food nor water would be provided and that the Arabs had 48 hours to go to Transjordan. Israeli troops then began sacking both towns.<sup>(29)</sup>

<sup>(25)</sup> Harry Levin, *Jerusalem Embattled* (London, 1950), p. 160.

<sup>(26)</sup> Edgar O’Ballance, *Arab-Israeli War, 1948* (London, 1950), p. 147.

<sup>(27)</sup> Erskine Childers, ‘From Citizens to Refugees’ in *Transformation of Palestine*, p. 194.

<sup>(28)</sup> Kenneth Bilby, *New Star in the Near East* (New York, 1950), p. 43.

<sup>(29)</sup> Kimche and Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill* (London, 1960), p. 228.

47. DID THE PALESTINIANS LEAVE THEIR HOMES AT THE REQUEST OF THE ARAB LEADERS, AND 'IN THE HOPE OF RETURNING LATER TO WREAK THEIR VENGEANCE ON THE JEW'?

The Arabs fled in fear of Zionist terrorism, massacres and vengeance, neither of their own free will, nor at the behest of their leaders. Erskine Childers published in 1961 a study of Zionist allegations to the contrary. He wrote:

Examining every official Israeli statement about the Arab exodus, I was struck by the fact that no primary evidence of evacuation orders was ever produced. The charge, Israel claims, was 'documented'; but where were the documents? There had allegedly been Arab radio broadcasts ordering the evacuation; but no dates, names of station, or texts of messages were ever cited. In Israel in 1958, as a guest of the Foreign Office and therefore doubly hopeful of serious assistance, I asked to be shown the proofs. I was assured they existed, and was promised them. None had been offered when I left, but I was assured again. I asked to have the material sent to me. I am still waiting.

Childers continued: 'I next decided to test the undocumented charge that the Arab evacuation orders were broadcast by Arab radio—which could be done thoroughly because the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) monitored all Middle Eastern broadcasts throughout 1948. The records, and companion ones by a U.S. monitoring unit, can be seen at the British Museum.' He explained: 'There was not a single order or appeal, or suggestion about evacuation from Palestine from any Arab radio station inside or outside Palestine in 1948. There is repeated monitored record of Arab appeals, even flat orders, to the citizens of Palestine to stay put. To select only two examples: On April 4, as the first great wave of flight began, Damascus Radio broadcast an appeal to everyone to stay at their homes and jobs. On April 24, with the exodus now a flood, Palestine Arab leaders warned that: *Certain elements and Jewish agents are spreading defeatist news to create chaos and panic among the peaceful population. Some cowards are deserting their houses, villages or cities. . . . Zionist agents and corrupt cowards will be severely punished.* (Al-Inqaz—the Arab Liberation Radio—at 1200 hours.) Even Jewish broadcasts (in Hebrew),' Erskine Childers continued, 'mentioned such Arab appeals to stay put. Zionist newspapers in Palestine reported the same; none so much as hinted at any Arab evacuation orders.'<sup>(30)</sup>

<sup>(30)</sup> 'The Other Exodus', *The Spectator* (London) periodical, May 12, 1961. Reprinted in *Palestine Collected Papers* (Beirut, 1963).

John Davis emphasized again the fact that the evidence indicated 'the Arab authorities continuously exhorted the Palestinian Arabs not to leave the country.' He went on to say:

Thus, on March 7 and April 4, 1948, Damascus Radio broadcast an Arab Higher Committee communique urging all government employees and police to remain at their posts. On May 4, in a message relayed by the *Sharq al Adna* radio station, King Abdullah of Transjordan appealed to all Arabs who had left Palestine to return there, while Beirut radio reported a general call-up of all Palestinian males between the ages of 18 and 58 for military service. On May 15, the Arab radio stations reiterated these appeals and called also on religious functionaries to carry on their duties. At this point, even the Haganah radio repeated Arab announcements that visas would be denied to departing Arabs and levies made on refugees moving from district to district.<sup>(31)</sup>

48. DID THE PALESTINIANS LEAVE THE WEST BANK OF THEIR OWN VOLITION IN 1967?

1. In a joint statement which appeared in *The Times* (July 27, 1967, p. 8), British MPs, Ian Gilmour and Dennis Walters said:

According to refugee witnesses a carpenter and many others of the former residents of Bethlehem were told that unless they left within two hours, they and their houses would be blown up. They left.

At one village, in which a United Nations Relief and Works Agency employee was living, after the leading Arab was seen talking to the Israeli commander, a rumour suddenly spread that anybody remaining in the village one hour later would be killed. All the inhabitants left, and, by a fortunate coincidence, they found just outside the village buses provided to transport them to the River Jordan. . . .

After talking to a great many of the refugees, a surprising number of whom, including the children, speak English, and to many neutral observers in the camps, we are convinced that after the initial panic the bulk of the refugees have been and still are being forced out.

.....

Others, too, have left because their houses were blown up or knocked down. Not only has much of Qalqilya been bulldozed; about 10 other villages have suffered the same fate.

2. Amos Kenan, writer and journalist, gave the following eye witness

<sup>(29)</sup> John Davis, *The Evasive Peace* (London: John Murray, 1968), pp. 56-57.

account in a private letter to politicians, Knesset members, etc. *Private Eye* reprinted it on November 10, 1967:

The unit commander told us that it had been decided to blow up three villages in our sector; they were Beit-Nuba, Amoas, and Yalu. This was explained by strategic, tactical, and security considerations . . . We were told to search the houses of the village, to take prisoner any armed men. Unarmed people were to be allowed to pack up their belongings and to be told to go to the nearby village of Beit-Sura. We were ordered to block the entrances of the village and prevent inhabitants returning to the village from their hideouts, after they had heard Israeli broadcasts urging them to go back to their homes. The order was to shoot over their heads and tell them not to enter the village.

After the destruction of three houses the first refugee column arrived from the direction of Ramallah. . . . There were old people who could hardly walk, murmuring old women, mothers carrying babies, small children. The children wept and asked for water. They all carried white flags.

We told them to go to Beit-Sura. They told us that they were driven out everywhere, forbidden to enter any village, that they were wandering like this for four days, without food, without water, some dying on the road. They asked to return to the village, and said we had better kill them.

.....

We drove them out. . . . In the evening we found out that . . . in Beit-Sura too, bulldozers had begun to destroy the place and they were not allowed to enter.

3. *The Guardian* (13 June 1967) reported that:

more than 100,000 Palestinians—10 per cent of the population of Jordan's West Bank—have fled since the Israeli occupation, according to United Nations officials. Reports from senior officials of UNRWA said that in many cases the Israelis had apparently forced the Palestinian occupants from their homes and driven them from permanent refugee camps by bombing during the fighting which began a week ago. Arriving refugees told the U.N. officials *that in a number of West Bank towns Israeli loudspeaker vans announced that buses would be ready to transport them within two hours. The vans issued warnings: 'We cannot tell what will happen if you remain.'*

4. *The Guardian* (19 June 1967) also reported that 'it appeared from a town of the area that considerably more than 80 families were involved and that the Arabs were not leaving of their own free will'.

5. *The Observer* (24 December 1967) reported that 'nearly a quarter

of a million Palestinian Arabs, including former refugees, were expelled from the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip<sup>7</sup>.

6. The Israeli newspaper, *Kol Ha'am* (17 January 1968) affirmed on 17 January 1968, that the Israeli authorities forced the Arab citizens of Gaza to seek refuge in Jordan.

## CHAPTER V

### ZIONISM AND ISRAEL

#### 49. DID THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT APPROVE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO BE APPLIED IN PALESTINE?

G.H. Jansen gives the following account of the Zionist position in regard to the principle of self-determination.<sup>(1)</sup>

The official Zionist position on self-determination was given in a brochure entitled *Zionism, a Reply to Recent Criticism* published in 1921 by the Zionist Organisation of Great Britain which, as the Zionist group most directly concerned with Palestine, would be fully cognisant of authoritative Zionist argumentation. One of the criticisms replied to is 'that Zionism cannot be reconciled with the principle of self-determination.' The answer is given in these words: 'To admit that self-determination simply means a system under which account should only be taken of the present racial composition of every province and town would mean... leaving the dispossessed dispossessed and the landless landless. . . . Has it ever been recognised, in the whole history of civilisation, that colonisation of an underdeveloped territory can only be undertaken with the consent of the majority of the actual inhabitants on the spot? Had it been so, hardly any country in the world could have been colonised.' 'If in every such case the principle of self-determination had been carried to its abstract logical conclusion and, say, a plebiscite of the natives had been taken, all expansion would have been rendered impossible, and the crowded masses of Europe would now suffocate and starve on this side of the Atlantic while a handful of Red Indians would still freely roam in the limitless spaces of America.' After this frightening vision, and the damaging confession that the Zionists regarded the Palestine Arabs as the early American settlers had regarded the Red Indians, the Zionist case is clinched thus: 'Colonisation is a principle no less important than self-determination and there are cases when the second

<sup>(1)</sup> G.H. Jansen, *Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism* (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), pp. 87-89, 130-132.

can only be applied in so far as it is compatible with the free development of the first. It is, of course, not claimed that every land in the world should be open to colonisation: only underpopulated and generally backward territories can be considered appropriate for the expansion of the homeless. But the world has already evolved the conception of a Society of Nations. Whatever may be the further stages of its progress, the idea of a World Council representing the aggregate conscience of civilised peoples, implies, *inter alia*, the competence to sanction the opening up of an undeveloped area for colonisation. This sanction will have to be taken as the expression of a collective will outweighing purely local consideration.<sup>(2)</sup>

Today the advocates of Zionism and the Israeli Foreign Ministry would refrain from such a public repudiation of self-determination. In 1921 the Zionists did not need to conceal their intentions because they were talking to people who, for the most part, shared their colonialist outlook and who possessed effective power. What the peoples of the 'generally backward countries' thought about the issue did not greatly matter, though, even then it did matter more than the Zionists believed.

... Balfour wrote in 1919: '... Zionism, be it right or wrong, is ... of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land. ... for in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country.'<sup>(3)</sup>

This robust cynicism was meat too strong for the delicate stomachs of the 'liberal' variety of Gentile Zionist who had to find some argument to justify the exception to the rule of self-determination made in favour of the Zionists. Thus the famous pacifist, Norman Angell, argued that there could be no question of 'majority' or 'minority' rights in Palestine because 'the homelessness of the Jews ... concerns the whole of mankind, the whole of civilisation ... are the Arabs a majority in that connection?' ...<sup>(4)</sup>

Some of the Jewish Zionists with more sensitive consciences also felt the need to justify by argumentation the denial of self-determination. In his 'Open letter to Mahatma Gandhi', written in 1949, the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber asks: 'What do you mean by saying a land belongs to a population ... You obviously mean to say that a people, being settled on a land, has so absolute a claim to that land that whoever

<sup>(2)</sup> *Zionism, a Reply to Recent Criticisms*, Zionist Organization, London 1921, pp. 7-9.

<sup>(3)</sup> Quoted in Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, pp. 649-670.

<sup>(4)</sup> Quoted in Heller, *The Zionist Idea*, p. 68.



settles on it without the permission of this people has committed a robbery.’ According to Buber this means giving sanctity to some original act of conquest. He goes on ‘It seems to me that God does not give any one portion of the earth away. . . The conquered land is, in my opinion, only lent to the conqueror who has settled on it—and God waits to see what he will make of it.’ Referring to the work of the Jewish settlers Buber says ‘This land recognises us, for it is fruitful through us.’<sup>(6)</sup>

Just as Zionism has been described as a ‘spiritual nationalism’ here Buber is enunciating a sort of ‘spiritual colonialism’.

The end result of these arguments is the same as the bald, original claim: a people settled in the land can be ignored and pushed aside by foreign settlers if these latter, like the Zionists, claim to be superior to ‘the natives’,

Jansen goes on to tell us that (according to a Zionist Organization pamphlet published in 1921) the Zionists wanted a Parliament which would represent ‘*all* the elements concerned’, i.e. ‘the present inhabitants of the country on the one hand, the Jewish people as a whole [i.e. world-wide] on the other’.

Zionist wrath was truly aroused when it became known, in December 1935, that though the proposed [Legislative] Council was severely limited in its powers, it would contain 14 Arabs, both elected and nominated, and 12 other members, 7 elected Jews and 5 nominated officials.<sup>(6)</sup> This was only a very small first step towards self-government, but it was too dangerous for the Zionists. Even before the plan was officially presented it was denounced by the Zionist Congress on the grounds that Palestine was the concern not only of the Jews in Palestine but of the whole of world Jewry.<sup>(7)</sup> The Arabs asked for time to consider this proposal but in view of the Zionist veto the British government abruptly abandoned the whole project, so that Palestine continued to be governed as a colony.

## 50. IS IT TRUE THAT THERE WAS A ZIONIST-BRITISH COLLABORATION DURING THE MANDATE?

Overall co-operation was, of course, the inevitable consequence of the

<sup>(6)</sup> Buber and Magnes, *Two Letters to Ghandi* (Jerusalem, 1939).

<sup>(6)</sup> ESCO, Vol. 2, pp. 785-786.

<sup>(7)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 801.

1917 Compact, for the Mandate was essentially nothing but the implementation of that compact. Even the Revisionist leader, Jabotinsky, was staunchly pro-British. The general lines of Jewish-British collaboration were laid down by the strongly anglophile Weizmann and the Jewish community in Palestine adhered to them, under its local leaders such as Ben Gurion. Though Ben Gurion always disliked Weizmann and his 'too docile attitude towards the British' he agreed with him on this basic policy: 'Co-operation with the mandatory government is a basic condition for the growth of our population and for the increase of our strength in the country.'<sup>(8)</sup> After the end of the Arab general strike 'Ben Gurion triumphantly called the pro-Zionist attitude of the British "the greatest political success since the Balfour Declaration." '<sup>(9)</sup>

The most important and the most obvious aspect of collusion was the inflow of Jewish immigrants—what Ben Gurion called 'the growth of our population'. The figures speak for themselves. In 1919 the effects of the war had reduced the number of Jews in Palestine to about 55,000 or 8% of a total estimated population of 700,000. In the 1922 census the Jews were 83,000 or 11%; in the 1931 census 174,000 or 16%; in 1942 the figures were 484,000 or 29.9%.<sup>(10)</sup> And in 1948 at the time of partition and the creation of Israel, 655,000 or 36%.

In terms of actual numbers the Jewish population of Palestine increased by 600,000 during the Mandate and of this increase 484,000 were immigrants.<sup>(11)</sup>

Thus the British, despite bitter Palestinian protest, held open the door of Palestine and allowed the Jews to more than triple their numbers by the inflow of foreign Jews, 90% of whom came from Europe<sup>(12)</sup> during the first decade and 80% in the whole 1919-1948 period.<sup>(13)</sup>

And this massive influx was into the small area of Palestine with a total population, at the end of the Mandate, of less than 2 millions. Only because of the imposition of British power was this possible; during the period, the Zionists, with British assistance, accomplished a radical alteration in the character of Palestine's population, involving the physical importation of just under half a million human beings: a service for which the Zionists are not always as grateful as they might be.  
.....

<sup>(8)</sup> Michael Bar Zohar, *The Armed Prophet, a Biography of Ben Gurion* (London, 1967), p. 42. Since Bar Zohar is the first person to have been given full access to Ben Gurion's private diary and papers, it must be assumed that he is the 'official' biographer of the Israeli leader.

<sup>(9)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>(10)</sup> ESCO Foundation, *Palestine, a Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies* (Yale University, 1947), Vol. 2, p. 665.

<sup>(11)</sup> G. de Gaury, *The New State of Israel* (London, 1952), p. 28.

<sup>(12)</sup> ESCO, Vol. I, p. 407.

<sup>(13)</sup> de Gaury, p. 28.

The Jewish influx under powerful British protection which the Arabs felt themselves powerless to remove was one of the main reasons for the 1936 rebellion and gave it its edge of desperation.

As might have been expected the Jews gave military assistance to the British against the Arabs: 'thousands of young Palestinian Jews were armed by the British and organised in territorial units to help keep order, thus becoming the nucleus of an official Jewish army' writes Ben Gurion's official biographer.<sup>(14)</sup> In addition there were the Special Night Squads organised by Orde Wingate in which 'several of Israel's most distinguished military leaders, including Moshe Dayan, learned their first military lessons.'<sup>(15)</sup> Whatever the motives, and whatever the justification, the fact is that the Jews fought alongside Britishers against the Palestinian Arabs.

Zionist-British military co-operation was occasional and as required. Political collaboration, of necessity, was continuous. Once again we have the words of Ben Gurion to describe the general Zionist approach. In 1934 he had secret negotiations with some of the Palestinian leaders, with the result that 'he had refused to support them in their struggles against the British and the French. In all sincerity he said. . . "We will not fight against the British; they have helped us, and we want to benefit from their help in the future. We are loyal to our friends."'<sup>(16)</sup>

## 51. IS IT TRUE THAT THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT WAS ANTI-COLONIALIST FROM ITS INCEPTION?

The colonialist nature of Zionism has been manifest from the very beginning of the movement. Theodor Herzl wrote in *The Jewish State*: 'Supposing His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return undertake to regulate the whole finances of Turkey. We should there form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilisation as opposed to barbarism. We should as a neutral State remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence.'<sup>(17)</sup> Why the 'have to', it may be asked? Presumably in return for services rendered by the Jewish State as the defenders of Europe against Asian 'barbarism'.<sup>(18)</sup>

<sup>(14)</sup> Bar Zohar, p. 59.

<sup>(15)</sup> Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel*, (London: Collins, 1965).

<sup>(16)</sup> Bar Zohar, p. 55. The whole passage is taken from Jansen, *Zionism, Israel*, pp. 126-129.

<sup>(17)</sup> Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State* p. 30.

<sup>(18)</sup> Jansen, p. 83.

The British started to work with their potential ally quite early on; Jansen tells us:

The first official British connection with Jews in Palestine would seem to date from 1839 when Palmerston asked British consuls to afford protection to the Jews. No further official British action was taken till Chamberlain met with Herzl but the idea of a British-Zionist initiative was never wholly forgotten. In the 1840's a former colonial Governor pressed for Jewish settlement in Palestine to ensure Britain's line of communications to the East. In 1852 Hollingworth's *Remarks upon the Present Conditions of the Jews in Palestine* said that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was 'not only an act of humanity and justice but a political necessity . . . in the safeguarding of the highway across Asia Minor to India.' Sir Laurence Oliphant, in 1879, linked the idea of Jewish settlement with the need to ensure 'the political and economic penetration of Palestine by Britain'. The construction of the Suez Canal only served to heighten Britain's sensitivity towards the area of Palestine and made her that much more receptive to schemes that promised to safeguard its security: one such scheme was Zionism.

Upon the declaration of World War I Zionists on both sides of the firing lines seized the possibility that the war could further their cause.

In Germany, where Zionist Jewish leaders strongly supported the war aims of the Kaiser's government, the President of the Jewish National Fund, Bodenheimer, presented a memorandum to the Foreign Ministry urging the creation of autonomous Jewish areas in Eastern Europe which would help in the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.<sup>(19)</sup>

In Britain there was the same anticipation. Even before Turkey entered the War in October 1914 Weizmann wrote that after victory he expected 'that Palestine will fall within the British sphere of influence . . . we could easily move a million Jews into Palestine within the next fifty or sixty years and England would have an effective barrier (for the Suez Canal against any hostile forces which might come from the north) and we would have a country . . . an Asiatic Belgium.'

Thus from the very beginning Weizmann envisaged a combination of the interests of Britain and Zionism in the Middle East.<sup>(20)</sup>

Weizmann considered that the Zionist movement played a decisive

<sup>(19)</sup> J. Kimche, *The Unromantics*, p. 10. Among them was Nahum Goldmann, now President of the World Zionist Organization.

<sup>(20)</sup> Jansen, pp. 108-109.

role in placing Palestine under British Mandate. He said: 'It was the Jews who gave substance and reality to the idea of a British protectorate—which afterwards took the form of a Mandate—over Palestine.' Jansen comments that this was a perfectly just claim, 'for the Mandate, indeed, was the "substance and reality" of the Zionist-British Compact of 1917.'

In 1924 Weizmann wrote a letter to Churchill in which he reminded him that though 'you have set up a great Arab kingdom in Mesopotamia you will have to rely on the Jews for your loyal element'. He went on to say:

Nor need I dwell on the proposition that this alliance with Zionism is a waxing asset or on the fact well-known that those greatest soldiers of history, Julius Caesar, Alexander and Napoleon, all recognized the immense importance of Palestine in their Eastern schemes and were markedly pro-Jewish in their foreign policy. Napoleon may even be claimed as the first of the modern non-Jewish Zionists. . . . If there were no Palestine, it would, I believe, be necessary to create one in the Imperial interest. It is a bastion to Egypt. On the one side, the existence of a Jewish Palestine leaves you absolutely free to follow whatever policy may be most convenient to you, and enables you, if you wished, to evacuate Egypt altogether and to concentrate on the Suez Canal with your army based on Palestine. . . . It is an asset on which you can draw almost indefinitely in case of danger. . . . It is difficult to understand how one can build on Arab loyalty so near the vital communications across the Isthmus of Suez. All one has seen and heard of the Arab movement leads one to believe that it is anti-European. The Palestine Zionist policy, far from being waste, becomes a necessary insurance that we quote to you at a lower rate than anyone else could dream of.<sup>(21)</sup>

## 52. IS IT TRUE THAT ISRAEL WAS BORN AS A RESULT OF A HEROIC STRUGGLE AGAINST BRITISH IMPERIALISM?

The Zionists do not, of course, concede that there is any difference at all between their movement and those of Asian nationalism. On the contrary, and especially in the last ten years, they have asserted that Zionism, in its principles, and as a European phenomenon, was nationalist and that Zionism, in action, in Palestine, was both anti-colonial and non-colonial. . . .

The claim that Zionism was anti-colonial is founded on the fact that from October 1945 to February 1947, a period of 16 months, the Jewish community in Palestine waged a campaign of violence against the British administration. The claim to non-colonialism is argued from

<sup>(21)</sup> Cited by R. Crossman, *A Nation Reborn* (New York: Atheneum 1960), pp. 153-163.

the general character of the Zionist effort in Palestine.

.....  
The events which led to the British-Zionist clash in 1945 were these: after 20 years of trying to work an unworkable Mandate, faced with a growing Arab threat to very substantial British interests, political and economic, in the Middle East, nagged with the doubt that perhaps the Balfour Declaration was an injustice, the British Government tried to even the balance in the 1939 White Paper. Its principle provisions were that there was to be no partition of Palestine, no Jewish or Arab state, but a bi-communal independent Palestine within ten years; 75,000 Jewish immigrants were to be allowed in during the following 5 year period; thereafter no further Jewish immigration was to be allowed 'unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it'; the purchase of land by Jews was somewhat restricted.

The Arabs generally welcomed the White Paper; the Zionist reaction was one of anger and dismay. . .

Zionist criticism was particularly directed at the section on immigration. [By 1939] the British had permitted a . . . twenty year total increase of 397,500 on the Jewish population of 56,000 that was in Palestine in 1919. This was not enough for the Zionists, because the natural increase in the Arab majority would have kept the Jews permanently in the position of a minority.

What the Zionists decided to fight was this belated decision of the British not to allow the Arab majority to become a minority by unlimited Jewish immigration.

The outbreak of war overtook developments in Palestine and since it was being waged against their main persecutor, Hitlerite Germany, the Zionists were in an anguished quandary. The way out was provided by a paradoxical slogan thought out by Ben Gurion: 'we shall fight with Great Britain in this war as if there were no White Paper, and we shall fight the White Paper as if there were no war.'

What this meant in practical fact was that the Jewish community cooperated actively in the British war effort, while the Arabs did so passively. By the end of the war 27,000 Jews had enlisted in the British Forces with the clear understanding, among the Jews, that they were to be the trained nucleus of the future Jewish Army.

On the political front the Zionists in 1942, according to the Biltmore Programme, abandoned the objective of the National Home in Palestine for that of converting Palestine into a Jewish Commonwealth.

When, soon after the end of the war, the new British Foreign Secretary Bevin refused to be rushed into taking a final decision on the future of Palestine, the Jewish underground forces launched their campaign, in

October 1945, with the object of wrecking the Mandatory Government or else forcing it to revert to a policy of promoting Jewish interests. During the succeeding 16 months, the underground movements inflicted damaging casualties on British soldiers and civilians. In the year 1946 the two Jewish armed groups, Irgun and Stern 'could boast, and they were the kind who could boast about murder, that they had killed 373 people in Palestine, of whom 300 were civilians'.<sup>(22)</sup>

This was the 'national' struggle of the Zionist Jews in Palestine. It ended with a conference in which the British met with Zionists and Arabs separately in London in January 1947. In a final meeting between Ben Gurion and Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, a last attempt was made to revive the 1917 Compact on the old, familiar basis of Jewish protection for British imperial interests.

Ben Gurion's official biographer describes the concluding exchanges. Bevin said that Britain only sought to keep the peace in the Middle East. Ben Gurion replied: 'And the Negev—doesn't that interest you?' Bevin admitted that there was oil in the Negev, and that there was a plan to build a canal. . . 'but every time we start to prospect or drill, you come and poke your nose in and you establish farming villages there'. Ben Gurion was ready to swear that a Jewish State in Palestine would safeguard British interests. But it was obvious that there was no hope of reconciling the two points of view.<sup>(23)</sup> Britain then decided to refer the Palestine issue to the United Nations.

This conversation between Ben Gurion and Bevin was hardly the conclusion that would be expected after an anti-British anti-colonial campaign, for it shows that the Zionists to the very end did not want to break completely with the British; it was the British who broke with the Zionists. . .

.....  
Hence in assessing the 'nationalist' character of the Jewish campaign in Palestine the decisive question is not 'who was it against?' but 'what was it for?' It *was* against the British restricting immigration, but it was *for* uncontrolled immigration preferably under a continuing British Mandate.

The Jewish struggle was, therefore, not a nationalist struggle by colonial subjects but a rebellion by discontented colons. . . . They [the Zionists] were European settlers, not natives, who had settled thanks to a decision of imperial policy by a European power and under its protection, but for which no such settlement would have been possible.

Accordingly Rodinson's characterisation of the Jewish fight against the British cannot be faulted: it was an example of how tensions arise between

<sup>(22)</sup> Sykes, *Crossroads*, p. 366.

<sup>(23)</sup> Bar Zohar, p. 94.

the metropolitan power and the colony where the colons are often displeased by rules imposed by the metropole through legislation which they cannot control, or at least not entirely, and which often seems to them to be not adjusted to local conditions. This is especially the case when the metropolitan power, framing an international policy on a world scale, has to take into account the interests and aspirations of the local people<sup>(24)</sup>—of whom the colons are not part.

.....  
We have seen that the claim that Zionism is similar to the Asian nationalist movements, because like them it fought an 'anti-colonialist' campaign, cannot be sustained. The various arguments to prove that Zionism is also non-colonial break on one rock-like fact; the State of Israel produced by Zionism became possible when the Palestinian majority was converted into a minority; the Palestinians did not consent to this reversal—they fought it as best they could. If the movement which brought about such a situation is described as non-colonial then words lose all meaning.<sup>(25)</sup>

53. DOES THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT CONSIDER 'MANDATE PALESTINE' AS HAVING THE SAME BORDER LINES AS 'HISTORIC PALESTINE'?

The boundaries of Palestine drawn in the Zionist Organization's Memorandum to the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference (Feb. 3, 1919) were as follows:

Starting to the North at a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon as far as *Jisr al Karaon*, thence to *El Bire*, following the dividing line between the two basins of the *Wadi El Korn* and the *Wadi El Tem* thence in a Southerly direction following the dividing line between the Eastern and Western slopes of the *Harmon*, to the vicinity West of *Beit Jenn*, thence Eastward following the Northern watersheds of the *Nahr Mughaniye* close to and West of the *Hedjaz Railway*.

In the East a line close to and West of the Hedjaz Railway terminating in the *Gulf of Aqaba*.

In the South a frontier to be agreed upon with the Egyptian government.

In the West the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>(26)</sup>

In other words the Zionists envisage a Palestine which includes

<sup>(24)</sup> Rodinson, in *Les Temps Modernes* p. 55.

<sup>(25)</sup> Jansen, pp. 184-189.

<sup>(26)</sup> J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N.J : D. Van Nostrand Co. 1956), Vol. II, p. 46.



Upper Galilee, the sources of the Litani, the Jordan River, Houran, Transjordan and parts of Sinai.

The latest Twenty-Eighth Zionist Congress, which convened in Jerusalem in January 1972, indirectly defined the borders of 'Historic Palestine' which exceed by far the borders of 'Mandate Palestine' when it announced: 'The right of the Jewish people in Eretz Israel is irrevocable. In the six-day war, the aggressors were repelled, *the land of our fathers was liberated, and Jerusalem again became a unified city.*'<sup>(27)</sup>

Some of the Israeli leaders revealed Israel's concept of its 'historic' borders while commenting on King Hussein's plan. Haim Tzadok, Chairman of the Committee for Security and Foreign Affairs in the Knesset, announced: 'The plan said that Jerusalem is the capital of the Western part of Jordan. Of course we will, as it is well known, never accept this because we look at Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and it will stay as a unified city. The plan spoke about Israeli withdrawal from the territories we got hold of after June 4, 1967. This is, as is well known, unacceptable to us. . . . We have always declared that there is a space only for two states: one Arab and one Jewish between the Mediterranean and Iraq.' Menachem Beigin said that the West Bank of Jordan was not part of Jordan, 'It was not and will not be.' Ezer Weizmann reiterated the same position by saying that 'Jordan and Samaria (West Bank) are a part of Eretz Israel and will remain so for ever'.<sup>(28)</sup>

#### 54. HAS ZIONISM REALIZED ITS AIM IN CREATING THE STATE OF ISRAEL?

Before Israel was created in 1948, the Zionist movement worked for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine without defining any borders. The important thing was the *establishment* of a state.<sup>(29)</sup> When the Peel Commission published its report in July 1937 in which it recommended the partition of Palestine, Ben Gurion said: 'This Jewish state now being proposed to us is not the Zionist aim, *for it's impossible to solve the Jewish problem in such a territory.* But this will be a decisive stage in bringing about the great Zionist aims. In the shortest possible time, it will build up the real Jewish strength that will carry us to our historic objective.'<sup>(30)</sup> (eds. italics.)

<sup>(27)</sup> Resolution 2 under the item 'Political Questions' of the Resolutions of the Congress.

<sup>(28)</sup> Israeli Radio (Hebrew), 15/3/1972, 19.00 hrs.

<sup>(29)</sup> *Maariv*, 18/4/1972.

<sup>(30)</sup> Michael Bar Zohar, *The Armed Prophet: A Biography of Ben Gurion* (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1967), p. 61.

The establishment of Israel in 1948 was viewed as a start. Ben Zohar wrote: 'Although the history of the Jewish State had scarcely begun, one thing was clear—*neither the frontiers drawn by the United Nations nor those obtained by force of arms in 1948 were the definite limits of the State* in Ben Gurion's eyes. A start had been made, that was all.'<sup>(31)</sup> (eds. italics.) Ben Gurion himself emphasized this when he stated in the 1952-53 *Israeli Government Yearbook*—that it 'must now be said that the State of Israel has been established in only a portion of the Land of Israel'. In the 1955-56 *Yearbook* he reiterated this position: 'The creation of the new State by no means derogates from the scope of historic Eretz Israel.' Even after 1967 Israel is still aiming at further expansion, especially to the North where the occupation of South Lebanon as far as the Litani River is its goal.<sup>(32)</sup>

Zionism thus considers that its aim in regard to borders has not been totally achieved. It also considers that its basic aim of persuading all Jews to immigrate to Israel has not been fulfilled. The 28th Zionist Congress emphasized this unfinished task and announced that immigration is 'the essence of Zionism' and therefore it must become the 'centre of its activity'.

## 55. WHAT ARE THE REMAINING TASKS AND OBJECTIVES OF ZIONISM AND ISRAEL?

1. Defence Minister Moshe Dayan announced: 'People abroad ought to realize that, quite apart from their strategic importance to Israel, Sinai, the Golan Heights, the Tiran Straits and the hills west of the Jordan lie at the heart of Jewish history. Nor has the "restoration of historical Israel" ended yet. *Since the return to Zion a hundred years ago a double process of colonisation and expansion of frontiers has been going on. We have not yet reached the end of that road: It is the people of Israel who will determine the frontiers of their own state.*' (eds. italics.) (*Jerusalem Post*, August 10, 1967).

2. Dayan said, in a conversation with Guala Cohen in *Maariv* on New Year's Eve (1968): 'In my opinion, the main thing is that we should understand that what is happening here is a *process*, one that has been

<sup>(31)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>(32)</sup> *Haaretz*, 2/8/1968 (A statement by Levi Eshkol).

going on for many years. *The main thing is that we should not think that Daganya is a full-stop, that Nahal Oz is a full-stop, that three million is a full-stop. Every generation will add its own sentence.*' (eds. italics.)

3. *Haaretz*, the Israeli paper that usually reflects the real inner aims of the Government of Israel, demanded in its issue dated 24/1/1968 a 'more active' Israeli foreign and defence policy expressing the following tasks:

Full support for the strategic interests of the Western powers in the cold war against the East European states; a new initiative of war against the Arab countries; the conquest of the Eastern part of Jordan; the overthrow of the present regime in the UAR and all political frameworks supporting it; the conquest of the pipelines of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company' and of 'Aramco'; the occupation of the Saudi-Arabian coastline on the Gulf of Akaba. . .

56. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISRAELI 'LAW OF RETURN'?

The 'Jewish people' concept is a Zionist-Israel legislative one which emphasizes 'Jewish' nationalism and the claimed juridical obligations of all Jews to the State of Israel. It is a discriminatory concept as it is applied both in the international arena and in Israeli municipal law. It is internationally discriminatory because it seeks to impose membership in 'the Jewish people,' with accompanying duties to the State of Israel, upon Jews outside of Israel without regard to their voluntary assent or their established nationality status. It is equally discriminatory in Israeli municipal law because membership in 'the Jewish people' is the basis upon which 'Jewish people' nationals of the State of Israel are given preferential treatment as opposed to the treatment accorded to Christians and Moslems.

The Israeli Law of Return provides a brief but adequate illustration of the discriminatory characteristics of the 'Jewish people' concept. Under its terms, a member of 'the Jewish people' who is born anywhere in the world has a right to immigrate to Israel where he automatically becomes an Israeli citizen upon arrival. Under the same law, a Palestinian Moslem or Christian who was born in the country, or who is the child of a person born in the country, has no right to return to it. As a practical necessity in interpreting the Law of Return, the Zionist juridical meaning of the terms 'Jew' and 'the Jewish people' is one of the most important subjects of litigation in the Israel Supreme Court. Among the well-known cases which have defined these terms are the *Brother Daniel Case* and the more recent *Shalit Case*. While the Zionists accept this type of litigation as necessary to maintain the 'Jewish' character of the State of Israel, it is highly offensive to anti-Zionist Jews who recall that Nazi

Germany used similar juridical criteria in defining the terms 'Aryan' and 'German'.

The Government of Israel, in a manner reminiscent of George Orwell's *The Animal Farm*, treats some Jews as 'more equal' than others. Although they are within the 'Jewish people' concept, it is well known that Sephardic and Oriental Jews are second class 'Jewish' nationals within the State of Israel. It is less well known that Israeli anti-Zionist Jews are increasingly discriminated against as Jewish dissent within the State of Israel becomes more articulate and viable. These Jews in Israel are regarded as 'traitors' to Zionism and its 'Jewish people' concept, as are anti-Zionist Jews living outside of Israel.

The objective of obtaining international law recognition of 'the Jewish people' was accorded the highest priority by Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the long-time president of the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency and the first president of the State of Israel. He believed that such recognition would provide a secure juridical foundation for the establishment of the State of Israel as a Zionist state. He failed to achieve this in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 because of the inclusion of the two safeguard clauses which protected the rights of the Moslem and Christian Palestinians as well as the rights of anti-Zionist Jews. It is significant that these safeguards were placed in the Declaration over the strong objections of the Zionist negotiators and at the insistence of Edwin Montagu who was the only Jewish member of the British Cabinet which issued the Declaration. The objective was also frustrated in the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine of 1922. The Mandate included both of the safeguard clauses from the Declaration and, in addition, provided for Palestinian nationality on a non-discriminatory secular basis and did not provide for a 'Jewish people' nationality. In the same way, the U.N. General Assembly Palestine Partition Resolution of 1947, in spite of its basic fallacies, did not provide for a recognition of the Zionist claimed 'Jewish people' entity. If it had done so, it is obvious that such a provision would have violated articles 55 and 56 of the Charter.

Failure to obtain complete enforcement of the safeguard clauses and other legal restrictions placed upon the Zionists in the Balfour Declaration, the Palestine Mandate, and the Partition Resolution permitted the establishment of the Zionist state as a factual reality even though it was in violation of the governing principles of international law. Nevertheless, these safeguards and restrictions did prevent the juridical recognition of the 'Jewish people' concept in international law. Dr. Weizmann well understood that the lack of such recognition endangers the Zionist nature of the State of Israel and makes that State far more vulnerable to future international action to change its character.

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, its government has consistently attempted to obtain international law recognition of 'the Jewish people' in a variety of ways. For example, the *Eichmann Case* was based on the claimed jurisdictional authority of 'crimes against the Jewish people'. This immoral claim is based upon the conception that crimes against Jews, including mass murder, are crimes against 'the Jewish people' rather than against the common humanity of all.

It is significant that the U.S. Department of State in a letter of April 20, 1964 addressed to Rabbi Elmer Berger, the leading American anti-Zionist Jew, agreed with his position that the U.S. Government does not have authority under the First Amendment to the Constitution to assent to the 'Jewish people' concept. The official letter, after stating that it 'does not recognize a legal-political relationship based upon the religious identification of American Jews' between them and the State of Israel, continued: 'Accordingly, it should be clear that the Department of State does not regard "the Jewish people" concept as a concept of international law.' The Zionist frustration over their continuing failure to obtain recognition of 'the Jewish people' was indicated by strong protests including an unsuccessful attempt to have the Department of State withdraw its letter to Rabbi Berger.<sup>(33)</sup>

#### 57. IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT ONLY FORCE OF ARMS DETERMINES THE ISRAELI BORDERS?

David Ben Gurion was once asked why didn't he define the borders of Israel when he proclaimed its establishment in 1948. He answered: 'At that time I realized that the State would be established by the strength of our army and not by the United Nations power. . . I was aware that it is the Jewish army that will define the borders.'<sup>(34)</sup> When Israeli forces occupied more territory in 1967, new borders were delineated for Israel. The 'old' borders were abandoned because, as Moshe Dayan said, 'they were defined as a result of the 1948 war when Israel was weak'.<sup>(35)</sup>

#### 58. IS IT TRUE THAT ISRAEL HAD NO EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS BEFORE 1967?

Expansionism is an intrinsic part of the Zionist movement and Israel.

<sup>(33)</sup> W.T. Mallison Jr. and S.V. Mallison, *An International Law Appraisal of the Juridical Characteristics of the Resistance of the People of Palestine: The Struggle for Human Rights* (Beirut: NEEBII, 1973), pp. 26-29.

<sup>(34)</sup> *Maariv*, 28/4/71.

<sup>(35)</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, 10/8/67.

In 1964, for example, Ben Gurion told the Israeli journal *Ha-Boker* (March) that if Moshe Dayan had been chief of staff in 1948, ‘the borders of the State might be different today’, meaning, of course, larger. This provoked a brief and bitter public debate between the 1948 leaders. Yigal Allon declared that Ben Gurion had ordered the army to halt for political reasons just when ‘we had been on the crest of victory [from] the Litani River in the north to the Sinai Desert in the southeast. A few more days . . . would have enabled us [to] liberate the entire country.’ (*Times* [London], March 9, 1964; *Jewish Chronicle*, March 13, 1964.) In a history of the war publicly endorsed by Ben Gurion, Jon Kimche and David Kimche have given details of one of the planned final-stage thrusts, operation Shin-Tav-Shin, to occupy ‘the whole of central Palestine as far as the Jordan’. (*Both Sides of the Hill*, p. 267.) In the midst of the 1948 war, Ben Gurion spoke of how the army had reached ‘our goal . . . in a State made larger and Jewish by the Haganah.’ (*Rebirth and Destiny*, p. 292.)<sup>(36)</sup> A week after the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, Ben Gurion announced in the Knesset that ‘Our forces did not infringe upon the territory of the land of Egypt and did not even attempt to do so . . . Our operations were restricted to the area of the Sinai Peninsula.’<sup>(37)</sup> He spoke of ‘freeing’ Sinai and ‘liberating’ a part of the ‘homeland’.

## 59. DOES ISRAEL HAVE AMBITIONS IN LEBANON?

1. On November 16, 1918, the Advisory Committee on Palestine, which included most of the leading Zionist personalities, decided to work out a proposal for the boundaries of Palestine. . . . A document was drafted which said that ‘on historical, economic and geographical grounds it is proposed that the boundaries of Palestine should be as follows: “In the North, the Litani River, to Banias, close to and North of the sources of the River Jordan; then in the south-easterly direction to a point just south of the Damascus territory and west of the Hejaz railway . . .” ’<sup>(38)</sup>

From this it can be seen that Israel covets quite a sizeable chunk of

<sup>(36)</sup> All references cited by Erskine Childers in, ‘From Citizens to Refugees’, *Transformation of Palestine*, p. 178.

<sup>(37)</sup> *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* (London, November 16, 1956).

<sup>(38)</sup> H.F. Frischwasser-Ra’anan, *The Frontiers of a Nation* (London, 1955) pp. 101-102.

Lebanon, for the Litani River lies some 40 kilometers from the current Lebanese-Israeli 'border'.

2. The Zionist Organization, in its memorandum to the Peace Conference in 1919, demanded:

A line starting on the Mediterranean just south of the port of Sidon and then running north-east up the slopes of the Lebanon, to include the greater part of the Litani and the whole of the Jordan catchment area up to its northernmost source, near Rashaya. From there, the frontier was to run along the crest of the Hermon, then turning due east to run along the northern watershed of the Yarmuk tributaries toward the Hejaz Railway at a distance of some 20 kms. south of Damascus. . .<sup>(39)</sup>

3. The *Keren Hayesod*<sup>(40)</sup> issued a manifesto in 1921 in which it said (p. 15): 'It is much to be regretted that we must abandon for the present all plans concerning the Litani', and accept a 'truncated Palestine'.

4. Ben Gurion wrote in a memorandum to the Zionist Executive in 1941: 'We have to keep in mind that the survival of the Jewish State requires that we be neighbours to Christian Lebanon, and that Negev and the waters of the Jordan River and Litani be included within our borders.'<sup>(41)</sup>

5. Yigal Allon informs us (as we mentioned earlier) that Ben Gurion had ordered the Israeli army to halt for political reasons just when 'we had been on the crest of victory [from] the Litani River in the north to the Sinai Desert in the southwest. A few more days . . . would have enabled us *to liberate the entire country*.'<sup>(42)</sup> (eds. italics.)

6. More recently, Moshe Dayan declared in October 1967: 'Israel's borders, with the exception of that with Lebanon, are ideal, though not necessarily realistic.'<sup>(43)</sup>

7. Recent Israeli threats and attacks on Lebanon, using the existence of Palestinian commandos as a pretext, fit in with previous Israeli statements. After the Israeli raid on Beirut on the 10th of April 1973 which resulted in the murder of three Palestinian leaders and in the blowing up of some houses in Beirut, General David Elazar said: 'Israel will not respect the sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon and its capital unless the Lebanese Government puts an end to the activities of the terrorists.' When it was suggested such activities are mostly unsuccessful

<sup>(39)</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 107-108.

<sup>(40)</sup> A fundraising institution which helps to finance Zionist operations.

<sup>(41)</sup> *Maariv*, April 18, 1972.

<sup>(42)</sup> *Jewish Chronicle* (London, 13/3/1964).

<sup>(43)</sup> *Ibid.*, 6/10/1967.

ful, he said, 'I know that these operations fail, but we want to fight the phenomenon.' (Israeli Radio, Arabic Service 10/4/1973, 20:30 hrs.)

## 60. WHAT DOES ISRAEL MEAN BY SECURE BORDERS?

Israel was founded on a land that was usurped from its rightful owners, and the leaders of Israel are aware of this. Hence, the question of guaranteeing the security of this illegitimate Israeli existence ranks among Israel's prime concerns. Nevertheless, this does not imply that Israel's conception of security is static—it is rather dynamic and in keeping with Israel's expansionist and imperialist policies. Hence this concept is constantly modified so as to be in keeping with the changing political and military situation. Moreover, for Israel, the concept of security does not entail defending a defined territory. Rather it entails granting Israel the right to manoeuvre on Arab land and in Arab aerial space bordering on Israel. For Israel believes that its realization of security does not lie in international guarantees; it is, rather, impingent upon actual gains and achievements.

In the course of his discussion about the settlements established by Israel on Arab territory which was occupied in June, 1967, Yigal Allon said: 'We shall not settle for retaining these settlements but shall also build new settlements along the new borders for security reasons. The 1949 armistice lines are not defensible. Consequently a return to these borders is a return to a strategic trap.'<sup>(44)</sup>

On another occasion, Allon said:

Israeli presence, whether civilian, military or political, should be strengthened by a geo-strategic formation securing geographical depth and defensible topographic centers for Israel. Such presence only serves as a basis for Israel's security. Secure borders are political borders resting on territorial depth and natural barriers such as water channels, mountains, deserts and narrow passages that would serve to deter the advancement of mechanised and ground troops. Further, secure borders are those that can guarantee the possibility of devising an effective early alarm system against approaching enemy aircraft. Finally, secure borders are those that provide good bases for launching counter attacks. There is no acceptable alternative to such borders.<sup>(45)</sup>

<sup>(44)</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, June 17, 1969.

<sup>(45)</sup> *Maariv*, October 1968.



Allon goes on to say that secure borders for Israel also means that 'Israel should continue to have the prerogative and the executive power to launch a pre-emptive counter-attack against any anticipated attack that is being implemented'. Secure borders also signify that 'it is not only Israel's prerogative but also its duty to fight' Arab countries if these embark on a military or a political task regarded as 'taboo' by Israel. We have listed such circumstances, as quoted by Yigal Allon, in the answer given to question 62 of this handbook.

## 61. WHAT IS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SETTLEMENT AND EXPANSION?

One of the facets of Israeli policy in the Arab territories occupied after 1967 is the establishment of settlements. Settlements are considered by the Israeli Government as the *de facto* answer to all calls for withdrawal from those territories:

– Yigal Allon said: 'Settlement in the vital areas is one of the basic tools of our political struggle to define secure borders.'<sup>(46)</sup>

– Golda Meir said: 'As it was the policy in the past, the Government will consider settlement and establishment of ports for our sons on our historic homeland as being of a political value for the security and existence of Israel.'<sup>(47)</sup>

– Dayan said: 'We will establish more settlements because this would help in shaping a new map.'<sup>(48)</sup>

– Allon said: 'The facts that we will create [in the territories] will define the future map.'<sup>(49)</sup>

Yigal Allon defines the importance of retaining Israel's territorial gains by saying that Israel should quickly seek to establish a defensive, agricultural, colonial existence in those territories which are considered so crucial from a defensive point of view; that it is impossible to give them up under any circumstances. There can be no hope of winning a political territorial struggle without establishing a studied, fortified, armed colonial existence serving the purposes of territorial defence, which is regarded as an integral part of Israel's conception of defence and which allows the Israeli army to devote itself to effective campaigns...<sup>(50)</sup>

<sup>(46)</sup> *Maariv*, 22/9/1968.

<sup>(47)</sup> *Jewish Observer*, 21/3/1969.

<sup>(48)</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, 20/3/1969.

<sup>(49)</sup> *Maariv*, 27/9/68.

<sup>(50)</sup> *Maariv*, 27/9/1968.

## 62. WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF ISRAELI PEACE?

Israeli leaders have been wont to declare their belief and devotion to the cause of peace in the Middle East. They say that the essential condition for establishing peace is Arab *recognition* of Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state in the area, within *secure* and recognized borders. Let us examine this condition in order to determine the validity of the Israeli plea for peace.

Israel is a country which came into being by making another country cease to be: Israel is the replacement of a Middle Eastern country; its people constitute the demographic replacement recruited from a hundred different lands of the indigenous Palestinian Arab people who have been displaced and dispersed throughout a dozen lands; its land is a land occupied but not owned, nor purchased, nor otherwise rightfully acquired, by its present occupants. The demanded Arab recognition of Israel means legitimizing and perpetuating this wrong and unjust situation. It means a surrender, an acceptance of Israeli non-recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs to continue to live on their own soil and to enjoy both their individual rights and their collective right of self-determination in their homeland. The Israeli call for recognition is in a way similar to the Rhodesian call for recognition where such recognition means the acceptance of racial discrimination, domination, and exploitation. The case of Israel is even worse because it involves a people uprooted, totally dispossessed and ignored. What Israel calls peace is, therefore, nothing but a consolidation of territorial conquest. It is a legalization of its act of forcibly uprooting the Palestinian people from its homeland and throwing it into the 'desert'—or into the 'sea' of refuge and exile.

Israel not only demands Arab recognition of its right to continued occupation of the territory occupied in the year 1948, but it adds to this area a large part of the territories occupied as a result of the June war when it talks about 'secure' borders. Here, in this concept of secure borders, lies the real content of Israeli peace. The former Israeli Premier, Levi Eshkol, explained the meaning of secure borders by saying: 'We look for peace that would guarantee for us secure borders in the East, free navigation in the West, and a control over water sources in the North.' (*Haaretz*, 2 August 1968). Yigal Allon, the Deputy Prime Minister, gave the following definition of secure borders, he said:

The 1949 Armistice lines do not constitute secure borders. Peace can only be achieved by a total peace treaty that would lay down effective security measures and new strategic borders. The Israeli existence—be it civil, military, or political—should be based on a geo-strategic arrangement that would guarantee a geographic depth and topographic positions suitable for defence. The secure borders are political borders providing territorial depth and natural barriers, such as waterways, mountains, and deserts. There can be no alternative, whatsoever, to these borders.’ (*Maariv*, 22 September 1968).

A third prominent Israeli leader, Moshe Dayan, made the following definition of secure borders:

For Israel, the area lying between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River constitutes one territorial unit. I vehemently oppose the demarcation of any frontiers that would divide this unity. Israel should not agree to the Security Council Resolution (No. 242) under any circumstance because this resolution clearly calls for our withdrawal to the 4th of June 1967 lines.’ (*Maariv*, 19 June 1968).

Golda Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister, while answering a question on what territory she considered necessary for Israel’s security, said:

If you mean that we should draw a line, that we haven’t done. We will do that when we get to it. But one basic article in Israel’s policy is that the borders of the fourth of June, 1967, cannot be re-established in the peace agreement. There must be changes in the border. We want changes in our borders, on all our borders, for security’s sake. . . .<sup>(51)</sup>

Israel thus not only looks for Arab recognition of its right to exist as a sovereign state, but also wants to expand ‘its’ frontiers to the lines it deems necessary. The Zionists fought severely for the Partition Resolution. When they got it, they expanded their frontiers and occupied a larger part of Palestine, and Israel was established. Israeli spokesmen stressed, throughout the period from 1948 till 1967, that what Israel wanted and strove for was Arab recognition of its right to exist. When Israel waged its attack on the Arab countries on June 5, 1967 and won, the theme became ‘secure borders’ and not ‘recognition’. Israel is not even satisfied with the territories it occupied as a result of the June war. Yigal Allon expressed this attitude while defining what he considered as being the ‘must nots’ in Israeli strategy. He said that it was,

<sup>(51)</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 31 January 1972.

necessary and just for the Israeli Army to practice one of its *rights* which entitles it to cross the cease-fire lines for a short operation or for a longer stay for any of the following reasons: 1. In case of a local or a general attack; or in case of a build-up of forces in preparation for an attack; or if we would know that our enemy is effectively preparing for an all-out air attack or a missile attack on vital Israeli targets. 2. To put an end to terrorist war launched across the borders. 3. In case of a blockade on Israeli navigation in the high seas, or in the straits or the narrow passages as Bab-el-Mandab in the Southern end of the Red Sea. 4. To offer assistance to our known or unknown, real or probable allies in any Arab country. 5. In case of a change in the *status quo* in any neighbouring country that would threaten Israel.<sup>(52)</sup>

A quick glance at these conditions discloses, quite vividly, the real content of Israeli peace. Israeli peace is a plan to enforce Israeli will physically and/or 'morally' over the area which Israel 'considers' to be the sphere of its security. This peace is equivalent to surrender and servitude for the Arabs. Furthermore, it is a plea for the maintenance of one super-power in the Middle East that would dominate the area militarily and politically, and exploit it economically. Israel cannot but follow such an aggressive and expansionist strategy because it is compatible with its nature.

#### 63. WHAT WERE THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ISRAEL WAS ADMITTED TO THE UN?

The General Assembly has established a direct relationship between the admission of Israel to the United Nations and the implementation of Resolution 194(III). . . . This link is clearly expressed in the actual text of Resolution 273(III) of May 11, 1949 concerning the admission of Israel to the United Nations.

'Noting . . . the declaration by the State of Israel that it unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honor them from the day when it becomes a member of the United Nations,

'Recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948 and taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of the Government of Israel before the ad hoc Political Committee in respect of the implementation of the said resolution,

<sup>(52)</sup> Yigal Allon, *The Making of the Israeli Army* (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1970), pp. 105-106.

‘The General Assembly,

... decides to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations.’

.....  
Israel has not honored the obligations she thus subscribed to before the largest possible body of public opinion and, what is more, on the occasion of her solemn admission to the United Nations. On the contrary, she has shifted her own responsibility for the Arab refugees to the lap of Arab countries.

Already in its Resolution 394 of 14 December 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations noted that no repatriation, no resettlement and no economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees had been carried out, and that the payment of compensation had not been effected. Since that date the General Assembly has on several occasions noted that the provisions of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194(III) concerning repatriation, have not been put into effect. Such censure, indicating the condemnation of Israel, has clearly not disturbed the Zionists at all.

Thus, Israel has not only pledged her responsibility for the refugees, but has also released the United Nations from its obligations towards her, so that the Organization would be perfectly justified in expelling her.

The close link established by the General Assembly in the same resolution, between the admission of Israel and the implementation of Resolution 194(III) of December 11, 1948, makes it possible to affirm that it was the intention of the United Nations to confer upon the application of this resolution the character of an abrogating condition.<sup>(63)</sup>

#### 64. HAS ISRAEL RESPECTED ITS COMMITMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPATRIATION OF THE REFUGEES?

In December 1948, the General Assembly recommended ‘that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those not choosing to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.’ (Resolution 194, II, para. 11).

<sup>(63)</sup> Seminar of Arab Jurists on Palestine, *The Palestine Question* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1967), pp. 128-129.

These provisions were subsequently recapitulated in other resolutions, particularly in the conditions attached to the admission of Israel to the U.N. For her part, Israel, once admitted, refused to honor her obligations to the refugees demanding that they be resettled elsewhere.

As a result of the 1967 war, 410,000 new refugees left their homes. Pressured by the U.N., Israel agreed to admit a limited number. Under Red Cross supervision 176,000 persons filled application forms. Only 14,000 persons were allowed to return to their homes (UNRWA report A/6713, para. 36) accompanied by a great deal of propaganda.<sup>(54)</sup>

## 65. ARE RETALIATORY RAIDS JUSTIFIABLE UNDER THE UN CHARTER?

U.N. Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte realized that Israel had expansionist designs which she planned to execute under one pretext or another. Moshe Sharett, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, had mentioned to the Mediator that Israel would reserve for herself the right to retaliate militarily if the Arab countries broke the Armistice agreements. Sharett had told him also that the area of Israel must expand, now, after the establishment of the state. Count Bernadotte said:

Shertok even hinted that any partitioning of the Arab part of Palestine might result in the Jews resuming military operations—a statement that seemed inconsistent with the Jews' own criticism of certain Arab countries for trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Jewish State. Clearly Shertok was laying himself open to much the same charge now.

Shertok continued: the decision of the Jewish Government to call a peace conference was dictated by a sincere and honest desire to put an end to the war. But he realised that the Arabs would probably refuse. As to the shape the Jewish State was to assume, he shared my view that the frontiers laid down in the United Nations resolution of 29th

<sup>(54)</sup> Ian Gilmour and Dennis Walters, British Members of Parliament, made a joint statement in which they said: 'The Israeli attitude to the refugees becomes clearer when their return rather than their expulsion is considered. Most people in Britain probably believe that Israel has agreed to their return and that repatriation is now satisfactorily proceeding. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Certainly on one day, in front of television cameras, 144 were allowed to return over the Allenby Bridge. Unfortunately, there was no television to record that over the other bridges on that same day, more than three times that figure were still going in the other direction. And since July 10, so far as we could establish, not one single refugee has been allowed to return and the sad traffic of exodus has continued at a rate of about 1,000 a day.' (*The Times*, London, 27 July, 1967).

November 1947 could not be maintained. They were impossible to defend militarily; in view of the tension that existed between the two parties some modification must be sought. The Israeli territory would have to be expanded. The great Arab promontories thrusting into Jewish territory would have to be abolished. That, Shertok asserted, would be the best way of preventing future Jewish expansion. If Jewish territory were made too small from the start, a tremendous outward pressure among the population was bound to arise that would lead to serious complications. I interpreted this as meaning that the Jews would after a time make use of the argument that the number of immigrants at a given moment had become so great—and would become still greater later on—that Jewish territory was inadequate. This was a line of argument completely in accordance with what the Arabs believed Jewish plans for the future to be.<sup>(65)</sup>

Count Bernadotte reported his fears to the Security Council which took a decision on August 19, 1948 forbidding any of the parties from violating the truce either by way of retaliation or deterrence. (S/982, sec. d). The Security Council reaffirmed this same decision four times in the same year: On October 19, November 4, November 16 and December 29, 1948.

Furthermore, the philosophy of so-called 'retaliation' has been examined by the Security Council with great thoroughness, and has been condemned in the statements made by the majority of the Council members during the debates on Israel's invasions, as well as in the Council resolutions. Thus, in its resolution of January 19, 1950 the Council proclaimed that the alleged 'provocation' which Israel claimed had prompted its invasion 'in no way justifies the Israeli action,' and proceeded to 'remind' Israel that it (the Council) had 'already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreements, whether or not taken by way of retaliation.' (Paragraphs 1 and 2). The Council, moreover, 'condemned' that attack as a three-fold 'flagrant violation . . . of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement . . . and of Israel's obligations under the Charter.' (Paragraph 3).

Finally, the Secretary-General, in his reports on the visit he made to the Middle East in pursuance of the Security Council's request of 4 April 1956, had examined thoroughly the question of 'retaliation' and of the right of a state party to the Armistice Agreements to undertake military

<sup>(65)</sup> Bernadotte, *To Jerusalem*, Joan Bulman, trans. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), p. 211-212.

action if another party violates some other provision of these Agreements. The findings of the Secretary-General, submitted to the Council on 12 September 1956, merit quoting at length:

In my report to the Security Council of 9 May 1956 I pointed out the complications which had arisen because of confusion concerning the extent to which compliance with the Armistice Agreements could be conditioned by reciprocity. I said in this context:

‘As a matter of course, each party considers its compliance with the stipulations of an Armistice Agreement as conditioned by compliance of the other party to the Agreement. Should such a stand be given the interpretation that any one infringement of the provisions of the Agreement by one party justifies reactions by the other party which, in their turn, are breaches of the Armistice Agreement, without any limitation as to the field within which reciprocity is considered to prevail, it would in fact mean that the armistice regime could be nullified by a single infringement by one of the parties. Although such an interpretation has never been given from responsible quarters, it appears to me that a lack of clarity has prevailed. From no side has it been said that a breach of an Armistice Agreement, to whatever clause it may refer, gives the other party a free hand concerning the Agreement as a whole, but a tendency to regard the Agreements, *including* the cease-fire clauses, as entities may explain a feeling that in fact, due to infringements of this or that clause, the obligations are no longer in a strict sense fully binding, and specifically that a breach of one of the clauses, other than the cease-fire clause, may justify action in contravention of that clause.’

In view of this lack of clarity I considered it essential to lift the cease-fire clauses out of the Armistice Agreements so as to give them an independent legal status as obligations, compliance with which was conditioned only by reciprocity in respect of the implementation of the same obligations by the other parties to the Armistice Agreements. As a result of the negotiations last spring such an independent status was established for the cease-fire obligations to be found in Article II:2 of the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement, and in Article III:2 of the Jordan-Israel, Lebanon-Israel, and Syria-Israel Armistice Agreements. Thus, no party could any longer justify a violation of the cease-fire by reference to an alleged non-compliance by other parties with other clauses of the General Armistice Agreements than the cease-fire clause itself, and then only if and when such non-compliance were found to be a reason for the exertion of the right of self-defense as recognized (and subject to the conditions) in Article 51 of the Charter. Any such measure must be immediately reported to the Security Council and is subject to decision by the Council. In this connection, circumstances make it necessary to emphasize again that acts of retaliation have repeatedly been condemned by the Security Council.



The assurances given to the United Nations of unconditional observance of the cease-fire clauses, further, made the United Nations itself a party to the cease-fire obligations. Its right to take steps for securing the implementation of these obligations was thereby again clearly established in line with the decision of the Security Council on 11 August 1949.<sup>(56)</sup>

## 66. HAS ISRAEL EVER AGREED TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT?

Yes, once, when Israel signed the 'Lausanne Protocol', May 12, 1949, agreeing to the Conciliation Commission's proposal that the partition may be taken as a basis for discussion aimed at 'achieving a final settlement of all questions outstanding' between her and the Arab countries.<sup>(57)</sup> The Israelis then reversed their position and their delegation

submitted proposals regarding the territorial question, according to which it demanded that the international frontiers of Mandatory Palestine be considered the frontiers of Israel, with one provisional and temporary exception, namely, the central area of Palestine then under Jordanian military authority, in which the Israelis consented to 'recognize the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as the *de facto* military occupying power. . . without entering into the future status of the area for the time being.'<sup>(58)</sup>

Hadawi says that:

the Israelis themselves later admitted that their signing of the 'Lausanne Protocol' had been connected with their application for membership of the United Nations. Israel's first application had been rejected in December 1948. . .

In 1949, the Israelis again sought admission. Concurrently, the Conciliation Commission was conducting negotiations for a settlement in Lausanne, Switzerland. The signing of the 'Lausanne Protocol' on 12 May 1949, coincided almost to the hour with the approval of Israel's admission into membership of the United Nations on 11 May 1949, if the time difference between Lausanne and New York is taken into account. The signature, of which member-states of the General Assembly were informed, gave the impression that the Israelis were now ready to surrender the extra territory occupied beyond that assigned to the 'Jewish State' under the Partition Plan, and to allow the Palestine Arabs to return to their homes.

<sup>(56)</sup> E.L.M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (London: George Harrap and Co. 1962), p. 139 and pp. 144-145. Also U.N. Document S/3659 (September 27, 1956), Section II, pp. 2-4.

<sup>(57)</sup> UN Document A/927 of June 21, 1949.

<sup>(58)</sup> *Ibid.*

The Israelis made no secret of the strategy they adopted at the time. They admitted that 'some members of the United Nations wished at this opportunity to test Israel's intentions with regard to the refugees, boundaries and Jerusalem issues, before approving its application for admission. In a way, Israel's attitude at the Lausanne talks aided its delegation at Lake Success [U.N. Headquarters at the time] to obtain the majority required for admission. (*Israeli Government Yearbook 1950*, pp. 140-142.)<sup>(59)</sup>

67. IS IT TRUE THAT ISRAEL WAS FACING A CONCRETE THREAT OF EXTERMINATION IN 1967?

Israel attempted to vindicate its belligerence in June 1967 with the contention that it was a defensive measure in the face of an imminent threat on the part of the Arabs to carry out a war of extermination against Israel. Hence, war was the only alternative left for Israel to protect itself from the threat of extermination. Nevertheless, 5 years later, some of the Israeli leaders themselves revealed the falsity of such allegations.

Brigadier (Reserve) Metetyahu Peled, who was the head of the supplies division in the General Command of the Israeli army during the 1967 war attested: 'The assumption that Israel was subject to the threat of extermination in June 1967 and that Israel fought for its physical survival then is nothing but a story that was concocted and that gained proportion after the war.' (*Haaretz*, 19/3/72.) This statement was affirmed by Colonel Ezer Weizmann who headed the operations division during the 1967 war. Weizmann stated: 'I am ready to confirm that Israel's entity did not face the threat of annihilation.' (*Al Hamishmar* 20/3/72) Further, in an interview with Dove Goldstein, Weizmann said: 'There was no danger of extermination. It was inevitable that Israel should attack Egypt. Had the Egyptians taken the initiative in attacking Israel, the latter would not have faced a threat of extermination, but our losses would have been greater.' (*Maariv*, 4/4/72.) And when Goldstein asked, 'Did you tell Eshkol, before the war, that we do not face the threat of extermination,' he answered: 'That was not necessary, as this issue was never raised during a serious meeting. We have discussed war and its hazard. . . but there

<sup>(59)</sup> Sami Hadawi, *Palestine in Focus* (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1967), pp. 56-58.

has been no mention of extermination.’ Weizmann reiterated this when he said: ‘Israel would not have been actually exposed to the threat of extermination if it had not taken the initiative to start the war under the circumstances in May-June 1967, even if Israel had failed to defeat the Egyptians, Jordanians and Syrians. But Israel’s existence and its standing would have taken a different turn from what Israel was or is now.’ (*Yediot Ahronot* 6/6/72.)

Haim Barlev, the former Chief of Staff of the Israeli army confirmed Weizmann’s statements in an interview that appeared in *Maariv* (19/5/72) where he declared: ‘We were not facing the threat of extermination on the eve of the Six-day War; we never voiced or entertained such notions. Actually this assumption was made during the 1948 war, but has, since, proved to be hardly serious.’

Why then should Israel claim that it was facing extermination? First, Israel wants to justify the annexation of more Arab territory (*Al-Hamishmar*, 14/4/72), as Mordechai Bentov—a minister representing Mapam during the June war announced. Second, ‘Israel aims at maintaining the conditions of fear and anxiety that prevail over Israeli citizens’. (Amnon Kapeliouk: ‘Israël, était-il réellement menacé d’extermination?’ *Le Monde*, 3/6/72.) Third, Israel wishes to maintain an image of an embattled country, constantly facing the threat of extermination for the purpose of securing further support, aid and donations.

## 68. WAS THE CONQUEST OF ARAB TERRITORIES IN 1967 FAR FROM EARLY ZIONIST PLANS?

Besides the Zionist Memorandum to the Peace Conference in 1919 which drew the boundaries of the proposed ‘Zionist State’, the daily *Jerusalem Post* published, on August 29, 1967, an article which said *inter alia*:

In February 1920, Louis Brandies [a fervent American Zionist] wrote urgently to President Wilson: ‘. . . My associates of the Zionist Organization wire me from Paris that in the conference on the Turkish Treaty France now insists upon the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement. . . If the French contention should prevail it would be disastrous to the realization of the establishment of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine, in as much as the Sykes-Picot agreement divides the country in complete disregard of historical boundaries and natural necessities. This means on the North Palestine must include the Litani River and the watersheds

of the Hermon, and on the East it must include the plains of the Golan. Narrower than this is mutilation. . . It is your word at this moment to Miller and Lloyd George which may be decisive.'

#### 69. DOES ISRAEL WANT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT?

1. Abba Eban announced in the London weekly, *Jewish Observer*, in April 1965: 'Israel cannot accept the proposal for negotiation on the basis of the UNO resolutions of 1947. Such a proposal is not new, since the Arabs proposed it several times in the past inside the United Nations and on other international bodies, while Israel rejected it'.

2. In June 1966, the Knesset defeated a draft resolution affirming its belief in peace as the only solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and calling upon the government to act in this spirit. This resolution was defeated by 43 votes against 5 with 32 abstentions. (*Haodam Hazeh*, Tel Aviv, June 10, 1966.)

3. After the adoption of the resolution by the UN Security Council, the Israeli Government met *in camera* on 28/11/1967 in the form of a 'Ministerial Committee of Security'. The government allowed the publishing of the following statement only: 'The Government will continue to act according to the resolution of the Knesset on 13/11/1967.'

In that resolution the Knesset decided that 'Israel will continue to maintain in full the present situation, as laid down in the ceasefire agreement and will fortify its positions, taking into consideration its vital needs of security and development. The Israeli Government repeats and stresses that only through permanent peace reached at direct negotiations between the Arab States and Israel, lies the solution to the problems of the region.'

As a matter of fact, this decision of the government negates the Security Council's resolution and the handling of the problem by the United Nations. The daily *Maariv*, commenting on the Israeli Government's meeting, pointed out on 29/11/1967, that Israel's intentions are, to limit the contacts with Mr. Jarring, and not to negotiate with him on any concrete things.

4. Defence Minister Dayan told the daily *Haaretz* in an interview published on January 19, 1968:

Maybe that Abdel-Nasser will be prepared, even without Hussein, to come to an agreement with us, under the condition that we withdraw

to the lines of June 4, 1967, and then Abdel-Nasser possibly will be prepared to announce the end of hostilities, free navigation in the Gulf of Eilat and may be also [ready] to promise something about the Suez Canal. If we are prepared to withdraw to the former lines, we shall solve the problem with Egypt to a large extent.

And when the interviewer asked: 'And you, are you not for such a solution?' Dayan answered: 'Certainly not!'

5. Abba Eban told *Haaretz* (2/2/68) that 'Some high-ranking politicians in the world told me, that according to your press you stopped being interested in peace. June last you talked about the territories as a lever for peace. Now this has changed. You fell in love with the territories themselves.'

6. Israeli Galili, the minister in charge of information, told a press conference in Jerusalem on July 3, 1967 that 'Israel is not likely to abide by any one-sided demand of the U.N. Assembly'. (*Jerusalem Post*, July 4, 1967.)

#### 70. DOES ISRAEL REALLY INTEND TO WITHDRAW FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967?

1. Yisrael Yesheyahu, Minister of Posts, announced (*Davar*, 17/1/1968): 'The declared and approved policy of the government in regard to the occupied territories is that all of Jerusalem will remain Jewish, that the Golan Heights will be a security shield for Galilee and Jordan Valley settlements, and that the Gaza Strip will not again be part of Egypt and will not be under Jordanian rule.'

2. *The Jerusalem Post*, August 10, 1967, tells us:

There is no going back to the 1948 borders. . . .

We must not allow other countries acting in their own interests to force us to return to the 1948 Armistice Agreements nor to their borders. . . .

We need to consider the reality of 1967 and the map of 1967. We need not only permanent borders but borders that will ensure peace. *The former borders were the result of the 1948 war, when Israel was weak.*

3. Dayan told a gathering of foreign and local correspondents that: 'The Gaza Strip is Israel and that it should become an integral part of the country.' He went on to say: 'I don't see any difference between Gaza and Nazereth any more. The West Bank and Gaza enjoy the same status. I don't see any difference.' (*Jerusalem Post*, July 6, 1967.)

4. Yigal Allon spoke of the Jordan River as 'our security frontier and political border, where we should have settlements'. (*Jerusalem Post*, 20/8/1968.)

5. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon said on July 16, at a rally of Golan Heights settlers which was celebrating the anniversary of the establishment of Kibbutz Golan, that while the Arabs wait, 'Israel must establish new conditions that will ensure our security'.

He added that Israel's permanent presence in the Golan was 'an irreplaceable means of safeguarding the security of Galilee and the Jordan Valley'. (*Jerusalem Post*, July 18, 1968.)

6. Israel has established up till now 46 settlements in the Arab territories occupied after the 1967 war.

#### 71. HAS ISRAEL EVER AGREED TO THE RETURN OF PALESTINIANS TO THEIR HOMELAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS?

Israel has been clear in announcing, ever since its establishment, its absolute refusal to the return of Palestinians to their homeland under any arrangement whatsoever, except for a few thousand old men and women who were allowed to join their families and 14,025 other persons, who were allowed to return to their houses on the West Bank, out of a total of more than 400,000 refugees. Israel was more extreme on this issue. It refused the return of the Arabs of Ikrit and Kafr Birim to their original villages, although they are in fact considered 'citizens' of Israel.

#### 72. HAS ISRAEL BEEN ABLE TO CREATE ONE SOCIETY BY MELTING THE SOCIAL DIFFERENCES ARISING FROM THE DIVERSE ORIGINS OF HER CITIZENS?

At the fourth Mapam Congress in 1963, Meir Ya'ari, the then Mapam's General Secretary, said:

As we note, most production workers now belong to the oriental communities. *To be quite frank we are concerned not only with freezing wages but with deepening the ethnic differences in the country.* This social exploitation helps hold the oriental communities, one half of the population, in their present state of economic, social and cultural discrimination.

Ya'ari compares the ethnic discrimination against both Oriental

## Jews and Arabs in Israel:

The common denominator of the two problems is that the Arab worker must live in a hut or hovel on the outskirts of Jewish towns where he must seek his work, and the worker of the Sephardic (Oriental) community is packed into crowded slums. . .

We are witnesses to the desperate struggle being fought by slum dwellers in Tel Aviv whose land was sold from under them at exorbitant prices to a corporation which plans an entertainment center on the site of their homes, costing millions and perhaps tens of millions of pounds. This land is the stage for a devil's dance of land speculation involving astronomical sums.

Slums have been destroyed with the help of eviction notices. Policemen were recruited to aid the land speculators in order to evict the dwellers into the streets. Almost incredible! Women and children tried, empty-handed, to defend their homes against the policemen and their clubs, against the threat of expulsion.<sup>(60)</sup>

A similar situation prevails in the kibbutz. Melford E. Spiro writes in *Kibbutz: Venture in Eutopia*:

The prejudice against the 'Oriental' Jew has racist overtones. The youths from Morocco and Iraq, who were living in the kibbutz were often referred to contemptuously as 'hashechorim' the dark ones; and snobbish reference was often made to both their origin and their primitive behavior. . . One day when the work in the kitchen was particularly slow and inefficient, he [one chaver] exclaimed, 'What can you expect? The only ones working there are Africans, Asiatics and Americans!'<sup>(61)</sup>

There are several indicators that ascertain the existence of a wide social gap between the Western (Ashkenazim) Jews and Oriental (Sephardim) Jews in Israel. These indicators prove that Israel was not able, even after more than two decades, to mould the settler-society and create one coherent society:

1. The Israeli Cabinet has not included, ever since 1948, more than two ministers of Oriental origin. One position was the Ministry of Police which was held by an Oriental Jew from 1948 until his death in 1972. The Ministry of Social Affairs was given to a Sephardi at certain times. The Jewish Agency, which is in charge of Immigration and

<sup>(60)</sup> Quoted in Peter Buch, *The Myth of Progressive Israel, Zionism and the Arab Revolution* (New York: The Young Socialist Alliance, 1967), p. 10.

Second Edition (New York: Schocken Books, 1963), pp. 108-109.

Absorption, does not have one single Sephardi in its top level leadership. The Histadrut leadership is also void of Orientalists. Knesset member Ben Forat said once, that out of 300 high officials in the government, there were only 9 Sephardim. In the Knesset itself there are only five members of Oriental origin.<sup>(62)</sup>

2. In a study on the integration of Diaspora Jews in Israel, an Israeli writer related the following: 'It became clear to us that the question of integrating Diaspora Jews is not feasible. Colonisation, adaptation to the new environment, and farming require a community spirit. This spirit does not evolve among people who come from different origins, speak different languages, and practice different customs. They do not constitute a social unit. The *mixed village* is internally divided and suffers from factionalism. Social life and its various manifestations (parties, feasts, and marriages) are not unifying factors but rather crystallize differences and contradictions.'<sup>(63)</sup> In the Wadi Sahib quarter in Haifa there are several Ashkenazi families amidst a majority of Orientalists. These families, inspite of 22 years of neighbourhood, continue to live in isolation from their Oriental neighbours. Meir Steimetz, an Ashkenazi living in that quarter, described this situation: 'I have nothing to do with any one of them. They are not my friends and I do not look forward to their friendship.'<sup>(64)</sup>

A Jewish Soviet student who immigrated to Israel said in a panel at the Hebrew University: 'We never knew that there was an ethnic problem in Israel and that there are "Whites" and "Blacks". The Soviet papers used to publish things of this sort. We never believed them.'<sup>(65)</sup>

### 73. HAS ZIONISM SUCCEEDED IN CREATING A STATE WHEREBY PERSECUTED JEWS' COULD LIVE IN PEACE?

Amos Elon, the Israeli writer, gives the following account of the military and warlike atmosphere that dominates Israel's life and shapes the Israeli individual:

<sup>(62)</sup> *Daavar*, 11/4/1971.

<sup>(63)</sup> Moshe Lesk and Others (eds.) *Immigrants in Israel* (Hebrew), Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1969), p. 28.

<sup>(64)</sup> *Maariv* Supplement, 13/8/1971.

<sup>(65)</sup> *Maariv*, 11/11/1971.



Young men have gone to war three times within less than twenty years. Each war called for near total exertions; each war was fought in the firm belief that it would bring peace within reach, or at least a little closer. None has. On the contrary, year after year, war after war, the basic situation remains static. There are some Israelis, still in their early forties (as there must also be Egyptians), who have three times in their lives fought over the same arid, desolate, God-forsaken wadi in the desert that controls a strategic point along the old Egyptian-Israeli frontier. They have gone from war to war; it has always been the same, dismal, bloody wadi, only a few miles long, yellowish-brown, under a thick dustcloud in the scorching heat of the desert sun. They took it, they left it: they took it again and left it again. They took it once more; nothing changed.

Many thousands must go through life haunted by the harrowing sights, sounds and smells, which have been the recurrent features of their youth and manhood; the groans of wounded and those dying in their arms; the screams of fear more piercing than the thunder of nearby explosions; the sight of uncountable corpses littering vast flat expanses of sand; the wretched refugees walking off into an unknown distance; the machines of war ablaze like huge torches against the darkening desert skies, the stench of burning fuel and incandescent rubber mixing with the reek of roasting human skin and flesh.

‘When, my friends, have we last seen peace?’ the poet Chaim Guri exclaimed some years ago in a short prose piece. ‘This soil is insatiable,’ he wrote bitterly. ‘How many more graves, how many more coffins are needed until it will cry out—enough, enough!’

One of the few surviving Israeli paratroopers dropped into Nazi-occupied Europe in 1944, herself a near-legendary figure, rose at a public meeting in her Upper Galilee *kibbutz* shortly after the 1967 war. Her interpolation was brief. ‘There is one question that gives me nightmares and I would like to ask it,’ she said: ‘How many wars will our boys fight before they will become animals?’ She sat down again and waited for answers.

It is the younger Israeli who must bear on his shoulders and with his nerves the main burden of this seemingly endless emergency. One result has been a growing cult of toughness among younger people. It has led on occasion to bizarre refractions of the mind. In the diary he kept during the Suez-Sinai war of 1956, Moshe Dayan recalled being told that two distinguished paratroop officers had taken to spiritualism and were communicating with their dead comrades on those nights when they were not out on action.

‘I could not believe my ears’, Dayan wrote. ‘I cannot imagine more balanced characters than these men. When I told A. this, he answered,

to my surprise, without a smile that if I had gone out on action for two years and each week my best friends had fallen right next to me, my sobriety and stubbornness would fail me and the borderline between life and death would become obscured.’

There have also been cases of senseless murder and wanton destruction, such as the mass killing in 1956 of peaceful Arab villagers at Kafr Kassem; or the attempted razing, in 1967, of the town of Kalkilya, only a mile across the pre-1967 Jordanian border, for reasons, apparently, of personal vengeance. Before the razing, the population of this unfortunate town had been evacuated and sent off to fend for itself in the hills.<sup>(66)</sup>

Let us look at the question from the social angle to see whether Israel was able to provide the Jewish immigrants who came from several parts of the world with a decent and dignified life. Baruch Nadel of *Yediot Ahronot*<sup>(67)</sup> interviewed Avi Bordugo, a fifth-year law student (of Moroccan background) at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Avi describes how he moved from job to job because each time, a new Ashkenazi applicant was hired to replace him, even if he did not possess Avi’s qualifications. He says:

‘Personally, I don’t have any problems, I am in a position where I can take care of myself. I’ll be able to graduate and become a lawyer. But I am worried about my comrades, the children of Oriental Jews. The State is built of communities; the lowest are Arabs, above them, Oriental Jews, and above them, Ashkenazis. They claim that we Oriental Jews hate Arabs. This is a lie that was fabricated by the Ashkenazis. Everything here is built on communities. The State pays attention to every new immigrant, but the immigrants who have been here for ten, fifteen, or twenty years, nobody cares about. A serious social problem has been created—the problem of the lower classes—but because 99% of those are Oriental Jews, the problem becomes a communal one. This strengthens the feeling of discrimination (*Yediot Ahronot*, March 12, 1971).’

[Another Oriental Jew] tells the reporter in the same article: ‘We realized that we are always oppressed. It begins with the government and goes on through to the Municipality, which is the closest thing to us. Therefore, we decided to form an organization. We knew that there is such an organization in the United States, with the name the Black Panthers, and it fights for rights. There, discrimination exists between blacks and whites. We felt that we are almost like them. Wherever

<sup>(66)</sup> Amos Elon, *Founders and Sons*, pp. 230-231.

<sup>(67)</sup> The quotations that follow appeared in an article by Yusuf Hamdan, an Arab from Israel under the title ‘Oriental Jews’ that was published in *The Arab World*.

we enter, whatever office we go to, our treatment is different.' (*Yediot Ahronot*, March 12, 1971).

The following is a cry by Aliza Marcello, a Moroccan woman who lives in the Musrara section of Jerusalem. It was published in *El Rhad* magazine in April 1971, as a reprint from *Yediot Ahronot*. After her son was arrested in order to prevent a demonstration of the Black Panthers in Jerusalem, at the beginning of March 1971, the woman said to the reporter:

'All right, all right, give the Ashkenazis everything. They deserve it. Why not? Bring new immigrants. Put them in new and beautiful houses so that you pull out our eyes. Give them four rooms, and even five. Build beautiful houses for them, just opposite our houses, so that my children can see how you care about the immigrants and how you leave us living like dogs.

'We gave our blood for this state. We lived for twenty years near the borders. The Arabs were shooting at us and throwing stones. But we kept silent. We thought: all right, a better situation will come. When will it happen, and where?

'I have three children in the Army. One is a paratrooper, and two are in the Artillery. For what do they shed their blood? And for whom? So that we may live in Musrara like dogs, 14 people in a room and a half? And so that the police can come every day and pull their brother from his bed and take him to jail and beat him like a dog?

'I'll go to the rabbi now and ask him to pray for me by the Western Wall. God might listen to him. There is nobody except Him. Everyone else does not want to listen. Ah, my God, what a world you created for us! Why is it our fate to see our children starving and spending all day wandering in the streets without school, without job, without future? You created this world for *all* of us, not only for the Ashkenazis and the new immigrants. But they don't let us live.

'My son is now in prison. I heard that he is on a hunger strike. We have enough troubles and in addition, they put him in prison. He is sick, the poor thing. Something bad may happen to him. I want my son. Give me my son. I am his mother, a sick old woman, and I am ready to go to prison in his place. Free him and take me instead of him. You are policemen, but be human, too.'

*Ma'ariv*, May 7, 1971, published another story about a resident of Ahituv village in Emek Hefer, near the border with Jordan. 'Zvi Morad was supposed to go early in the morning to the farm to collect the first fruit of the cucumbers in his section. Instead of going to the field, he took a gallon can of gasoline and went to the office of the Secretary of the moshav, where he found the accountant. He pushed him outside,

poured the gasoline around the rooms, and lit a match. The revenge of the young man who was consumed by bitterness, cost the members of the moshav a lot because the tongues of the flames ate all the account books and documents. . . .’

Then, the reporter, G. Sharoni, mentions that he had met Morad five years previously, when he was 21 years old ‘and after one of his battles.’ His despair and poverty moved him to cross the nearby border to Jordan, with one of his friends, when he was only 17 years old. ‘We can’t stand any more. If they will kill us, let them.’ After a while he was returned to the Israeli authorities. He spent a year in prison, and after that he returned to his family in Ahituv to continue his miserable life there, in a small barrack with twelve other members of his family. After a few years of hard work, he married a girl from Kfar Sirkin, in the south. But in spite of all his efforts, he could not get even a small barrack for himself and his wife, and they continued to live with his large family. As a result, his wife left him and returned to her family. Then, Morad expressed his anger by breaking all the furniture in the Secretary’s office and the cold storage room of the moshav’s grocery and general store. Because of this, he was imprisoned. Afterwards, there was a settlement, according to which he was released on condition that he pay back all the damages. He began working hard—digging sewage pipes for a few years and paying his salary to the moshav Secretariat until he paid back his debt. After that, ‘Zvi worked on his family’s farm, ten brothers—ten dunams. There is no cowshed. There is no chicken coop. Every year they plant tomatoes and cucumbers on the same land. The income is hardly enough for buying bread. After that he met a girl who immigrated from Roumania and who had lost her parents in the Holocaust. They married and she went to live with him in Ahituv and shared his lot of poverty and misery. “My parents” said Ada Morad, “died in the Holocaust and I came to the country as an orphan. I didn’t have anybody. Five years ago we met and we decided to marry. We lived in a terrible one-room barrack for two years until we had a child. We lived there two years, and there were scorpions and snakes in it”. . . .Ada is the only Ashkenazi in the moshav. . . .’ Morad continues to ask for a house, even of only one room, but in vain. So, despair and anger drove him at last to burn the Secretary’s office.

The hero of this sad story also is not European. ‘Zvi Morad came with his family from Iraq in 1951.’ In his poor moshav, Ahituv (*The Best*), which was built on the border, all the inhabitants are from Iran and Iraq, except for ‘one Ashkenazi woman’ who now lives a miserable life with her children in the small barrack belonging to the family of her husband, who is behind bars.

Sonya Daitz, in *Ma’ariv* (April 2, 1971) describes another large village, Givat Olga, five kilometers west of Hadera. In the words of the head of

the action committee formed by the people of the village in order to work for improvement of conditions in the village, at an extraordinary session of the committee:

‘There are many poor families here who are not able to pay the water bills. Some of these families have received final warnings that the water will be cut off if they do not pay immediately. Other families are trying to pay the bills by giving up necessities. Something must be done.’

#### 74. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE AND EXPANSIONIST POLICY ON THE ISRAELI SOCIETY?

For an answer to this question we turn to the special issue of *New Outlook*: Volume 12, Nos. 5-6 (107) June, July, August, 1969.

[The Israeli historian Jacob Talmon observed in] The International Symposium on Inevitable War or Initiatives for Peace [which was held in Tel Aviv]:

‘Israel may be able to win and win and go on winning till its last breath, win itself to death, thereby demonstrating the truth of Hegel’s aphorism about the “impotence of victory”. After every victory, we face more difficult, more complicated problems. If we continue to go on triumphing, the country will become a standing army; we will all live in Bevingrads, one larger than the other. All our energy and talent will go into spying, policing, repressing, and preventive action, and the perpetual state of emergency, the atmosphere of suspicion, fear and peril will corrode the whole fabric of our life. The remarkable constructive character, the idealistic splendor, the wonderful humanistic spirit and values that were at the cradle of our great movement of renaissance would be entirely perverted. The abyss of mutual hatred will deepen and the desires for vengeance will mount. What a perversion of the vision of a Herzl, Achad-Haam, A. D. Gordon, Berl Katznelson!

.....  
‘“Don’t make it too hard for us; don’t force us to decide one day, in anguish and despair, between our loyalty to Israel and our loyalty to our human values.” In short—we can win war after war, but you can’t solve this problem by force. The hawks of all kinds throughout the world consider themselves realists but in reality they are short-sighted and also egocentric. Because they assume—and they argue in this way all the time—that if we show the enemy that he doesn’t have any choice, if we make him face the fact of crushing force, we will bring him to absolute despair and then he will crumble and yield. The trouble is that the hawks forget that the other side is liable to think in the same way, and they also forget the power of despair, of not having anything to lose.

We Jews have shown how strong the power of despair could be. Where are all the experts on Arab mentality, on the oriental character, today, after the lessons of decolonization in Algeria, or in Vietnam? “But our Arabs are different.” Didn’t their persecutors also think the Jews to be despicable different? What didn’t they say about the Jews in the course of the centuries? So—there can be only either mutual destruction or coexistence on the basis of mutuality.’

Chaika Grossman, another participant in the seminar said :

For in the meantime, the scale of values is being adapted to the needs and character of a ruling power. The value of a security-oriented society will overshadow the values which make human life worth living. The values of Zionism, humanist values such as work, creativity, tolerance, brotherhood, will make way for one single value which by its very nature will be the decisive one—*power*. [eds. italics]

The regime of domination and security is bound to distort the natural fronts and ideological and social differentiations. The individual from the egalitarian, pioneering society stands together with the chauvinist, the enemy of the labor movement and progressive forces.

The security regime is already beginning to undermine the possibility of maintaining the elementary rights of the workers, and will undermine them even further. Tension over matters of security is already today breeding laws which will become more severe, and will deprive workers of the possibility of fighting for their wages and living conditions, a right attained by the wage-earners through the social and democratic struggles of many generations. Inevitably, it will push society backwards and not forwards. It will slow down and even hold up the pace of economic and social advancement of those strata at the bottom of the social ladder. An economy geared to security is fertile soil for speculation. The wealthy will grow even wealthier, while those living on wages will receive even less.’

Amos Elon in his book, *The Israelis; Founders and Sons* (pp. 236-238), makes the following observations:

The first thing to note is a spreading cult of toughness. It does not go unopposed; there are frequent protests in the newspapers, by teachers and parents. This cult of toughness is not, as yet, accompanied by a disdain of intellect and of moral qualities. But there are times when it comes close. Teachers, parents, youth leaders, engage in a constant battle against the senseless emulation of military practices and needless rigors in the youth movements and schools.

The para-military youth organization GADNA (‘regiments of youth’) has been especially prone to this kind of regimentation. GADNA

operates in conjunction with the educational authorities in nearly all of the high schools. Senseless tests of endurance under excruciatingly difficult conditions of climate and terrain in the name of a spartan ideal of physical fitness have led to fatal accidents among teen-agers. Almost every summer a number of children die of sunstroke in the desert where they have been made to march for days, or tumble down deep precipices while walking on narrow mountain paths in exercises designed to steel their nerves and train them to unflinching courage.

A spartan rigidity has developed over the years and now marks large segments of the younger adult population. It often spills over from the military life, where it was acquired, to the civilian sphere. Foreigners are often more aware of such characteristics than some of the most critical Israelis. In 1969 a team of young Israeli long-distance walkers participated in an international walking contest in Holland. One of the Dutch organizers asked the Israelis why everything they did was done in military rhythm. 'Singing, eating, resting, everything! Why are there never dropouts on the Israeli team? Why does everything with you function as in a well-oiled but inhuman machine? Your teams,' said the Dutchman, 'remind me of German youth groups during the thirties. . . .' An Israeli newsman who had overheard the remark reported that the Dutchman meant no insult. 'He simply wanted to indicate elements of the Israeli character.' The newspaperman also reported that when some members of the Israeli team suddenly had felt sick and wanted to drop out, the team captain had announced: 'It is better to die than stop walking, and be a disgrace to Israel.'

Frequent and prolonged periods of service in the army breeds a stark, intensely introverted, icy matter-of-factness in the young that contrasts sharply with the externalized, rather verbose emotionalism of their elders. Such starkness is partly the natural reaction of the young to a public atmosphere still heavy with the ideological fervor and slogans of a previous age. But it is also a result of the kind of life they lead. The more puritan older settlers often grumble that young people are too selfish, too career-minded, not sufficiently responsive to this or that sacred tenet of traditional Zionist ideology. They voice their fears frequently in the stately columns of the daily newspaper *Davar*, a curious mixture of early *Pravda* and old-style Quakerism, mouthpiece of the ruling labor establishment, and the abode of untiring watch-dogs for purity of pioneering manners and ideology. There were times, in the early 1960s, when discotheques, and even espresso coffee shops, were declared corrupt and decadent by some old-timers.

Yet younger Israelis have never shirked their responsibilities in time of danger. The power of ideas to sustain human enterprise, a power that played such a great role in the earlier lives of the founding fathers, has been substituted among younger people by an unreflecting, elemental urge for self-preservation.

The language of younger Israelis is often inordinately stark, divested of all ornament and elegance, without nuance, and delivered in harsh staccato sequences. One reason is that 'official' Hebrew is still too formal and lags far behind the needs of daily intercourse; the developing street patois that substitutes for what is missing or inadequate in the dictionary is still raw and unformed. Another reason may be more important. The harsh starkness that marks *sabra* speech and manners stems from many years of deliberate educational efforts to produce 'normal,' 'manly,' 'free,' 'new' Jews, unsullied by the shameful weaknesses of exile.

Yael Dayan, the novelist, draws a portrait of the young *sabra* hero in her *Envy the Frightened*. 'Do you know what he is afraid of? To be afraid—this is the fear that masters him, until all other fears, human, normal, healthy ones, are pushed aside and stop existing.' Bruno Bettelheim, the psychologist, quotes an Israeli psychoanalyst, who has devoted much of his professional life to the study of *kibbutznik*. '... our children are ashamed to be ashamed, are afraid to be afraid. They are afraid to love, are afraid to give of themselves. ... I am not sure whether it is a deficiency in emotion or a being afraid of feeling. ...'

The letters written by young Israelis to their sweethearts are notoriously dry, unimaginative, and frequently oddly impersonal. They are often so skimpy in exclamations of love, devotion, or longing—indeed of any feelings whatsoever—that a reader may suspect a near-total lack of sensitivity and refinement. Or else he may suspect that the young writers, if they have feelings, are so frightened by them—or so ashamed and embarrassed—that they have apparently resolved to keep them permanently concealed. One does not talk of feelings, one rarely admits that they exist.

## 75. WHAT KIND OF EDUCATION IS BEING GIVEN TO ISRAELI PUPILS?

Rami Livneh wrote the following commentary on one textbook used in Israeli schools (*Information Bulletin*, Tel Aviv, Sept. 1968 pp. 38-42). The textbook is a companion to the history of the State of Israel, called *Israel's Independence*, which in certain educational institutions is even used as the main text book.

It is difficult to demand of a book 'for the young' to be constructed along the lines of a profound historical research work. Still there is no doubt that big letters and a popular style do not relieve it from conveying reliable information. The book opens with a description of 'the country at the stage of desolation'. It says (P. 13): 'The Arabs who already conquered our country one thousand and three hundred years ago, did really settle here and did consider the country as their homeland, but



they did not do anything to preserve it from the teeth of destruction and desolation’.

The worst of it is not the concealment of the fact that the area under cultivation, in Arab hands at the time of the (Zionist-transl.) ‘redemption of lands’, was 5,5 million dunams, which is somewhat more than the area under cultivation at present; neither is it the concealment of the fact that in every place where the Islam arrived during its expansion, close relations between Islam and Judaism developed; nor is it the disregard of the common struggle of Jews and Arabs against the Crusaders’ occupation. The worst is the style. For throughout the whole length of the book, except in some isolated instances, it is impossible to find the noun Arab without modifiers such as: occupants, murderers, robbers and thieves.

About the Bilu (first Zionist immigration, financed by Baron Rothschild—transl.), the author says (P. 26): ‘In the beginning they had a difficult time in the country. Wherever they turned to, they were surrounded by Arabs, and the Arabs’ eyes were fastened to their pockets. No Jewish colonies had yet been established, and they did not know where to look for work. Should they go to work in Arab orchards? No, not for this had they come here.’

The book does not attempt to show how the lands were ‘redeemed’, how business was transacted between the Jewish ‘philanthropists’ (Barons Rothschild, Hirsch etc.) and the effendis, at the expense of the tenants who cultivated the soil. Against this, the words of one of the members of Bilu are quoted who speaks about the first days of Gedera (one of the first Jewish colonies—transl.),—P. 30: ‘Our neighbours sold us dry sticks instead of the olive shoots which we wanted to plant. They drove us off in shame when we came to draw water from the well. . . . Gedera was then nothing but a desert near an Arab village, the inhabitants of which were only looking for plunder’.

The Jews coming here did not find peace. Their brothers, the Jewish farmers, preferred to employ Arab workers because of the low wages they received and because of their skill. The new immigrants of the second immigration wave did not conduct a common struggle with the Arab workers against the Jewish kulaks. They had only one object before their eyes (P. 58): ‘To be sure, the new immigrants could have established colonies of their own and made a living, but they understood the great danger of foreign labour. (throughout the history of Zionist settlement in Palestine, the labour of Arabs for the Jewish newcomers has been called “foreign labour”—transl.); they could not reconcile themselves to the fact that the Arabs would inundate the Hebrew colonies, and instead of creating there conditions of absorption and opportunities of work and existence for the Hebrew immigrants, foreigners would dominate them.’

Who were those Arabs who would dominate the colonies? (P. 59): 'The Arabs who inundated the Hebrew colonies, did not only come there to obtain work. They saw the flourishing farms of the Jews and wished to profit from them not only by heavy work, but also in a much easier way—theft and robbery'.

Particularly interesting are the chapters dealing with the 'pogroms'. In 1920—thus it turns out in the chapter 'The Bloody Events'—the colonies in the Galilee did not play any role at all in the struggle between the rule of the British imperialists and that of the French; they simply 'built the country', contrary to the Arabs who devised plots of murder and plunder against the Jewish Yishuv (the Jewish population of Palestine—transl.).

'The Arabs in the region'—so it says on P. 83—'hated the French. But at the same time as they chased the French, the bandits set eyes upon the Hebrew settlements in the Galilee. Under the pretext that the Jews were friends of the French, they planned to attack the Hebrew settlements and to vent their anger on the settlers'.

An innocent child could ask the simple question 'why?' Therefore the author prepares the medicine before the injury and explains (P. 88): 'Agitators went among the Arabs, telling them that the Jews would take their lands from them; the incited Arab masses were just waiting for a suitable time to shed Jewish blood like water, and by the way to plunder the possessions of the Jews. Leaders incited them against the Jewish population and sent them to attack the new settlements, to plunder them and murder their inhabitants'.

Of course there is not one word about the Arab rebellion. Not one single line is devoted to the Arab anti-imperialist general strike, which was exploited by the Zionist leadership in order to 'conquer the market'. Instead, the young pupil is told that the Arabs are bloodthirsty and kill for pleasure. This is how the period 1936-39 is described (P. 95): 'The Arab gangs plotted to destroy all that had been built by generations of "Halutzim" (Zionist "pioneers"—transl.) and they attacked our colonies, set fire to our corn fields, stoned and fired at Jewish passenger cars; the damages done to our property was very great and many were the victims that fell in those bloody events'.

### *The Establishment of the State of Israel*

In our innocence, up to now we had been sure the State was established in order to give equal rights to all its citizens, without regard to their religion, race, sex and nationality. We had been sure that the Jewish people in Israel was not designed for being a 'Herrenvolk', but a people maintaining friendly and fraternal relations with its neighbours, based on mutual respect. Now comes this profound book, 'Israel's Independence' and clears our error away. It describes to the children of Israel

the 'yearnings of the heart of the people sitting in Zion' on the eve of the UNO Resolution of November 29, 1947 (When it was decided to end the British mandate in Palestine and to set up two states—a Jewish and an Arab one—transl.). On page 114 we read: 'Shall the dream of the tortured people which has for two thousand years resembled an eternal wanderer through the world, really come true? Shall the English leave the country and we ourselves shall we become its lords, and shall we be able to open its gates, open it wide before every *Jew* who will wish to return to it to live here?'

In order that the disaster that has happened to us should not recur, in order that in Israel no children should grow up who might think that this is a country which promises equality of rights without regard to religion and nationality, the author quotes the Declaration of Independence (on pp. 123-124-125), *but leaves out of it the paragraph that mentions notions such as equality of rights . . .*

### *Guarding Security*

A pastoral image depicts Ben-Gurion sitting under a tree, a shepherd's staff in his lap, in his hands an open book, near him a heap of books and a flock of sheep, calmly browsing on desert grass. For Ben-Gurion is, of course, 'the most distinguished and most energetic man among the Jewish people of our generation'.

Throughout the 20 years of the State of Israel's development, its achievements have been great and miraculous. 'Throughout the whole of this period our state has marched along the road of consolidation and strengthening and now it need not be afraid of its enemies' designs'. (P. 164)

We learn from the book that in 1956 there were sabotage acts of the 'Fadayun' (Palestinian Arab military organisation active at that time—transl.) which without express reason decided to do sabotage work in Israel and to attempt the lives of its citizen. 'Finally', it reads on page 202, things reached a point where the State of Israel could no longer bear these crimes and the Defence Army of Israel 'decided to put an end to them'.

There is one way to understand what makes our 'darling sabras' (nickname of Israeli-born Jews—transl.) so stinging. There is a well-tested means for the understanding of the great psychic distortion affecting too many our young people—the future of our people: One has just to open the school bags of children coming home from their 'homeland lesson' and peruse their text books. One has to open their drawing exercise-books and see what subject was drawn in their last lesson. No doubt the knowledge that these children carry in their school bags explosives designed to sabotage any perspective for Jewish-Arab under-

standing —this mere knowledge will not prevent the explosion. But it suggests the direction of development of the young generation, so that we shall not be surprised, may God forbid this! by the malignant tumours that will grow thanks to the overdoses of this poison. [Sic.]

76. IS IT TRUE THAT ZIONISM SUCCEEDED IN MAKING ISRAEL THE IDEAL AND MODERN STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Menachim Talmi, in *Ma'ariv*, May 14, 1971, describes a section in Jaffa named Bayaret Dalek (Dalek's Grove), in which Oriental Jews live alongside the vestiges of Palestinian Arabs who had remained on their land since 1948. The reporter says:

'There is no grove there, but everyone who knows the place still calls it Dalek's Grove. In fact, years ago, there was a grove, but today it is a miserable residential area on the side of Jaffa located between what was once called the Jabalia section and the Nuzha section. . . . Most of the houses are made of sheets of rusty tin, old wooden crates and wooden boards which, together, create a residential section. Part of these so-called houses belong to the horses and cows, the rest belong to human beings. At first glance, it is hard to tell where the horses end and where the people begin.

'This section enjoys a deep social consciousness. There is no discrimination between horse and man. For these and for those, there is a cover over their heads, an equal standard of living from the point of view of the size of the house, cleanliness, health conditions, and the smells.

'It is a mixed sector, where Jews, Moslems, horses, cows, large rats, and insects live. The other reptiles on the urine-soaked soil are permanent additional residents. Despite the fact that they do not pay key-money, and that the Protection of Tenants Law does not apply to them, it is impossible to dislodge them from their homes.'

In a conversation between the reporter and a woman resident, the woman says:

'Here there is no difference between a Jew and an Arab. They all live together in peace. No one fears the other, and they all fear the rats only. Did you see what kind of rats are here? Each one is like a small dog, and when you see them run at night, your heart stops beating.

'There is no electricity, no refrigerator, and no milk. The children are not given pasteurized milk, and this is not so good for their health, but what can we do? My son has been coughing for years and choking a little. We were at the hospital. Tests were made. Then they came to see the place we live in. They said that this was a result of the bad

smells caused by horses and garbage. They said that if we want to protect our child, we have to live somewhere else. But where can we go to live, and who will give us another place?’

When the photographer, who accompanied the reporter, wanted to take a picture of one of the barracks, the woman who lived in it shouted: ‘Sir, please don’t take pictures’. And when we asked her why, she replied: ‘I don’t care if you photograph the horses and donkeys, but not us. The horses and donkeys don’t mind living here, but for us it is shameful’.<sup>(68)</sup>

## 77. IS ISRAEL A THEOCRATIC OR A MODERN SECULAR STATE?

Sabri Jiryis in his book *Democratic Freedoms in Israel* (pp. 14-17) discusses the role of religion in Israel:

The Jewish religion forms the basis of the Israeli Law of Return, which gives every Jew, just because he is a Jew, the right to immigrate to Israel and obtain Israeli nationality whenever he likes. Otherwise Judaism does not have the status of an established religion. In theory at least, it does not enjoy any special official or legal privileges other than those which result from the fact that it is the religion of the majority of the population. Moreover, the majority of the Jewish population, to judge by its representation in the Knesset, is non-religious. Only one sixth of the members of the Knesset belong to religious parties.

Their [the religious parties] participation in the government has allowed the religious parties to expand their influence, little by little, in many fields of everyday life. Not content with transforming the rabbinical courts, which deal with matters related to the personal status of Jews and with the affairs of organisations which provide services in the religious field, into strongholds of Jewish religious influence, these religious groups have turned their attention to other aspects of Israeli life. They have, for example, succeeded in obtaining state support for their own religious schools (‘religious State-educational institutions’) and basic religious education for children whose parents wish it in the ‘State-educational institutions.’<sup>(69)</sup> They have also secured the exemption from compulsory service in the army of Orthodox girls; about 49 per cent of Israeli young women manage to escape military service in this way.<sup>(70)</sup> Young men enrolled at institutes for Torah and Talmudic studies are similarly exempted. Having achieved these initial successes, the religious parties proceeded to extend still further the field of their

<sup>(68)</sup> *The Arab World*, 1972.

<sup>(69)</sup> State Education Law, 5713-1953, *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. VII, 1952/53, p. 113.

<sup>(70)</sup> According to a statement in the Knesset by the Minister of Defence, *Knesset Debates* (Hebrew), June 23, 1970, p. 2188.

activities, getting a law passed in the Knesset forbidding the raising of pigs in Israel, except within the municipal boundaries of certain Christian Arab villages.<sup>(71)</sup>

Furthermore, affairs related to the personal status of Jewish citizens have been made entirely subject to the most traditional Jewish religious jurisdiction. This is a situation which has forced both private citizens and the authorities to resort to absurd measures. For example, a judge of the Supreme Court, Haim Cohen, was obliged to go to Cyprus for a civil marriage with a divorced Jewish woman.<sup>(72)</sup> According to Jewish religious teachings no man who bears the name of Cohen, and who is therefore regarded as belonging to the priestly caste, may marry a divorced woman or a widow, because of the special connection this caste had with the religious ritual of the Temple. This is the same Judge Cohen who in July 1963 stated in the Israeli Supreme Court that the official definition of Jewishness in the State of Israel was based on the biological and racial theories that were disseminated by the Nazis and which inspired the notorious Nuremberg Laws.<sup>(73)</sup>

On another occasion the Israeli Ministry of the Interior refused to register the children of an Israeli officer as members of the Jewish people, at their parents' request, because their mother was not a Jewess. The Jewish religion stipulates that only children of Jewish mothers are Jewish. The officer proceeded to bring a case against the authorities and obtained a judgement from the competent court supporting his view.<sup>(74)</sup> The result was a crisis that nearly led to the fall of the government, which then amended the Law of Return so as to avoid such cases in the future.<sup>(75)</sup>

Another case concerned the refusal by the religious authorities in the Israeli army to allow a conscript killed in the course of his military duties to be buried in the Jewish military cemetery, because his mother was not Jewish.<sup>(76)</sup>

Perhaps the most amusing incident of this kind involved the granddaughter of Ben Gurion. In 1968 the rabbis refused to register her for marriage to an Israeli Jew until she agreed to be 'Judaised' by the Rabbinical Court. On the same occasion, her mother was also

<sup>(71)</sup> Pig-Raising Prohibition Law, 5722-1962, *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. XVI, 1961/62, p. 93. Pork is, however, always available in Israeli markets.

<sup>(72)</sup> *Haolam Hazeh*, March 30, 1966.

<sup>(73)</sup> Nathan Weinstock, *Le sionisme contre Israël*, Paris: François Maspero, 1969, p. 319.

<sup>(74)</sup> Text of the judgement in *Maariv*, January 25, 1970.

<sup>(75)</sup> Law of Return (Amendment No. 2) 5730-1970, *Laws of the State of Israel*, 586 (Arabic), August 19, 1970, p. 50.

<sup>(76)</sup> *Haolam Hazeh*, April 4, 1970.

‘Judaised.’<sup>(77)</sup> It was Ben Gurion’s policy more than anything else that led to the imposition of religious authority on Israel and the increasing power of the clergy in Israeli life.

The Jewish religious authorities have also refused to permit marriages conducted by Reform Jewish rabbis to be registered in Israel or recognised as legal.<sup>(78)</sup>

Similar religious restrictions exist in other fields of everyday life in Israel. For example, the Israeli labour laws stipulate that the weekly rest day for Jews must be Saturday, whereas non-Jews can choose either Friday, Saturday or Sunday.<sup>(79)</sup> But an amendment to this law which was passed as a result of the increasing influence of the religious parties in the government forbids non-Jews to open their workshops or shops on Saturdays, unless such workshops or shops are in a place where at least one quarter of the inhabitants are non-Jews.<sup>(80)</sup>

#### 78. IS IT TRUE THAT ISRAEL IS A SOCIALIST STATE AND THAT IT IS COVERED WITH KIBBUTZIM FROM END TO END?

It is a fact that the Kibbutz is passing through a critical period in its history. There exist various discrepancies between the Kibbutz ideology and actual practice. Ayad al-Qazaz in an unpublished paper on ‘The Kibbutz: a Critical Evaluation’ cites the following symptoms and reasons for this crisis.

1. Regimentation of life, which is an essential quality of the Kibbutz, causes many people to leave the Kibbutz. If a woman wants a new dress, for example, she may not choose its style, but is limited to the two or three to be found in the sewing room. (Yechi). If a couple wishes to move into a different housing they may do so only with the permission of the social committee. Should a member desire a temporary leave from the Kibbutz, he must acquire the approval of the town meeting. In other words, personal decisions have been subordinated to the approval of the group or to one of its delegated committees. This hegemony of the group over, what is considered to be, private lives is a source of no small irritation (p. 204, Spiro).

<sup>(77)</sup> *Haaretz*, February 22, 1968; *Haolam Hazeh*, March 6, 1968 and *Knesset Debates* (Hebrew), February 28, 1968, p. 1588.

<sup>(78)</sup> Amnon Rubinstein, *Constitutional Law of the State of Israel* (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv: Schocken, 1969, p. 87.

<sup>(79)</sup> Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951, *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. VII, 1950/51, p. 125.

<sup>(80)</sup> Hours of Work and Rest Law (Amendment) 5729-1969, *Laws of the State of Israel*, 551 (Arabic), March 18, 1969, p. 52.

2. The Kibbutz is supposed to own and operate all the means of production. It is supposed to be the sole purveyor of all the consumer needs of its members and their families. It is firmly against the accumulation of private possessions by the members. The actual practice in the last decade or two, however, seems to contradict the original values of the Kibbutz. Among these practices is the gradual introduction of private property and the seeming inability of the Kibbutz to cope with this problem. The Kibbutz these days are beginning to permit its members to own such personal effects as books and fountain pens, radios, clothes, furniture, which in the past would have been turned over to the Kibbutz. Spiro gives us an example, from the Kibbutz that he studied, that some members owned refrigerators and automobiles. A couple received a small refrigerator, from relatives outside the country, which they have kept for themselves. This not only enabled them to have ice water, a real luxury, but also ice cream and cold beer! Ownership is justified under the pretext that they are no more than custodians of the refrigerator until its owner arrives in Israel. The automobile was inherited by a member from his relative in Europe. He has kept the car, he claims, because his wife lives in the city and he can visit her in the evenings without losing a days work (p. 209, Spiro). Such ownership constitutes a major and crucial violation of the very values of Kibbutz culture. The Kibbutz are afraid of taking action against such violations lest it touch a flame to a powder keg.

Another form of private property stems from the German reparation payments to individual members. Originally all Kibbutzim were violently against Israel's reparation agreement with Germany. They have not, however, rejected the actual payments. The separate federations evolved different policies on how much the individual members should be permitted personally to benefit from reparations. Some Kibbutzim have insisted that all the reparation money be turned into the Kibbutz treasury. Others left it entirely to the members to decide how much of the payments they should retain for their personal use and how much to turn into the Kibbutz treasury. Some Kibbutzim, in their financial statements, refer to the money turned in by the members from reparations as funds belonging to individual members (p. 138, Stern). . . .

Other values of central importance are also violated quite frequently and regularly. At the present time there is more privacy than before which is manifested in a number of ways. In the past, communal kitchens and communal dining were the outstanding earmarks of the Kibbutz. The dining hall was not only a place for obtaining meals, but a hall for membership meetings and other social and cultural activities, such as discussions and lectures. It was the communal center where, after long hours of heated discussions, the old Kibbutzniks would spontaneously break forth into song, invariably followed by many more hours of



dancing the hora—sometimes until dawn (p. 140, Stern). The dining hall was so important that *Amudin*, the monthly publication of the Socialist Religious Federation concluded, 'if a certain branch of the Kibbutz economy is eliminated, the Kibbutz will not disappear. But, if the communal dining hall is eliminated, the Kibbutz will cease to exist.' (p. 140, Stern). At the present time, people retire early to their room, preferring to stay there with family and friends and having tea or coffee, and perhaps a cookie or piece of cake. The dining room is no longer just an interesting place. Because of the increase in the population in the Kibbutz, meals are served in shifts, or members have to wait in line for seats to become vacant. The noise and confusion during the meal hours are such that no one is tempted to linger at the table, and the members rush away as soon as they have completed their meal.

Also, the communal showers are becoming fewer and fewer as some members have constructed their own private showers. The newer and more comfortable houses with built-in showers and other facilities have made the communal showers useless and superfluous. In the past, the communal showers served not only to keep the Kibbutzniks fresh and clean in body, but also provided a popular forum for discussion of world affairs, and an outlet for local gossip and the expression of personal gripes against the Kibbutz, particularly against those in charge of unpleasant job assignments. The increase in population and the wider age differentiation have brought to the Kibbutz a feeling of estrangement between individuals and between groups of members.

3. Another index of the crisis is the reluctance of many members to participate effectively in the political process of the Kibbutz and to accept official responsibility. In the past the size of the Kibbutz was small and the assembly meetings were regularly attended by the entire membership of the Kibbutz, and everybody had a chance to participate and feel his weight in decision-making processes. Today, the size is large, with some of them reaching the number of 2000 persons. The average attendance is less than 50%. And of those who attend, only a small percentage participate actively in the meeting, while others complain that the meetings are boring. An example of this mass apathy can be seen when ex-premier, David Ben Gurion spoke at Kibbutz Tel-Hoseph in January, 1965, and only three people from a neighboring Kibbutz went to the meeting, despite an express invitation to attend. The remaining Kibbutzniks preferred to watch an old American film (Alan D. Grown, 'The Changing World of the Kibbutz' *MEJ*, vol. 19 August 1965, No. 4P430). This mass apathy led to the emergence and development of a new class of people whose function is to manage and administer the Kibbutz. It has a distinctive style which sets them apart from the mass. Such development was contrary to the ideals of total equality (we shall say more about this later on).

.....

5. The women are an important source of the current crisis of the Kibbutz. Almost all resignations are instigated by women, and behind every desertion there is a woman. The increased demand for private property and for greater privacy is found most strongly in the women, which causes most tension in the Kibbutz. Hence, it is no accident that, with the exception of politics, nothing occupies so much attention in the Kibbutz as the women's problems.

6. Another index of the crisis is the hired labor. Nearly all the Kibbutzim in all the Federations now hire some workers from outside, with some Kibbutzim hiring more outside workers than they have members! Some only employ outside workers in agriculture during the harvest seasons, or in some emergency.

Hiring outside labor goes against the philosophy, traditions and the mores of the Kibbutz. . . .

.....  
7. Another problem facing the Kibbutz is the decreased and declining interest in joining the Kibbutz. It was expected that the Kibbutz will grow by leaps and bounds after the establishment of the State of Israel. Such expectation not only did not come about but also the growth was very slow. Of the 230 Kibbutz existing in 1964, 59% (including 76% of the total Kibbutz population) had been established before Israel's independence. This contrasts sharply with the development of the Mosharim where 23% of the settlements (with 22% of Moshav population) date their existence to the pre-independence period (Eliyahu Kanorsky).

It is not only that the growth was slow, but also the turn-over of members has been very high. Even the staunchest supporters of the movement admit that not everyone is capable of adjusting himself physically and psychologically to the extraordinary demands of the Kibbutz on the individual. A person entering the life of the Kibbutz must sacrifice all his personal ambitions, and he must be willing to accept the authority and decisions of the group as final. He must realize that there can be no relationship between his work performance and the pension for it; and he must also be ready to divide all his earthly possessions, past, present and future, with his group. Thus, it requires a certain type of mentality and a strong emotional stimulus to join a Kibbutz. It requires even greater fortitude to stick to the Kibbutz after the stimuli and the emotional appeal have vanished.

There are no adequate statistics available about the rate of desertion and turn-over in the Kibbutz. Following are a few bits of statistical information. They are not updated, but are indicative. Between 1956-1961, the four major Kibbutz federations accepted 11,614 new members. During the same period, 3,819 members left their Kibbutz. This constitutes a turnover of 32% (p. 92, Stern).

79. IS IT TRUE THAT ISRAEL SUPPORTS WESTERN POLICIES TOWARDS AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES?

The first big problem of de-colonisation that the U.N. faced was the struggle of the Indonesians against the Dutch, which so stirred the whole of Asia that Nehru called a special Asian conference in Delhi, in January 1949, to consider the matter. But because of 'the traditionally good relations between the Dutch and the Jewish people and the valiant record of the Dutch during the Second World War when many of them helped Jews at the risk of their very lives. . . Israel preferred to abstain from participating in the acrimonious debate on the Indonesian problem'. Israel also abstained on the Afro-Asian resolution supporting Indonesia on West Irian. Israel, because of her historical connection with Europe and her role vis-a-vis world Jewry, found herself in a dilemma. And because of the very nature of the Jewish state, being in Asia but not of it, Israeli solidarity with Asian national movements was sacrificed to safeguard Israel's umbilical link with Europe and the interests of Jewish communities in the Diaspora.

It was the latter consideration which caused Israel to abstain for 12 years from condemning South Africa's apartheid policy: not even Jewish memory of racial persecution prevailed against the interests of South Africa's large and very prosperous Jewish community. Only the Israeli government's almost desperate desire to win the friendship of the new states of Africa obliged her to switch from abstention to a condemnation of apartheid which was, nevertheless, much criticised in Israel.

Having opposed the application of the principle of self-determination in Palestine all through the 1920's and 1930's it might have been expected that the Zionists would accept it after Israel was established, as no longer presenting a danger to the Jewish community. But they evidently do not believe in taking any risks for in 1952, when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution supporting the principle of self-determination of peoples by 40 votes to 14, Israel was one of 6 countries that abstained. The Zionists could not accept the principle of one man one vote before 1947 and today they continue to oppose it. When in the 16th Session of the General Assembly, in 1961, an Afro-Asian resolution called for this democratic procedure to be applied in Southern Rhodesia, Israel abstained.

Israel likewise abstained on other Afro-Asian resolutions demanding the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the suspension of nuclear tests, and the de-nuclearisation of Africa—thus increasing Arab fears that she was keeping her hands free for the possible use of nuclear weapons said to be under construction at her secret nuclear plant at Dimona.

Even though Israel eventually supported anti-apartheid resolutions she is flouting the U.N. embargo on trade with South Africa. Her national

airline, El Al, is one of the few that flies into South Africa and most of the diamonds for Israel's important diamond-cutting industry come from South Africa.

Needless to say Israel has voted against all Afro-Asian resolutions giving support to the liberation movements in the Arab North African countries, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. With France her principal supplier of arms Israel could show no sympathy even for the heroic Algerians. As a result of these votes the Jewish communities in these three countries were placed in jeopardy. But whereas Israel rated Dutch or South African Jews above Indonesian or African nationalists she rated France above North African Jews.

The voting record of Israel at two U.N. General Assemblies, the 15th and 16th in 1961 and 1961-62, has been analysed<sup>(81)</sup> and this analysis shows that Israel has the second highest coincidence of voting with the United States of all Middle East and North African countries (Turkey has the highest); the lowest coincidence of all these states with the Communist bloc; and, with Turkey, either the lowest or second lowest coincidence of voting with the Afro-Asian groups: in the 15th Session Israel voted only 69 times, out of 145 votes, with the Afro-Asians (Turkey 81), and in the 16th Session Israel's figure was 59 out of 125 votes (Turkey 55).

There could be no clearer, more conclusive, proof of how far removed, in her political interest, is Israel from the Afro-Asians. Against this factual background Israel's programme of aid to Afro-Asia appears not as 'a duty' or 'a mission' but merely the economic price paid for political shortcomings.

So antagonistic were Israel's interests to those of the Afro-Asians at the U.N. that she considered a defeat for them a victory for herself. Speaking of the 1955 Assembly, following the Bandung Conference, Ishar Harari, a Member of the Knesset and a member of Israel's U.N. delegation, said: 'The most significant development in our favour was the defeat of the Bandung Conference countries on practically every issue brought before the General Assembly'.<sup>(82)</sup> And that has remained true for the subsequent Assemblies.

Even on issues involving particular Asian countries Israel has not hesitated to take a pro-colonial position when it has suited her interests. Evidently despairing of India's friendship the Israeli press could not bring itself to express any approval of India's military take-over of Goa in December 1961. Whatever the rest of the world may think of this

<sup>(81)</sup> *Middle East Record*, The Reuven Shiloah Research Center, Tel Aviv University, Volumes I and II, 1960, 1961.

<sup>(82)</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, 21/1/1956.

action it was enormously popular throughout Afro-Asia. But this Afro-Asian feeling was not shared by Israel. There the newspapers were non-committal on the substance of the issue but reproached India for hypocrisy and double standards. (The Israeli press later revealed that Israel was selling small arms to Portugal, which were certainly used against the freedom fighters in Angola and Mozambique.) When, in October 1962, China attacked India she received sympathy, if not support, from many countries, not excluding Russia. All that the Israeli press could do was, once again, to bring an accusation of double standards against India.<sup>(83)</sup>

### 30. HAS ISRAEL SUSPENDED ITS ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS SUPPORT FOR THE U.N. RESOLUTION TO BOYCOTT SOUTH AFRICA?

Israeli trade with South Africa has not diminished in recent years, but rather has increased rapidly. According to the *American Jewish Yearbook* (1949:454), 'a strong South African delegation attended the Jerusalem economic conference called by Israel Premier Levi Eshkol in April (1968). On their return, the delegates set up an Israel-South Africa Trade Association with Morris Lubner as chairman, to promote trade between the two countries.'

Citing evidence of improvement in relations between the two countries, the *American Jewish Yearbook* the following year (1970: 535) noted 'the success of "Israel Week" trade promotion in South Africa in August (1969), with four leading department stores displaying Israeli products in their branches throughout the country. . . . Adin Talber, deputy director of Israel's Ministry of Trade and Industry who, together with South Africa's deputy minister for economic affairs, attended the opening in Johannesburg, stressed the scope that existed for the promotion of reciprocal trade.'

Figures published by the Israel-South Africa Trade Association showed an increase in South African exports to Israel from \$3 million in 1967 to \$7 million in 1969; Israeli exports to South Africa rose from \$3.2 million in 1967 to \$9.1 million in 1969. . . Table 1 shows the amounts reported by Israel and South Africa respectively to the International Monetary Fund:

<sup>(83)</sup> Jansen, pp. 235-237.

TABLE 1  
ISRAEL-SOUTH AFRICA TRADE

	<i>Trade from Israel to South Africa*</i>	<i>Trade from South Africa to Israel*</i>
As reported by Israel		
1965	2.70	4.30
1966	2.30	4.50
1967	4.00	3.40
1968	5.70	5.20
1969	8.18	5.79
As reported by South Africa		
1965	2.80	3.60
1966	2.70	3.60
1967	3.30	3.00
1968	5.30	4.10
1969	6.77	4.82

\*in million U.S. \$

(*Direction of Trade*, March, 1970)

In all of the different sets of figures, however, it is clear that there has been a substantial increase in trade in recent years.

According to figures from the *Israel Foreign Trade Statistics*, that increase continued in 1970, with \$10.7 million of exports to South Africa and \$10.2 million of imports from South Africa.

For both South Africa and Israel, the most important trading partners are the prosperous countries of Western Europe and North America. In the African context, despite Israel's policy of wooing black Africa, her largest trading partner is South Africa. That nation buys approximately one fourth of Israel's exports to Africa while supplying approximately one third of her imports from Africa. . .

But these figures actually underestimate the importance of the economic ties between the two countries. For example, a 1966 figure giving the value of the South African trade to Israel, printed in the *South African Financial Mail* (July 21, 1967) does not include the diamond trade. While the Oppenheimer interests and de Beers Consolidated Mines control some 80% of the world production of raw diamonds, it is Israel which is second only to Belgium in the world export of polished diamonds (*Time*, August 17, 1970).

While these diamonds are obtained by Israel in uncut form through various sources, it purchases from the South African dominated Central Selling Organization which loom particularly large in the import column. In 1968, Israel obtained 52% of its supply from the Central Selling Organization, a figure which is representative of the range for the decade (40-60%). Total diamond imports in 1969 were worth \$219 million. (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1970).

The recent expansion of trade comes in addition to the ties already established in the international diamond trade. Israel's Trade Commissioner to South Africa, Amitay Ben-Joseph, described in 1968 his hopes for the trade: 'Israel needs wool, asbestos, industrial diamonds and metals. . . Israel will be able to supply South Africa with textiles, clothing, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.' (*News from South Africa*, July 3, 1968).

More recently, South Africa has relaxed investment controls, permitting South African companies to invest up to \$14 million in Israel. This followed a \$14.9 million line of credit from the South African Industrial Development Corporation in July, 1970, to boost South African exports to Israel. (*Christian Science Monitor*, June 5, 1971).

The above analysis suggests that Israel's economic practices do not accord with her stated political principles where South Africa is concerned.<sup>(84)</sup>

## 81. HAS ISRAEL MAINTAINED POLITICO-MILITARY TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA?

C.L. Sulzberger, writing from South Africa for the *New York Times* of April 30, 1971, commented on the close though concealed partnership between South Africa and Israel, a partnership with ramifications extending into political, economic and military affairs, yet played down in public for diplomatic reasons. He notes that for South Africa especially the relationship 'has psychological importance. Among foreign critics of South African policy there are many Jewish voices, especially in the United States and Britain. South Africa therefore feels that if Israel is sympathetic this will help its own international standing.'

Analysing the military links, Sulzberger indicates that South Africa manufactures the Israeli-invented Uzi submachine gun under a license granted through Belgium. He was told unofficially that a South African Mission flew to Israel during the Six Day War in 1967 to study tactics and use of weapons. Therefore, it is of great interest that this is one of

<sup>(84)</sup> Madison Committee on Southern Africa, *Contemporary Links Between South Africa and Israel*, pp. 4-8.

the two battles given major attention in South Africa's manoeuvre schools. He heard further unconfirmed reports that after the Israelis secured plans of the French Mirage fighter engine, blueprints of their improved version were made available to South Africa.

Sulzberger concludes: "The basic truth remains that this country, which has few friends abroad, regards Israel as one of them. . . ." (*New York Times*, April 30, 1971).

Relationships between Israel and South Africa have been particularly close since the 1967 Six Day War. Vorster's government not only permitted South African volunteers to work in civilian and para-military capacities in Israel, but allowed more than \$28 million to be transferred to Israel by South African Zionist groups.

.....  
Vorster himself was quoted by Sulzberger as saying, "We view Israel's position and problems with understanding and sympathy. Like us they have to deal with terrorist infiltration across the border; and like us they have enemies bent on their destruction." (*New York Times*, April 30, 1971)

The South Africa Foundation . . . is an organization funded by big business interests in South Africa (including American companies) to present South Africa to the world in a favourable light. In 1967 this organization founded an Israeli-South Africa Committee in an effort to improve relations between the two countries.

.....  
The [South Africa Foundation] committee has been active in promoting high level contact between South Africa and Israel. According to *Sechaba* of April, 1970 "One of the first things it did was to arrange a meeting between the South African Minister of Defense, Mr. P.W. Botha, and Mr. Shimon Peres, secretary general of the ruling Israeli Labour Party and member of the key Foreign Affairs and Security Committee . . . In September 1967 General Mordechai Hod, commander of the Israeli Air Force, visited South Africa and addressed a selected group of officers at the Air Force College near Pretoria . . . In December 1967 a group of Israeli government officials, businessmen and aviation experts, including the deputy director general and the chief engineer of Israel Aircraft Industries, toured South Africa. The Israelis visited the Atlas Aircraft Industries plant near Johannesburg and said they hoped to bring an Israeli-manufactured short-take-off-and-landing aircraft to South Africa for a series of demonstrations."

Military cooperation between the two countries apparently works both ways. According to a Jewish Telegraphic Agency report of January 20, 1970: "The South African Government has begun to organize the export of tanks to Israel marking a "new stage of their cooperation." The South African tank is a sixty-five ton giant "armed with a heavy



gun and designed according to the model of the British new tank". This is an apparent reference to Britain's new Chieftain tank which Israel has been trying to buy from Great Britain.<sup>7</sup>

While both countries are currently tied primarily to Western countries for their supply of weapons, they are rapidly developing their own capacities for independent military production. Given the harmonious relations between these two countries, it is to be expected that there will be occasional exchange of military technology or hardware. Of even greater importance (to be dealt with later in this pamphlet) are their military roles with respect to independent African states.<sup>(85)</sup>

## 82. WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN SOUTH AFRICA IN REGARD TO APARTHEID? WHAT EFFECT DOES THIS POSITION HAVE ON ISRAEL?

Still using as a source *Contemporary Links between South Africa and Israel*, we find that the year 1948 was important for both those countries, the Nationalist Party coming to power in South Africa at that time, having by then modified somewhat its anti-Semitism. The Afrikaaner press saw a similarity between its own position and Zionist opposition to Britain, and the newly elected Nationalist Government set out to gain Jewish support, its first step being *de jure* recognition of Israel.

Since 1948, the official representatives of the Jewish community in South Africa have reaffirmed repeatedly not only their Zionist convictions, but also their loyalty to the white regime of South Africa. Furthermore, *Jewish Affairs*, the monthly magazine of the S. African Jewish Board of Deputies, ceased to express its views on issues of color and discrimination. The Board of Deputies affirmed that it was a non-political body which refrained from taking any position on party political issues. Neither was it prepared to express views on the various race policies being advocated in South Africa. When South Africa became a Republic in 1961 the Board specifically affirmed that "as loyal citizens the South African Jewish community will continue to play their part in the well-being and progress of the State."<sup>(86)</sup>

The pamphlet goes on to give examples of Nationalist Party preferential treatment of Jews, including their appointment to prominent government positions—one of them, president of the Johannesburg

<sup>(85)</sup> *Contemporary Links* pp. 8-12.

<sup>(86)</sup> *Contemporary Links*, p. 13.

United Hebrew Congregation acting as prosecutor in the Rivonia trial of Nelson Mandela and other African nationalists. According to a *New York Times* report (5/7/71), quoted by the pamphlet, Mr. Saron, of the Jewish Board of Deputies, said that 'the South African rabbinate had not spoken out publicly on apartheid because the issue "just hasn't come their way".'

Tensions do occur between the two countries on occasion, usually the result of some Israeli attempt to court an independent African country. The South African Prime Minister, Verwoerd, (as cited in *Contemporary Links*) had this to say on Israel's 'inconsistency':

People are beginning to ask why, if Israel and its Rabbis feel impelled to attack the policy of separate development here, the policy of separate development in Israel is not wrong in their eyes as well . . . it may be said that they wish to differentiate in separate states because of religious and not racial differences, but if differentiation is wrong on one score it is also wrong on another . . . we believed in the separate state of Israel but now begin to wonder whether that support should be withdrawn if, according to their own convictions, the ideal of separate development is fundamentally wrong.

Such incidents are usually smoothed over, however, and the mutual interests of the two countries prevail.

### 83. IS THERE A COMMON HISTORICAL BASIS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA?

This question is well answered by Professor Richard Stevens of Lincoln University, in the following passage:<sup>(87)</sup>

Among the various decisions of the western world which have affected the lives and destiny of the peoples of the so-called Third World, none have revealed more clearly the very essence of western ethnocentrism nor have demonstrated more conclusively the capacity of the western world to transform, translate and legitimize its basic power thrust under the cloak of international law and morality than two decisions reached in London in 1909 and 1917; the first known as the South African Act of Union and the second, the Balfour Declaration. These two documents, formulated without regard to the rights and aspirations of the peoples affected as the objects of power, were rationalized, how-

<sup>(87)</sup> Richard Stevens, 'Settler States and Western Response', an address given at an International Symposium on Palestine in February 1971. Passage cited in *Contemporary Links*.

ever, in terms of the highest moral principles and responsibilities of western civilization. Thus, in the name of British liberalism the indigenous people of Palestine and South Africa would not only lose their homes, their land, their most basic natural rights, but would find themselves stripped of their own positive identity, subjected to the dictates of those capable of exercising massive power, and taxed and administered in keeping with a plan designed to insure the survival of the colonizers. Defined in terms of 'otherness' as 'non-white' on the one hand and 'non-Jewish' on the other, the definitions revealed a psychological bias characteristic of the power possessors, a bias so completely assimilated into the prevailing international legal order that protests from those affected would be dismissed in terms of that same legal code. . . . Palestine and South Africa—lands some 3,500 miles apart but each the concern of the same chancery, each sacrificed in the name of Western peoples and British imperial interests and the details of the sacrifice arranged by the same statesmen. In both cases, a perceived injustice committed by the western power or western civilization against Jew on the one hand and Afrikaner on the other was to be atoned for at the expense of those judged too 'uncivilized' too 'primitive' and too 'backward' to establish an equal moral claim. In both cases, the self-identification of Jew and Afrikaner as a 'chosen people' and inheritors of the 'promised land' was explicitly or implicitly accepted by Britain.

. . . in the final analysis, Britain's decision to sacrifice the rights of the indigenous peoples in South Africa and Palestine was perhaps traceable to imperial considerations. What dominated the thinking of the British government in 1909 was that in time of war the Suez Canal might be closed to British shipping in which case the Cape route would reassume its former commercial and strategic importance; a friendly South Africa would be a vital asset. Following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire British control of Palestine, with its Zionist settlers, was seen as the best guarantee that the Suez route would in fact never be denied Great Britain.

. . . British trust in her new white partners brought immediate rewards. . . . General Smuts (of South Africa) was put in charge of the whole imperial force in East Africa and then went on to membership in the British War Cabinet itself. Although he declined to accept the Palestine command, Smuts was a staunch supporter of British control and Zionist settlement in Palestine, and his friendship with Chaim Weizmann was to be one of the most important in his life. Indeed, it was due to Smuts as much as to anyone that the mandate system itself emerged and it is of no small significance that Smuts played a prominent role in the disposition of both Palestine and South West Africa under that system.

*Contemporary Links* elaborates this:<sup>(88)</sup>

Thus one historical dynamic common to both South Africa and Israel is that which derives from their origins as settler states. Specific circumstances of the settlement process differed in the two cases. Settlement occurred at divergent times and as the result of somewhat different motivations for the immigrants of the two areas. Dutch settlement in South Africa occurred early in the period of outward European expansion and the original settlers themselves subsequently experienced a degree of colonial subjugation by the British. Settlement of European Jews in Israel occurred relatively late and was not so much a manifestation of European economic expansion as the response to the persecution and attempts at genocide which the Jews suffered in Eastern and Western Europe. For its own reasons, the British Empire acquiesced in the Zionist settlement. Yet, in spite of such specific differences, the fact of the common origin of South Africa and Israel as settler states appears to be one which is useful in helping to explain the formation in each case of somewhat similar internal and external policies. In each case the government has developed policies to deal with indigenous peoples within and with independent Afro-Asian states outside their borders in the interest of survival of a regime which represents immigrants and their descendants. Both states, which were established with the aid of British imperialism (but also in conflict with it when settler and imperial interests failed to coincide) are now maintained with the aid of western imperialism of which the new center—the United States of America—itsself has origins as a settler state.

#### 84. IS THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION IN REGARD TO LAND SIMILAR TO THE ISRAELI POSITION?

Of primary importance in both areas is what happened to the land. For it is the appropriation of land by immigrants which characteristically serves as the basis of legitimacy and power for the minority government in a settler state.

In South Africa, the Native Land Act of 1913 reserved 7.3% of the land for Africans. Except in the Cape, they were forbidden to buy land outside the demarcated areas. The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act made a new division, with allocation of 12.7% of the land as the African share. This means that today the white population (19% of the total population) is in possession of 87.3% of the land. This white portion contains all the rich mineral resources, the industries and commercial undertakings, and the urban areas. Ownership of the portion reserved

<sup>(88)</sup> p. 20.

for Africans is vested in the South African Bantu Trust, an all-white body appointed by the white government. (*South Africa: 'Resettlement' — The New Violence to Africans*). This situation is further aggravated by the current removal campaigns, by which Africans living (perhaps for generations) in areas ruled 'white' are deported into desolate 'resettlement areas.' Nadine Gordimer describes the effect on the people in a *New York Times* feature article, January 15, 1971: 'In South Africa, in ten years, 900,000 black people have been moved from their homes. . . They are usually eventually granted some sort of compensation for the houses they leave behind to be bulldozed, but where they are sent, there are no new ones: at best, some basic building materials may be supplied, and they are expected to build new homes themselves, living meanwhile in tents that may or may not be supplied. There may be water nearby and fuel, often they must walk miles for these necessities...

'The bit of ground may be near a white town where work is available, or may not—it has not proved to be part of the "planning" to insure in advance that those who lose employment by the move shall be provided with alternative employment where they are ordered to live. . .

'The physical conditions of resettlement are practically without exception of such desolation that confronted with them, one is almost unable to think beyond bread and latrines. The . . . struggle for existence has been reduced to a search for wood to make a fire, a bucket of clean water to drink, 20 cents to pay a busfare to a clinic. . .'

South West Africa, in direct contradiction to United Nations actions, has been incorporated into South Africa, and the same *apartheid* provisions applied. Africans are supposed to be content with the 'Bantustans' created on 'their' portion of the land, while continuing to supply their labor power to the white areas as transients without any rights in those areas.

South African policy has been oriented towards the dual aim of forcing Africans off the land and forcing them into the labor market to fuel South Africa's economic growth. Israel's policy has been more exclusively oriented toward acquiring land and simply replacing the previous inhabitants.<sup>(89)</sup>

What happened in Palestine as regards the question of land has been gone into in detail in earlier questions in this Handbook. Suffice it to say here that 'in both South Africa and Israel, the alienation of the indigenous peoples from the land has occurred as part of the pattern of establishing and maintaining a state controlled by the settlers and their descendants'.<sup>(90)</sup>

<sup>(89)</sup> *Contemporary Links*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>(90)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

85. WHAT IS THE POSITION OF ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA IN REGARD TO SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP?

Both Israel and South Africa are plural states, divided into several ethnic and racial groups, indigenous peoples, settlers of European origin, as well as intermediate groups. The fundamental cleavage between settler and indigenous groups which exists in the political sphere is manifested as well in the social sphere, and is enforced through differential treatment of the various groups under the law.

Israel's population is distributed primarily in three groups: Jews of European and American descent, Jews of Asian and African descent, and Arabs.

*Population Groups in Israel, c. 1968*

Jews of Europeans & American descent	1.4 million
Jews of Asian & African descent	1.1 million
Arabs	
within pre-1967 borders	0.3 million
in newly occupied territories	1.1 million

The primary dividing line is between Jews and Arabs.

.....  
In South Africa the population is divided into four groups, white, colored, Asian, and African ('Bantu' according to South African government terminology).

*Population Groups in South Africa, c. 1968*

White	3.5 million
Colored	1.9 million
Asian	0.6 million
African	13.0 million

In South Africa the dividing line is clear—between white and non-white.

For the dominant group in each case there is an ideology of survival, and of nationalism—but a nationalism that includes within the orbit of nation only one sector of the population. *Apartheid* ideology and Zionist ideology both stress the central importance of group survival and identity. The South African newspaper *Die Transvaler* (quoted by H. Katzew, *Apartheid and Survival*) asked, 'and is there any real difference between the way that the people of Israel are trying to maintain themselves amid non-Jewish peoples and the way the Afrikaaner is trying to remain what he is?' . . .

In the name of survival, then, the rights of non-whites in South Africa, of Palestinians in Israel (or those expelled from Israel) are sacrificed to the interests of a dominant settler group.

In South Africa, the following are only a few of the restrictions on rights of Africans. An African person:

- may not vote and has no voice in his future.
- is forbidden to own land anywhere, even in his own area, the Bantustan ‘homelands.’
- may be removed from any area, any time, whether or not he has been born there and lived there all his life; he has no access to court in this.
- may not leave his municipal area without a special permit.
- may not be employed in those professions and forms of labor which under the ‘Job Reservation Act’ have been reserved exclusively for white people,
- may not strike.
- may not organize or attend a meeting of more than ten people without a permit.<sup>(91)</sup>

These laws are reminiscent of the laws enacted by the military authorities of Israel, which we see in detail elsewhere in this book.

The restrictions in South Africa are directed toward two ends: the provision of a cheap and easily manipulated labor force, and the prevention of any resistance by the subject population.

In Israel, the use of Arab labor does not assume a primary role (although it is growing). But complete territorial displacement has not proved possible, and Israel since 1967 has control in the occupied territories over an additional 1.1 million Arabs. Accordingly there is disagreement ‘on how to subjugate the Palestinian Arab people and on whether to adopt a demographic (Jewish majority) or territorial (Greater Israel) approach.’ (Lobel, *Palestine and the Jews*, p. 127). But there is agreement, as in South Africa, on hostility to the subordinate group. Israeli sociologist, Peres (*American Journal of Sociology*, May 1971) reports that 91% of his 1968 sample of Israeli Jews agreed that ‘It would be better if there were fewer Arabs’; 76% agreed that ‘the Arabs will never reach the level of progress of Jews,’ 86% said they would not ‘rent a room to an Arab.’

Discrimination also affects education. In South Africa the system of Bantu Education is deliberately designed as education for subjugation. Primary and secondary education is free for whites while Africans have to pay school fees. . . . The Extension of University Education Act (1958) actually precluded the option of non-whites attending any of the eight White universities in South Africa. Instead, ethnic colleges were established . . . Non-whites are not trained to be engineers, dentists, or what is often called the ‘white-collar’ professions.

<sup>(91)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

Likewise, a *New York Times* report (January 29, 1971) notes a wide gap between Jew and Arab in post-primary education in Israel: 'almost 60 per cent of the Jews but only 20 percent of the Arabs between the ages of 14 and 17 are regular students. . . .'

*Newsweek* (February 8, 1971) reports that officials justify lack of equality for Arabs in Israel on the basis of their low education, 'yet it is precisely in the field of education that the most pervasive inequities exist.' . . . It is clear that systematic inequality and inequity for subordinate groups in both societies (manifested as a 'second-class citizenship' with associated handicaps for the group subordinated) are features which cannot be denied, and which both societies share with their prominent ally and supporter, the United States.<sup>(92)</sup>

## 86. IS IT FALSE AND UNFAIR TO ACCUSE ISRAEL OF BEING AN IMPERIALIST BASE?

In an attempt at defending Zionism, Uri Avnery wrote:

. . . the formula according to which Zionism (or the state of Israel) is an 'imperialist creation destined to enslave the Arabs, etc.' appears even more erroneous particularly since it contains an ounce of truth: the constant collaboration between Zionism, from the start, with the forces of imperialists. To the Zionists, Zionism is an authentic 'renaissance' movement which used (or found itself obliged to use) the Western powers in order to attain its goal in the face of growing Arab hostilities.<sup>(93)</sup>

Avnery builds this distinction on the basis that Zionism was only 'an aspect of dying Western imperialism' and 'a secondary manifestation of this imperialism' (p. 705); that it 'never served it [imperialism] voluntarily. . . .' (p. 710); and that 'the first Zionists knew not where to create their ideal state.' (p. 706). This is academic hair splitting.

Avnery himself concedes that 'historically, Zionism emanated from the awakening of Nationalists' in Europe (p. 705) and that 'Herzl adopted the imperialist terminology of the epoch' ('a bastion of Europe against Asia,' 'an advanced post against barbarism') (p. 706). He concedes further that, 'learning of the existence of some hundreds of thousands of Arabs living in the Holy Land, the Zionist Movement took no note of them.' (p. 708).

<sup>(92)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27-29.

<sup>(93)</sup> *Les Temps Modernes*, 1967 (Dossier sur le Conflict Israélo-arabe), p. 710.



One need not hunt long or hard for proof that the Zionist leaders went about, quite aware of what they were doing, offering willingly to act on behalf of the imperialist powers, in particular, Britain and later the U.S.A. The biographies and autobiographies of Zionist figures, Jewish and non-Jewish; the records of the debates in the British Parliament; the archives of the British Government and the British administration in Palestine all abound in facts and figures pertaining to this matter.

It is ironic to note that in its quest for 'Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic development and control,'<sup>(94)</sup> Israel has become a puppet to a bigger imperialist force. Writes Isaac Deutscher:

Yet, whatever their own motives and fears, the Israelis are not and cannot be independent agents. The factors of Israel's dependence were to some extent 'built in' in its history over the last two decades. All Israeli governments have staked Israel's existence on the 'Western orientation'. This alone would have sufficed to turn Israel into a Western outpost in the Middle East, and so to involve it in the great conflict between imperialism (or neo-colonialism) and the Arab peoples struggling for their emancipation. Other factors have been in play as well. Israel's economy has depended for its tenuous balance and growth on foreign Zionist financial aid, especially on American donations. These donations have been a curse in disguise for the new state. They have enabled the government to manage its balance of payments in a way in which no country in the world can do it, without engaging in any trade with its neighbours. The influx of foreign funds has distorted Israel's economic structure by encouraging the growth of a large, unproductive sector and a standard of living which is not related to the country's own productivity and earnings. (In recent years Israel has been receiving up to 250 million dollars annually in grants and loans from the western powers, in aid from the United States, and in contributions from Jews abroad. This amounts to nearly 125 dollars a year per head of the Israeli population). This has, of course, unfailingly kept Israel well within the 'western sphere of influence'. Israel has in effect lived far above its means. Over many years nearly half of Israel's food was imported from the West. As the American administration exempts from taxation earnings and profits earmarked as donations for Israel, the Treasury in Washington has held its hand on the purses on which Israel's economy depends. Washington could at any time hit Israel by refusing the tax exemption (even though this would lose it the Jewish vote in elections). The threat of such a sanction, never uttered but

<sup>(94)</sup> The Jewish Agency Memorandum presented to General P. Hurley, May 1943.

always present, and occasionally hinted at, has been enough to align Israeli policy firmly with the United States. . . . Years ago, when I visited Israel, a high Israeli official listed to me the factories that they could not build because of American objections—among them steel mills and plants producing agricultural machinery. On the other hand, there was a list of virtually useless factories turning out fantastic amounts of plastic kitchen utensils, toys, etc.<sup>(95)</sup>

Israeli leaders themselves began to speak explicitly about the convergence of Israeli and U.S. interests. Yigal Allon said :

Cordial relations between Israel and the U.S. were strengthened as a result of American interests in the political aspect of the *status quo* in the Middle East. Israel was not established for the purpose of supporting and guaranteeing the interests of any foreign country in the Middle East. But the geo-political factor which was created and which still stands has a different objective meaning. The existence of Israel as a strong independent country on the Mediterranean and in the heart of the Middle East came to serve U.S. interests. Moreover, it is possible to conclude that preserving the *status quo* in the Middle East is vital to the U.S. It is also as vital to the U.S. to preserve the *status quo* in South-east Asia, where American interests are vast, as they are in the Middle East. I can confirm that the matter of preserving the *status quo* in the Middle East is even more vital . . . For while the U.S. feels that it must exert great efforts to preserve a precarious state of affairs in South-east Asia, Israel is capable of self-defence, provided that it is supplied with armaments.<sup>(96)</sup>

Moshe Dayan said:

I believe that the policy we adopt rests upon strengthening the U.S. status in the Middle East. If the Americans lose their interests in Jordan, this will not serve our interests at all. For American planes and military missions will be supplanted by Soviet planes and missions. This may not concern the Americans, but there is a great difference for us between American and Soviet presence in Jordan. And I fear that this is feasible. . . .

As far as our ties with external powers are concerned, I believe that we should do our utmost to prevent the Soviet Union from inheriting any influence in the Middle East. We should do our utmost to ensure this for the Americans.

<sup>(95)</sup> Isaac Deutscher. The Israeli-Arab War, June 1967, *The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays* (London: OUP 1968), pp. 129-130.

<sup>(96)</sup> *Maariv*, September 6, 1968.

In the course of his analysis of the general political situation, Abba Eban explained during a radio interview (published by *Daavar* on April 8, 1971), the nature of relations between Israel and the U.S. thus:

The United States will not fail Israel, because this year it has reached a decision to the effect that its support for Israel does not stem from its sympathy for Israel; it is necessitated by the wish to preserve American interests. Moreover, U.S. security is based upon faith in its deterrent power in the world. Hence, if the U.S. forsakes Israel, no other country can count on possible support from the U.S.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ARABS IN ISRAEL

#### 87. HAS THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IMPOSED UPON THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL REALLY BEEN ABOLISHED?

Sabri Jiryis gives the following evaluation of the changes to occur in the Military Government apparatus that has been imposed upon the Arab minority in Israel since 1948:<sup>(1)</sup>

The new method of employing the Emergency Regulations adopted at the beginning of December 1966 was to a great extent the result of the efforts of the Eshkol regime, which had come to power at the end of the Ben Gurion era, to provide itself with a popular democratic facade. The idea was that the Arab population should be 'incorporated' into the everyday life of the state and that those Arabs who so wished should be encouraged to 'link their destiny' with that of Israel. This was to be achieved by concentrating on and strengthening 'positive' Arab elements and by crushing and isolating 'negative' elements. This new policy was obviously incompatible with leaving the Military Government unchanged; it had to be abolished if 'positive' Arab elements were to be won over and if the Israeli regime was to be given a democratic look. Another consideration was the damage the existence of the Military Government was doing to the reputation of the Israeli regime, both inside and outside Israel. But at the same time it was essential to retain the Emergency Regulations or other similar laws to deal with the 'negative' Arab elements and crush their activities. The solution arrived at was typical of Eshkol's policy—it was both deceptive and indecisive. His government 'abolished' the Military Government and handed over its powers to the police, while the Emergency Regulations remained unchanged.<sup>(2)</sup> The authorities also announced the granting of a 'gener-

<sup>(1)</sup> Sabri Jiryis, *Democratic Freedoms in Israel* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), pp. 43-48, 58-60.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Knesset Debates* (Hebrew), November 8, 1966, pp. 228-241.

al permit' under which the great majority of the Arab population of Israel is allowed to move about freely within the country, with the exception of a number of demolished Arab villages which are still regarded as closed areas to prevent their former Arab inhabitants from returning to them.<sup>(3)</sup>

In fact, all that the abolition of the Military Government meant was that the military personnel enforcing it were transferred to other duties within the army, while their function was taken over by others: the police and the commanders of the three regional army commands, both of whom are empowered to enforce the Emergency Regulations. The army commanders can rescind the 'general permit' for their areas and the police can notify individuals that the 'general permit' does not apply to them.

Within the police organization, the Emergency Regulations are enforced by the Special Duties Branch. This branch performs the role of a political police in Israel, its principal tasks being to exercise surveillance over the Arabs, to combat espionage and to supervise foreign tourists. In the performance of these duties it is subject to the Israeli internal intelligence service, being regarded as one of that service's five branches.<sup>(4)</sup> This same organisation already had been 'advising' and 'assisting' the Military Governors. In fact, there had been only 84 officers and other ranks employed in the 13 Military Government centres in areas of Arab concentration, while most of the actual enforcement of the Emergency Regulations was already being carried out by the police. After the control which the Military Government had exercised over the Special Duties Branch, in an administrative sense at least, was abolished, the Special Branch was in a position to conduct its activities with even greater zeal. Once the powers to use the Emergency Regulations were handed over to the police, the Special Branch proceeded to send notifications to dozens of Arabs in Israel, whom it regarded as 'negative' elements and leaders of the 'agitators' against the foundations of the state. These notifications informed those who received them that, whereas previously they had been able to move around in a whole district without a permit, they were now in enforced residence and forbidden to leave their towns or villages without permits, or under house arrest and forbidden to leave their homes at night and obliged to report to the police daily. [Sabri Jiryis gives specimens of these documents all of which date from after the formal abolition of the Military Government in 1966].

<sup>(3)</sup> These villages are: Ikrit, Kafr Bar'am, Kafr Anan, Mijdal, Mansura, Mi'ar, Kuwaikat, Barwa and Damun. Most of them are in Galilee.

<sup>(4)</sup> Michael Bar-Zohar, *Issar Harel and Israel Security Services* (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp. 82-84.

The conduct of the police during the last five years—from the end of 1966 when these powers were granted to them until the present—leaves no room for doubt that it is to defend their political security and crush their political opponents that the authorities need the Emergency Regulations.

.....

It must also be observed that there has been a tendency on the part of the authorities to take harsher measures since the June 1967 War. Enforced residence and house arrest orders have been dispensed with a lavish hand and administrative detention has been used more frequently and for longer periods than previously. In the past detention under such orders was for comparatively short periods, but as of the spring of 1970 there were about 90 Arabs in administrative detention, some of whom had been detained for more than two years without trial and without any charge being brought against them.<sup>(5)</sup>

At the same time the general attitude of the authorities in this field is tending to grow more inflexible. In the past there used to be talk about the abolition, or at least the amendment, of the Emergency Regulations, but no such talk has been heard since 1967. On the contrary, the Israeli authorities, building on what they consider their successful experience with the Arabs in Israel itself, have enforced the same regulations in the occupied Arab territories, contrary to international law. This includes enforced residence, house arrest, curfews, administrative detention and establishment of closed areas.<sup>(6)</sup> It is a matter of general knowledge that the Israeli occupation authorities are exercising powers with great harshness and brutality.

The Israeli historian Aharon Cohen came to the same conclusion. He said: 'On December 1, 1966, the special machinery of the military government was abolished and its functions transferred to the police (which set up special departments for this purpose), with a few hundred people who were on a special list remaining under its supervision. However, the actual military government regulations remained in force.'<sup>(7)</sup>

Sabri Jiryis gives several examples of judgements passed by the Supreme Court which serve to emphasize the free hand of the Military

<sup>(5)</sup> *Al-Ittihād*, April 3, 1970; April 10, 1970; April 14, 1970; April 17, 1970.

<sup>(6)</sup> *Orders, Proclamations and Declarations Issued by the Command of the Israeli Defence Army in the Area of the West Bank* (Hebrew and Arabic). Order on Security Directives, June 7, 1967, p. 5 (Articles 65-70); Golan Heights, June 18, 1967, p. 9; Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai Area, June 10, 1967, p. 7; and Shlomo Area (Southern Sinai), June 11, 1967, p. 8.

<sup>(7)</sup> Aharon Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World* (London: Allen and Mowbray, 1970), p. 495.

## Government authorities.<sup>(8)</sup>

... The Military Government has absolute power in the areas it controls, because it can do precisely what it likes. There is no administrative control whatsoever over its actions and judicial control is restricted to the possibility of applying to the Supreme Court. Time has proved that there is no practical advantage in doing this, for the Supreme Court has made it a rule not to interfere with the Military Government when its actions are based on 'security reasons'. It has also proved impossible to question the military judges in the court about the nature of the 'security reasons', inasmuch as such questioning is, in itself, prejudicial to the security of the State.

This principle has been established and vindicated in a long series of judgements of the Supreme Court of Justice. In Appeal No. 53/197<sup>(9)</sup> the judgement of the Court included the following statement:

'The object of the order (to impose police supervision on the plaintiff) issued by the defendant was to ensure the safety of the people and public order, and we have no right to express an opinion as to whether this object can be achieved in this manner, this being left to the absolute discretion of the defendant. . . and we see no justification for interference in the matter.'

In Appeal No. 50/46<sup>(10)</sup> the Court's judgement included the following statement:

'The competence of this Court to criticise the actions of the competent authorities acting in accordance with the Defence Laws (State of Emergency) 1945, is extremely limited. When the Article under discussion allows the competent authority freedom of action as regards the individual in all cases "in which it thinks", or "in which it is of the opinion" that circumstances of which it is cognisant require such action, this, in a general way, makes the competent authority itself the final judge as regards the existence of such circumstances. . . and inasmuch as this Court is subject to this narrow competence, it has no right to criticise the grounds adduced by the competent authority in justification of its issue of the said order.'

Similarly, the judgement on Appeal No. 59/126<sup>(11)</sup> contains the following:

'It should be mentioned that this power (to give orders for banishment, detention etc.) is very extensive. It is at the discretion of the (Military)

<sup>(8)</sup> Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), pp. 11-13.

<sup>(9)</sup> Ismail Ali *vs.* the Police Inspector et al. *Judgements of the Supreme Court*, No. 7, p. 913.

<sup>(10)</sup> Ayyubi *vs.* the Minister of Defence. *Judgements of the Supreme Court*, No. 10, p. 105.

<sup>(11)</sup> Hasanein *vs.* the Minister of Defence. *Judgements of the Supreme Court*, no. 41, p. 272.

Commander, not of the Court, and he has the right to give the order even if it merely seems to him that such an order is desirable.’

These statements in themselves grant immunity to the actions of the Military Government. In effect they say that it is not permissible to question the military judges in the Court to ascertain the real, fundamental motives for actions, and all efforts made in this direction have been firmly rejected by the Supreme Court. Thus, for example, the verdict on Appeal No. 50/46, already referred to, states:

‘The responsibility for protecting the higher interests of the State rests on the Military Commander and it is his duty to decide whether or not these interests make it undesirable that he should disclose additional details which might throw light on the grounds for the issue of the order; or, in other words, it may be understood that the justification for the imposition of supervision (which is subject to criticism by this Court only within the narrow limits allowed) is the same as that which is used to justify the maintenance of strict secrecy in regard to such matters.’

The Court’s judgement in connection with Appeal No. 53/111<sup>(12)</sup> says:

‘A public authority must not be obliged to submit to the Court verbal or written proofs, the disclosure of which might lead to the endangering of the vital affairs of State, including matters connected with security. . . in particular it is forbidden to disclose the ways in which information on such matters reached the public authority. . . The same degree of caution is required not only with regard to sources of information, but also to their purport.’

## 88. ARE THE DEFENCE LAWS APPLIED AGAINST JEWS AS WELL AS ARABS IN ISRAEL?

In *Democratic Freedoms* (pp. 93-94), Sabri Jiryis tells us:

The authorities have on rare occasions used the Emergency Regulations against Jews. There have not been more than four such cases.

The first was in 1948, when certain members of the Zionist military group Etzel were arrested for having brought a ship loaded with arms to Israel and refused to surrender the cargo to the Israeli government. In the autumn of the same year some members of Lechi were arrested on a charge of assassinating Count Bernadotte.

The Israeli authorities also invoked these powers to arrest a group of fanatically religious Jews who intended to throw a bomb in the Knesset

<sup>(12)</sup> Kaufmann *vs.* the Minister of Defence et. al. *Judgements of the Supreme court*, no. 7, p. 543.



in protest against the passing of the law for the conscription of girls, and against another group whose members planted a bomb in the Soviet embassy in Tel-Aviv.

These four cases all occurred shortly after the establishment of the state. There have been two more recent cases of the use of the Emergency Regulations against Jews, but in both of these cases the action of the authorities was in reality directed against Arabs. In 1962, the Military Governor forbade a young Jew named Uri Davis from returning to the Arab village of Dair al-Asad. He had gone to live there with the intention of helping the Arab inhabitants of the village, after some of its lands had been confiscated so that the Jewish town of Kamiel could be built on them.

Finally, the authorities called on these powers once again after the June 1967 War and used them, to some small extent, to prevent certain Jewish women married to Arabs from going to the areas occupied in 1967 without obtaining a special written permit.

But these cases are insignificant when compared with what the Arabs constantly suffer from the enforcement of the Emergency Regulations, in terms of detention, expulsion and various other restrictions of freedoms.

The same discrimination is to be seen in the attitude of the authorities to freedom of the press and freedom of association. So far the authorities have not suspended a single Hebrew paper or banned the activities of any Jewish political group, however extremist and however much its views have differed from the official attitude of the regime. But not a single Arabic newspaper is published in Israel unless the authorities are confident of the support or at least the compliance of those who are responsible for it and no Arab organisation has been allowed to engage in any kind of activity of a political nature without the consent and full approval of the authorities.

The discrimination between Arabs and Jews can be clearly seen in the way the Israeli authorities deal with the Israeli Communist Party and use the Emergency Regulations to restrict its activities. Active Arab members of the Party are, and have been ever since the establishment of Israel, subject to the severest restrictions, especially restrictions on movement. On one occasion the authorities went so far as to forbid the Arab Communist member of the Knesset, Tawfiq Tubi, from going to a village in the Triangle to meet his constituents, in spite of his parliamentary immunity.

However, when the affair was submitted to the Supreme Court, they agreed to a compromise solution.<sup>(13)</sup> They were afraid that the Court

<sup>(13)</sup> Tawfiq Tubi vs. The Minister of Defence. Supreme Court Case No. 69/54. Judgements of the Supreme Court (Hebrew), Vol. VIII, p. 558.

would deliver a judgement which might, in future, be used as a precedent for frustrating their activities.

These restrictions have never once been imposed on Jewish members of the Party, nor have their movements or activities been hindered in any way.

.....  
It is the Arabs, essentially, who 'enjoy' these laws, which are not, in practice, enforced against the Jews whether inside or outside the Military Government areas. Evidence of this is to be found even in the report of the State Controller. . . . This report says:(<sup>14</sup>)

'If an area is declared closed by the Military Commander this order is, in theory, applicable to all citizens, whether male or female, without exception, whether they live inside or outside these areas. Thus anyone who enters or leaves a closed area without a written permit from the Military Governor is, in fact, committing a criminal offence. In practice, Jews are not expected to have such permits and, in general criminal actions are not brought against Jews when they offend against the provisions of Article 125. There is something improper about this law, which was drafted with the intention of its being applicable to all the inhabitants of the country, whereas in fact it is only enforced against some of them.'

#### 89. IS THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IMPOSED UPON THE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL LIMITED TO MATTERS RELATING TO SECURITY?

The Hebrew daily, *Yediot Ahronot*, of August 22, 1958 informs us that the Military Government interferes in an odious and arbitrary manner 'in all fields of the life of the Arab citizen, from political, economic and municipal affairs to education, culture, social relations, mail deliveries, social affairs, etc. The Military Governor of the Triangle once "complained" that he was not allowed to interfere in tax matters.'

In fact so 'notorious' has the interference of the Military Government in matters outside its competence become that in February 1959 the State Controller said this in his report:(<sup>15</sup>)

The Military Government deals with a large number of matters which come within the competence of the civil administration. It gives instructions or advice to the Ministry concerned, or opposes the granting of permits to buy agricultural equipment, to rent land or to work. The

(<sup>14</sup>) *Report of the State Controller*, p. 56.

(<sup>15</sup>) *Report of the State Controller on the Ministry of Defense*, No. 9, February 15, 1959, pp. 57-58.

Controller's Office has established that, in the field of coordination the Military Government has frequently dealt with matters that fall within the competence of government offices, without there being any weighty security reason to justify such interference. It has been suggested to the Military Government that it should restrict its activities to matters in which security reasons make its interference essential. . . The Controller's Office emphasized the necessity for the Military Government to drastically curtail its interference in matters that lie within the field of responsibility of government offices.

90. DOES ISRAEL 'UPHOLD THE FULL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EQUALITY OF ALL ITS CITIZENS WITHOUT DISTINCTION IN RELIGION, RACE OR SEX?'<sup>(16)</sup>

We shall treat this question from one angle, namely, the policy of Israel *vis-a-vis* the Arab minority.

[About this subject, the Knesset member, Yacov Hazzan, said:] 'The Military Government has isolated the Arab population, through its discrimination against them in a variety of fields and by the way it has treated them as second class citizens.' (*The Knesset Debates*, Vol. 33, p. 1317, February 20, 1962).

Even the Knesset itself, on May 22, 1951 made the following decision: 'The Defense Laws (State of Emergency) 1945, which have existed since the time of British rule, are incompatible with the principles of a democratic state.' (*The Knesset Debates*, Vol. 9, pp. 1828-1831). Eighteen years have passed, but no such draft has been prepared.<sup>(17)</sup>

91. IS IT TRUE THAT THE ARABS IN ISRAEL ARE TREATED LIKE ANY MINORITY IN ANY COUNTRY?

We leave it to the Zionists and the Israelis themselves to answer this question in a statement quoted by Sabri Jiryis in *The Arabs in Israel* :

About 200,000 of the inhabitants of the State of Israel who belong to another religion and nationality, do not enjoy equal rights and are the victims of discrimination and repression. The overwhelming majority of the Arab population of Israel live under a system of military government which deprives them of the fundamental rights of the citizen. They are deprived of freedom of movement and residence. They are not accepted as members with equal rights and obligations in the trade

<sup>(16)</sup> *Basic Laws of the State of Israel* (Proclamation of Independence), Vol. I, p. 3.

<sup>(17)</sup> Jiryis, *The Arabs* . . . pp. 20-25 and pp. 30-35.

unions (Histadrut), nor as employees in most concerns. Their whole life is dependent on the whims of the Military Governor and his assistants.<sup>(18)</sup>

It is a strange irony that Arabs in Israel cannot easily acquire the nationality of the country in which they were born, i.e. Israeli nationality:

The Court has adopted a similar attitude to the way in which the Israeli Nationality Law is enforced. As is well known, this law discriminates in an infamous manner between Jews and Arabs. It allows Jews to acquire Israeli nationality as soon as they arrive in Israel and without any preconditions. Arabs are allowed the same privilege only if they fulfil certain conditions, which have the obvious intention to prevent as many Arabs as possible from acquiring Israeli nationality.

One of these conditions is that a citizen should have been 'present' in the area which later became Israel from the date of the adoption of the United Nations resolution on the Partition of Palestine (November 29, 1947) until the Israeli army occupied the area.<sup>(19)</sup> In their interpretation of this article of the law the Israeli authorities have allowed themselves a great deal of latitude. In one case they refused to grant Israeli nationality to an Arab who had been present in the area except for a few days when he went to Beirut for medical treatment, after which he returned to his village in Galilee—all this before Israel occupied the area. The Supreme Court, when it considered the man's complaint, refused to accept the authorities' interpretation of the law, declaring that it was devoid of foundation, reason and mercy, and affirmed the man's right to Israeli nationality. When the state contested this first judgement, the Court upheld it, thereby affirming the right to Israeli citizenship of several hundreds of Arabs who had committed similar 'offences' and of their children.<sup>(20)</sup>

The Israeli historian Aharon Cohen said in his book *Israel and the Arab World* (p. 496): 'From the point of view of the law, the Arab citizens are equal to all citizens of the state; they participate in parliamentary elections and enjoy many rights of a democratic state. *However, no such statement can obscure the fact that the Arab minority in Israel lives in conditions of painful national discrimination.*' (eds. italics.)

<sup>(18)</sup> *Ner*, July-August 1958, as quoted in Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs* . . .

<sup>(19)</sup> Other conditions are that the Arab should have been of Palestinian nationality before the establishment of the state of Israel, have been registered in the Population Register of March 1, 1952, and have been residing in Israel both on April 1, 1952, and between the date of the establishment of the state of Israel and April 1, 1952. Article 3 of the Nationality Law, 5712-1952, *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. VI, 1951/52.

<sup>(20)</sup> Jiryis, *Democratic Freedoms* . . . , pp. 24-25.

92. HAS ISRAEL ALLOWED THE ARABS WHO REMAINED IN THEIR COUNTRY TO KEEP THEIR LANDS?

One of the first cases of the expulsion of the Arab population, or their forcible removal from their villages after the end of hostilities, was the evacuation of the inhabitants of the village of Rama on 5 November 1948. Ten days later, on 15 November 1948, the Arab population of Kafr Bar'am was evacuated from the village. Three months later again, on 4 February 1949, the inhabitants of the village of Anan were evicted from their homes; half of them were sent to the Triangle, where they were forced to cross the armistice line. Three years later, when those villagers who still remained in the country submitted a request to the Supreme Court to be allowed to return to the village, all the houses in the village were blown up by the Israel Defence Army.

On 28 February 1949, 700 refugees were expelled from the village of Kafr Yasif, where they had taken refuge during the hostilities, after leaving their own villages not far away in Galilee. Most of them were put in trucks and driven to the front lines, where they were forced to cross the frontier. On 5 June 1949, the Israeli army and police surrounded three Arab villages in Galilee, Hisam, Qatiya and Jauneh, and expelled their inhabitants to the Safad area.

On 24 January 1950 an army unit arrived in the village of Ghabisiya and told the inhabitants they must leave their homes by 3 p.m. on 26 January 1950, or else they would be expelled over the frontier. Seeing no alternative, they left their village for another demolished village, Damun.

At the beginning of March 1950, the inhabitants of the village of Batat were expelled from their village.

On 17 August 1950, the inhabitants of Mijdal (now called Mijdal Ashqelon) received an expulsion order, and the first group of them were taken to the Gaza Strip. The expulsion was completed in three weeks.

At the beginning of February 1951, the inhabitants of 13 Arab villages in Wadi Ara were expelled over the Israeli frontier.

On 17 November 1951, a military detachment surrounded the village of Buwaisat (near Umm al-Fahm), expelled the inhabitants and dynamited their homes.

In September 1953, the inhabitants of Umm al-Faraj (near Naharia) were expelled from their village, which was blown up immediately afterwards.

In October 1953, seven families were expelled from the village of Rihaniya, despite a Supreme Court judgement that the expulsion was illegal.

On 30 October 1956, the Baqqar tribe, which lived in the North of the country, was forced to cross the frontier into Syria.

As late as 1959—11 years after the establishment of the State of Israel—Bedouin tribes were expelled from Israel into Jordan and Egypt, the expulsion being reversed only after United Nations intervention.

It is not claimed that this list includes all the Arab villages whose inhabitants were expelled. There are many other empty Arab villages, either partly or completely demolished, and a large proportion of their former inhabitants live as refugees in different parts of Israel. Among them are the villages of Amqa, Saffuriya, Mansura, Mi'ar, Quwaiqat, Barwa, Damun and Ruways. But the above list of villages gives some idea of the extent of the operations undertaken by the Israeli authorities to rescue land during the first few years after the establishment of the State of Israel.<sup>(21)</sup>

### 93. HOW DOES THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AIDED BY THE DEFENSE LAWS AND THE EMERGENCY LAWS, SERVE THE POLICY OF EXPROPRIATING ARAB LANDS IN ISRAEL?

The real aim of the Military Government imposed upon the Arabs in the occupied territories is the expropriation of Arab lands.

[The Military Government's] activities in this field are radical, profound and rapid. To enforce expropriation, the Military Government invokes the powers granted to it under Article 125 of the Defence Laws (State of Emergency) 1945, and those granted it by the Emergency Laws (Security Areas) 1949.

The enforcement of Article 125 consists of a declaration by the Military Governor that certain areas are 'closed areas' or are reserved for manoeuvres. Such a declaration is, in fact, the prelude to the expropriation of lands whose owners are forbidden to enter them for 'security reasons'...

... Samuel Seguev, who is close to Ministry of Defence staff, has said: 'The repeal of Article 125, which deals with "closed areas"—the most important Article as far as the Military Government is concerned—would mean, in practice, the abolition of the legal power to close areas. The closing of an area by virtue of this Article means that it is being prepared for Jewish settlement, which is becoming more and more urgent, with the increasing waves of immigration.'

<sup>(21)</sup> Jiryis, *The Arabs...*, pp. 56-58.

Shimon Peres, the [former] Deputy Minister of Defence, and one of the spiritual sponsors of Military Government in recent years, says of this Article [*Davar*, 26 January 1962]: 'It is by making use of Article 125, on which the Military Government is to a great extent based, that we can directly continue the struggle for Jewish settlement and Jewish immigration.'<sup>(22)</sup>

94. WHAT WAS THE FATE OF THOSE ARABS WHOSE LANDS WERE CONFISCATED?

One of the first results of the expropriation of land under the Acquisition of Absentees' Property Law was the removal of some 20,000 Arabs from their villages, so that they became refugees in every sense of the word, in spite of the fact that most of them are still living in Israel,<sup>(23)</sup> only a few kilometres away from their original villages, which have been used for Jewish settlement. These Arabs are allowed to enter the lands that were formerly theirs only if they work as paid labourers for the new 'owners' of the lands. These refugees, according to a Zionist Jewish writer, 'mostly live in humble houses of tin, sacking or wood, that they have erected on the outskirts of their villages, the authorities regarding them as temporary residents. Very few of them are rich enough to have succeeded in buying a plot of land on which to build a house in the villages they now live in, or in renting a house in one of these villages. In some, but not all, of the villages of these refugees new immigrants have settled, while most, though not all of the cultivable land has been annexed to already existing Jewish colonies to meet their land requirements, or granted to new colonies.

'The great majority of these refugees—nearly all of them—ask to be allowed to return to their villages, refusing to sell their rights to their land, in spite of their unfavourable material conditions. They do not become absorbed by other villages, firmly maintaining their attitudes' [Israel Hertz, in an article in *Al-Hamishmar*, as quoted in the periodical *Ner*, April 1960.]<sup>(24)</sup>

95. HAS ISRAEL SAFEGUARDED THE PROPERTY OF THOSE ARABS WHO MANAGED TO STAY IN PALESTINE AFTER 1948?

According to government of Israel statistics, the custodian of abandoned property received rural assets in 350 abandoned and semi-abandoned

<sup>(22)</sup> Jiryis, *The Arabs* . . . , pp. 44-46.

<sup>(23)</sup> This is the origin of the name 'Non-Absent Absentees' Law' that has been given to the Absentees' Property Law.

<sup>(24)</sup> Jiryis, *The Arabs* . . . , pp. 86-87.

Arab villages. Their total area amounted to three and a quarter million dunums, including 80,000 dunums of citrus groves and about 200,000 dunums of other orchards. The urban assets operated by the administrative machinery established for this purpose included 25,416 buildings, in which there were 57,497 apartments and 10,727 businesses and workshops. However, the ownership of property by Arabs within the state of Israel was also harmed not a little because of the 'Law of Abandoned Property' (March 1950) which, in addition to its very wide enforcement enabled the authorities to expropriate Arab property (when one of the partners to it was in the category of 'present absentees' or when one of the heirs was outside the borders of Israel, etc. . . .), and to take it away from its owners according to various emergency decrees or by different types of pressure, not always entirely legal.<sup>(25)</sup>

Israel has enacted several laws to ensure the expropriation of Arab land. These are:

1. The Abandoned Areas Ordinance, 1949.
2. The Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Lands, 1947-1949.
3. The Absentees' Property Law, 1950.
4. The Land Acquisition Law, 1953.
5. The Law of Limitations or the Law of Prescription, 1958.

Under the first two laws listed, the Minister of Agriculture can declare 'abandoned', or 'uncultivated' an area or piece of land which has previously been evacuated of its inhabitants on the authority of the Minister of Defence and the Military Governor, who have declared the area 'closed' for 'security reasons'. The expropriated land, now deemed 'abandoned' or 'uncultivated', is then handed over 'to another party to cultivate it'. The 'other party' has always turned out to be a neighbouring Jewish settlement.

The Absentees' Property Law is structured in such a way that many Arabs who were absent from their homes for a certain period (e.g. on business or for other reasons) during the process of Israeli occupation and annexation, found that they were prevented from returning to their villages by the Israeli authorities. They were subsequently declared 'absentee' and their property seized.

The Land Acquisition Law empowers the Minister of Finance to transfer lands expropriated from Arabs under the aforementioned

<sup>(25)</sup> Aharon Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World* pp. 495-496. (See *Israel Government Yearbook*, 1959. pp. 74-75.)



laws into the possession of the State of Israel.

The Law of Prescription 'requires Arab landowners without a registered title to produce evidence that they have been in continuous undisputed possession of their lands for fifteen years, or forfeit them to the Israeli Government.'<sup>(26)</sup> Such evidence is often difficult to obtain under the circumstances. A further provision of the law demands that in the case of a man beginning cultivation of his land after March 1, 1943, the prescription period is 20 years.

The above-listed laws are just a few of the many at the disposal of the government in its policy of land expropriation.

Sabri Jiryis says: 'So far about 70 per cent of the land belonging to the Arabs in Israel has been expropriated. Not one single Arab village has escaped.'<sup>(27)</sup>

## 96. WHAT IS THE STORY OF THE INHABITANTS OF IKRIT AND K FAR BIRIM?

WHY DID ISRAEL REFUSE THEIR RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEIR VILLAGES?

Amos Kenan discussed this story in full in an article that appeared in *Yediot Ahronot*, July 7, 1972.

This is the story they are telling the Israeli people: in 1948 the Arabs fled in droves because they believed their leaders who promised they would return in a few days and liberate their homeland forever.

We did not want to expel the Arabs, says the story, but since they fled, we had no alternative but to inherit the country they abandoned.

An Israel Government that believed its own story could have proven its faith with ease in Biram and Ikrit. The inhabitants of those villages did not fight Israel; on the contrary, they cooperated with the Israeli Defense Forces. Moreover, they did not flee. Were the story true, Israel's Government should have permitted the inhabitants of Biram and Ikrit to remain in their villages and cultivate their land in peace.

Even if Israel's Government had the logic of empires and the cleverness of conquerors, it would have been in its interests to cultivate the friendship of the Maronites, Israel's only allies in the hostile Moslem Arab World, whose representatives supported Jewish national aspirations in the Land of Israel in every international forum before the State was established. Israel's Government could have remembered that the

<sup>(26)</sup> *Israeli Government Yearbook, 1964*, p. 280.

<sup>(27)</sup> Jiryis, *Democratic Freedoms* . . . , p. 72-75.

Maronite church is the only church in the world that issued an encyclical against Nazism during Hitler's rule.

But Israel's Government is not even concerned with preserving its image.

The inhabitants relate: 'During the War of Liberation (that is what they call the 1948 War), Israel army units entered our villages. The soldiers slept and ate in our houses. About a month after the war an officer told us that we must evacuate the village within 48 hours and that the evacuation would be for a period of 15 days. We were told that we could leave all our belongings in our houses. We obeyed and moved to the woods at the edge of the village. A few days later the same officer came and told us to move to Gush-Halav where we would be fenced in. We did so. We have been waiting for the end of the 15 day period for 25 years.

'Every moment of that time we aspired to return to our village. We appealed to the Prime Ministers and to Presidents. We appealed to the Supreme Court which ruled in 1952 that we have the right to return to our village. However, implementation of the ruling was dependent on permission from the security authorities.

'The security authorities did not give that permission and in 1953, a year after the ruling, systematic destruction of the houses in the village began. We used to climb the hill overlooking the village, watch our houses become heaps of rubble, and weep. Since then it is called Wailing Hill.

'Since 1953 we have continued our struggle to return. In the meantime Kibbutz Biram and Moshav Dovav have been established on our land. We do not request the return of our land. We do not request dispossession of the kibbutz or the moshav. They can keep our land. We do only want to return to our destroyed houses and to rebuild them.'

Biram can serve as an ironical illustration of Zionism. The village contains one of the most illustrious synagogues from the Roman period; gigantic stone pillars, arches and lintels are evidence of the flourishing Jewish settlement in the Galilee in the distant past, evidence of the strong historical tie between the Israeli people and its land.

After the houses were dynamited and razed to the ground the Park Authority converted the village into a tourist site. Large signs in many languages tell about the heroism of the Jewish people which did not forget its land. The tourists wander among the rubble of the Arab village and wonder at Jewish history. In the course of thousands of years the Jews did not forget their synagogue in the Galilee and now they have come to rebuild it.

'Do you see the wash rooms of this site?' someone from Biram asked me.

‘That was my house. When we were children we cleaned the synagogue and weeded its courtyard every year.’

‘Do you see the beautiful fence around the path that leads to the synagogue? That is the fence of what was my house’, says another inhabitant.

The people who established the tourist site are insensitive to the macabre irony. In deadly earnest they paved the path to sights from our past with fragments of the houses of the people who live two miles away and carry Israeli identity cards.

Although a private individual has the right to acquire property by deceit or deception, a state does not. The very fact that the villagers were expelled with an empty promise should be sufficient to remedy the injustice in a self-respecting state. It is not denied that deception was employed. Moreover, no one denies that there is a Supreme Court ruling.

Had the inhabitants joined ‘El Fatah’ things would have been easy for us. Had they become enemies of the State, that would have been wonderful. Had they even voted for the New Communist List that would have sufficed.

But those villains brazenly declare their love of the state and their loyalty to it. They glory in the fact that their sons serve in our armed forces and Israel’s police force.

Had they rightfully demanded the return of their land, it would have been possible to shrug one’s shoulders. But those scoundrels do not even request justice. They generously renounce justice.

It is extremely difficult to be an Israeli and look into the eyes of these people. They are weak. They cannot recover by force what was taken from them by force and pleas are of no avail. Nonetheless they are waiting with quiet pride and the stubbornness of water that erodes rock. They have found the most efficient weapon: the weapon of the weak who are in the right. They are causing us to lower our eyes in shame and to give the impression of being heartless.

And that is how they vanquished us. So long as an inhabitant of Biram lives, so long as there is one person who wants to return to his village and asks nothing else, so long as there is a silent look that does not express the desire to destroy us nor to obtain Shylock’s pound of flesh, we are vanquished.

But we shall not give them even the little they request because we shall not forgive them for not running away. Had they fled, our entire story would be correct. It is not correct because of them and there is no atonement for that. That is the only plausible explanation for the Government’s stubborn refusal to redress the wrong which it itself has

recognized as such.

Hashomer Hatzair deserves praise for having the ancient Jewish virtue of moral qualms and the Zionist faith that it is possible to settle the country without evicting others. The members of Kibbutz Biram, a Hashomer Hatzair kibbutz, favor the return of the village's inhabitants.

The members of Moshav Dovav, who occupy most of the village's land, do not even agree to the villagers' return to their homes without land.

'You are Avraham. Isn't that right?' an Arab asks a Jew from Dorav. 'Don't you recognize me? We played host to each other!'

'Yes', replies the moshav member, 'that's right.'

'Do you agree to the villagers' return?' I ask him.

'I don't know', he replies.

'Are you familiar with their story?'

'I don't know', he says.

'Do you agree to the villagers return to their homes if they leave you the land?'

'I don't know', he says.

'Why shouldn't we return? Why shouldn't you the kibbutz and we, live on the land like three brothers?' asks the Arab.

'I don't know', replies the Jew. I look at his unfurrowed brow and I want the earth to swallow me when I recall that I fought in the War of Liberation.

When the members of Moshav Dovav and Moshav Shomrah say that they oppose the return of Arabs to the border because of security reasons, their argument has a very hollow ring. Security considerations do not hinder their employment of the former owners to cultivate the land. The people of Ikrit cultivate the land of Ikrit for Moshav Shomrah. Were the inhabitants to return to their homes, the people of Shomrah would have to find other workers. It is that simple.

Accompanied by members of the village I go to their cemetery. In recent years Israel's army has permitted them to use their old cemetery. Consequently the villagers tread on their soil now and then. Each time one of their number dies, their feet renew the tie with Mother Earth.

I bow my head before their moral strength, the moral strength not to rebel or shout but to gaze into my eyes.

The Government's decision vis-a-vis the uprooted people of Biram and Ikrit has not been explained officially as yet. The Government did not

deny their patent moral right to return to their homes. The public was given to understand that the reasons for refusing them such permission, which were valid until now, are still valid: 'the present situation has existed for about 25 years. In order to change it reasons must be advanced to prove that a fundamental change has occurred in the situation'. That is to say, it is better to perpetuate error than to admit that we have been mistaken for 25 years. This is using old mistakes to justify a new one.

In any event, there were implications of two of the Government's time-worn considerations which it continues to press into service: the security consideration and fear of creating a precedent.

This time the flimsiness of the security argument is glaringly apparent. The matter involves faithful citizens who proved their moderateness again and again despite all they suffered. This is an argument which sees security danger in every Arab regardless of his attitude towards us, an argument which makes a mockery of our demand that the Arab world change its posture toward us.

The attempt to convince the cabinet of the absurdity of the 'security consideration' that led them to make their decision is, as a matter of course, wasted effort. It is difficult to assume that they do not know that they created the security danger with their own breaths this time.

On the other hand, it is conceivable that they do not know that they created a real danger because the most certain way to make an enemy of a friend is to declare that he is an enemy. In the name of national security, therefore, they are taking the risk of increasing the number of our enemies.

Perhaps public consideration of the second contention that influenced the Government (fear of creating a precedent), was undesirable before the Government's decision for fear of the evil eye. Now that the damage has been done (would that I were mistaken) it is permissible to ask an innocent question: If the Government feared that a decision in favor of the inhabitants' return would be a precedent for the demands of Arab citizens of Israel who have empty or destroyed houses to return to them, is not that a desirable precedent?

We are referring to Arab refugees who have been Israeli citizens for 25 years, whose existence was unknown until now to anyone who did not take a special interest in such questions. The official view that we are unable to return refugees because that would impair the Jewish character of the State, does not apply to them. The return of such refugees to their empty homes is a moral obligation and a deed that may serve as undeniable proof of the sincerity of this official view.

A government that expresses fear that precedents will limit its freedom

of action is expressing lack of confidence in its judgment. Are we to understand that the Government is not certain that its future decisions will be reasonable and sound? Are we to understand from this that fearing to err in the future, the Government is erring in the present?

Perhaps the Government's decision also had a positive aspect. Maybe it revealed to many people the Government's true sad and stubborn calm. And I know that come what may they will return.

97. HAVE THE ARABS' AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS IN ISRAEL IMPROVED SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISRAELI STATE?

Simha Flapan, in an article entitled 'Integrating the Arabs of Israel' (*New Outlook*, Tel Aviv, January 1963, pp. 25-30), said:

The Jewish agricultural sector consists mainly of kibbutzim and moshavim, both highly developed forms of economic cooperation and social organization, based on modern farming, advanced mechanization and modern agro-technology. Arab agriculture, on the other hand, is still a remnant of a backward and feudal society, with primitive farming based on and impeded by outmoded systems of land ownership and crop rotation. While the urban sector of the Jewish community is in the stage of dynamic industrial development, the two small Arab towns of Nazareth and Sh'faram are only provincial commercial centers for a rural hinterland.

... The Arab village: is not developing into anything like the kibbutz or moshav. It is disintegrating, as it cannot keep pace with the development in the country. From year to year Arab farming plays a smaller part in Israel's agricultural production. Though there has been a considerable increase in cultivated areas, irrigation, mechanization, etc., during the past ten years, the share of Arab agriculture in the total agricultural sector declined from 8.2 per cent in 1950-51 to 5.7 per cent in 1960-61. And this, despite the fact that the Arabs form 38 per cent of the rural population in Israel and cultivate 21.2 per cent of the total cultivated area (though only 2.1 per cent of the irrigated area) of Israel. The Arab villages are losing their agricultural character, as the majority of their population is already now engaged in hired labor outside the village.

.....  
This trend of development in the Arab community has not been only a natural and spontaneous process, but also a result of official policies.

Aharon Cohen makes the observation that:

The land basis [of Arab agriculture] has been narrowed down considerably. The Arabs of Israel lost most of their land (60 per cent-70 per cent),

and especially the better lands, which had been in their possession before 1948.

The Arab population works about 20 percent of all the cultivated lands in the country, but only 2 percent of the irrigated area. The value of the produce per dunum is about four times less than the average for Jewish agriculture.

Cohen observed also that the Arab village has 'remained outside the agricultural development programs, and the gap between Arab and Jewish farming is steadily increasing'<sup>(28)</sup>

#### 98. HAVE THE EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR THE ARABS IN ISRAEL IMPROVED?

Uri Lubrani, a former advisor on Arab Affairs to the Israeli Prime Minister, in a statement he made to *Haaretz*, on 4 April 1961 said: 'If there were no pupils the situation would be better and more stable. If the Arabs remained hewers of wood it might be easier for us to control them.' This statement reflects the educational policy of the Israeli government towards the Arabs.

The educator Aliza Lavenberg, in a comment on the content of Arab education, has said: 'The curriculum is dry, little is taught of Arab national value and of the place of the Arab people in the world.' (*Al-Hamishmar*, 9 July 1968).

Aharon Cohen observed that 'in the institutions of higher learning, there were, in the year 1966-67, 112 Jewish students per 10,000 Jewish population, while the Arabs had somewhat less than 10 for every 10,000 persons. (In 1963, there were in Egypt 50 university students for every 10,000, in Syria, 60, in Lebanon, 74. The proportion is continuing to rise in these countries.)'<sup>(29)</sup>

Another example of the 'improved' educational conditions of the Arabs is the fact that: 'In the year 1963-1964 there were two Arab schools for apprentices, with a total of 105 pupils, as against 140 such schools for Jews, with 5,138 pupils. There were two Arab vocational training schools with 166 students, and 138 such schools with 21,111 students for Jews; one agricultural school with 51 students for Arabs,

<sup>(28)</sup> Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, p. 449.

<sup>(29)</sup> Cohen, p. 501.

41 schools with 7,309 students for Jews; one teacher training college with 104 trainees for Arabs and 42 colleges with 7,575 trainees for Jews.'<sup>(30)</sup>

With such evidence before us, is it true to say that the educational conditions of the Arabs in Israel are better than those of the Arabs in other countries? Is there really no educational discrimination in Israel?

The Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* (August 16, 1971) leaves us without any doubt on that score: 'In the ten years from 1961-1971 only 300 Arabs graduated from Israeli universities.'

## 99. HAVE THE CONDITIONS OF ARAB WORKERS IN ISRAEL IMPROVED?

Israel adheres to the principle of 'Hebrew Labour' which has been advocated by the Zionists since the beginnings of their colonization of Palestine. At certain times, when they find it necessary, Israeli authorities deviate from this principle and permit Arab workers to work in Israeli firms and plantations. But the Israelis are always very anxious not to let the number of Arab workers exceed a certain limit. Recently the Israeli Minister of Agriculture, Harim Jefati, announced that he 'supported the position of Yusif Almogi, the Minister of Labour, in forbidding any increase in the number of labourers from the occupied territories who work in citrus orchards'. The minister went on to say that 'such work, before the Six-day War, was done without any need for manpower from the territories. Every effort should be made to recruit manpower from Israel so as to free this branch of labour from dependence on workers from the territories.' The minister then spelt out the reason behind his stand by saying that he wants 'Israel to be a Jewish state and the number of Arabs inside Israel to be decreased to the minimum.' (Israeli Broadcasting Service [Hebrew], October 19, 1972, 14.00 hrs.) The Israeli government decided that the number of Arab workers from the occupied territories should not exceed 50,000 by any means. (Israeli Broadcast, October 22, 1972.)

This official attitude was reflected on the popular level. Dan Merglet wrote in *Haaretz* (August 28, 1972): 'There are around 50,000 Arabs who work daily in Jewish firms in Jewish cities, but the Jewish worker is not ready to help the Arab worker, be friendly to him, or to consider him a partner in his feelings or even in his professional struggle.'

<sup>(30)</sup> Jiryis, *The Arabs...*, p. 151.



In his book *Israel and the Arab World* (published in Hebrew in 1964), Aharon Cohen wrote: 'The Arab worker who managed to find a job in the first ten years after the establishment of Israel, was restricted to unpleasant jobs that Jewish workers would not accept, like work in sewage or building. The wages paid to Arab workers never equalled those paid to Jews, even if the Arab was doing the same work. In practice many jobs were closed to Arab workers and employees. The Arab worker who found a temporary agricultural job in a remote Jewish colony could be dismissed on the ground that he was "not organised." And as Arab unemployment increased, efforts were made to make it even more acute by seeking out such Arabs as were working for Jews and dismissing them, with the help of the police. A further injustice was that Arab workers were obliged to take the hardest and most degrading jobs.' (p. 530)

The New York publication, *Jewish Currents* (April 1971), informed its readers: 'The monthly income of the Arab family is half the income of the Jewish family. The income of the non-Western Jewish family is 10 percent higher than that of the Arab family.'

#### 100. HAS THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT EVER CONFISCATED LAND OWNED BY JEWS?

The only case under which such confiscation might occur is when a Jew would rent his land to an Arab. *Maariv* (October 26, 1971) wrote: 'The Ministry of Agriculture together with the Settlement Section of the Jewish Agency will confiscate the land of one of the settlers in Moshav Nitsan O'z who had rented it to Arabs. This is the first time that land owned by Jews is confiscated. Confiscation is undertaken according to a decision passed by the Central Court in Jerusalem. The settler will get no compensation whatsoever.' *Maariv* went on to say that 'the Ministry of Agriculture has decided to fight this phenomenon.'

#### 101. DO THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY ISRAEL TO ITS ARAB CITIZENS EQUAL THOSE PROVIDED BY IT TO ITS JEWISH CITIZENS?

[1] In the twenty years of the state, thirty-two Arab villages were connected to the electricity network; upward of two-thirds of the Arab villages in the country—containing 45 percent of the Arab population—

have not yet received electricity (there is practically no Jewish settlement without electricity).<sup>(31)</sup>

[2] Only one per cent of the general development budget of Israel is allocated to the Arabs in Israel who constitute 15% of the population.<sup>(32)</sup>

[3] During the first six years of the state, the inhabitants in the military government zones were not permitted to elect local councils. . . in February 1967, about a third of the Arab population still lived in places without any municipal status whatever. In the Jewish sector, less than half of one percent was in this category.<sup>(33)</sup>

[4] [In matters of health] the achievements in improving the health of the Arab population do not keep up with those of the state as a whole, and as time passes, the gap becomes more obvious and more painful. Even in June 1966, almost half of the Arab villages did not have a doctor and were almost entirely without medical services.

[5] [Regarding housing and sanitation] there is a large gap between the conditions of Jewish housing and sanitation and those of the Arabs within the state. While nearly 100 per cent of Jewish families (according to the 1961 census) lived in houses with running water, electricity, kitchen, and sanitation, more than 40 percent of the Arab families (apart from the Bedouins) lived in houses without such amenities. 'Part of the buildings in the Arab villages are slum dwellings built of clay, or are structures without light, air, or sanitation. In Nazareth and in mixed cities like Haifa, Acre, Lydda, Ramle, and Jaffa, theirs are the poor living quarters in the older sections.' The housing programs for the Arab sector of the population have not even answered the needs of natural increase, which require an additional 2,000-2,500 units annually, not to speak of the need to eliminate some of the older, run-down living quarters described above, and without taking into consideration the problem of housing some 30,000 Bedouins.

The larger Arab villages, each with several thousand inhabitants, are increasingly composed of wage-laborers who are compelled to seek a livelihood further afield. They are, in fact, urban settlements, but in terms of housing, sanitation, roads, lighting, services, and public institutions, they remain in the category of backward villages.

As for the state of crowding in the homes, the census of 1961 indicates the following conditions:

<sup>(31)</sup> Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, p. 499.

<sup>(32)</sup> *Davar*, September 3, 1972.

<sup>(33)</sup> Cohen, *Israel and . . .*, p. 500.

	<i>Jews(%)</i>	<i>Arabs(%)</i>
Less than 2 souls per room	62	30
From 2 to 4 souls per room	31	38
4 and more souls per room	7	32

*In Rural Centers*

Less than 2 souls per room	51	13
2-4 souls per room	39	43
4 and more souls per room	10	44

The scope of building in the Arab sector, rather than diminishing the gap, is likely to increase it.<sup>(34)</sup>

## 102. DO THE ARABS IN ISRAEL EXERCISE FREELY THEIR RIGHT TO VOTE?

A clear example of interference in the affairs of the municipal councils [in the Arab villages] was an incident which eventually reached the Supreme Court at request of the injured parties. In its judgement No. 55/465 the Supreme Court decided:

That the statement submitted to us, and examination of witnesses in court, have convinced us that a number of the actions of Defendant No. 1 (Lieutenant-General Zalman Mart) and his subordinates proceeded from a desire to exert pressure on plaintiff No. 1 and his associates, to induce them to change their attitude to the election of a president of the local council of the village of Tira. In my opinion, expulsion orders were issued in a manner which gives serious ground for suspicion that the aim of these orders was to expel two members of the council from the village to diminish the influence of their list in the election of a president of the council.

## 103. IS IT TRUE THAT THE DRUSE ARE WELL-TREATED IN ISRAEL?

Sabri Jiryis<sup>(35)</sup> says: 'In spite of all that has been said of Druse-Israeli

<sup>(34)</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 503-504.

<sup>(35)</sup> Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs...*, p. 146.

cooperation, this cooperation has not protected the Druses from the expropriation of their lands in just the same way as the other Palestinian Arabs. 2,500 dunums of land were expropriated in Sajur, 3,000 dunums in Harfish and 5,000 dunums in Beit Jan—all Druse villages in Galilee...'

*Ramzoz*, the paper of the Youth Organization of the Labour Party in Israel raised the following points in regard to the Druse (April 1971):

1. There is no clinic in Yanoh, a village inhabited by 1,300 Druse of whom 150 are members of Histadrut.
2. An educational committee last year visited the two largest Druse villages. It observed that the classrooms in these two villages are not suitable even for dwelling. Abraham Katz, member of Knesset and head of the committee, announced that caves are still being used until today as classrooms. These places lack ventilation, light, and essential health requirements.

#### 104. DID ISRAEL OBSERVE HUMAN RIGHTS, PRINCIPLES AND CONVENTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AFTER THE 1967 WAR?

The United Nations has expressed, through several bodies, its condemnation of Israeli violations of the basic and essential human rights in the occupied territories. Several investigation committees have been established, all of which have submitted reports emphasizing this fact. Several resolutions have been passed by several organs of the U.N. Herein I would like to cite only some of these resolutions to serve as a sample of Israel's flagrant violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of the Geneva Conventions of December 12, 1949, and of the numerous U.N. resolutions.<sup>(36)</sup>

1. Resolution 2851 (XXVI) of the General Assembly Commending the Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices

<sup>(36)</sup> See: General Assembly Resolution 2443 (XXIII), December 19, 1968; Resolution 2452, A, B, and C (XXIII), December 19, 1968; Resolution 2546 (XXIV), December 11, 1969; Resolution 2649 (XXV), November 30, 1970; Resolution 2672, A, B, C, and D (XXV), December 8, 1970; Resolution 2727 (XXV), December 15, 1970; Resolution 2792, A, B, C, D, and E, (XXVI), December 6, 1971; Resolution 2851 (XXVI), December 20, 1971.

See: Security Council Resolution 259 (1968), September 27, 1968; Economic and Social Council Resolution 1336 (XLIV), May 31, 1968; Resolution 1592 (L), May 21, 1971; Resolution 6 (XXLV), February 27, 1968; Resolution 6 (XXV), March 4, 1969; Resolution 7 (XXV), March 4, 1969; Resolution 10 (XXVI), March 23, 1970; Resolution 9 (XXVII), March 15, 1971; Resolution 3 (XXVIII), March 22, 1972.

Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,<sup>(37)</sup> dated December 20, 1971, said *inter alia* :

*The General Assembly,*

.....  
1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and its members for their efforts in performing the task assigned to them;

2. *Strongly calls upon* Israel to rescind forthwith all measures and to desist from all policies and practices such as :

(a) The annexation of any part of the occupied Arab territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements on those territories and the transfer of parts of its civilian population into the occupied territory;

(c) The destruction and demolition of villages, quarters and houses and the confiscation and expropriation of property;

(d) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories;

(e) The denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;

(f) The ill-treatment and torture of prisoners and detainees;

(g) Collective punishment;

3. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to permit all persons who have fled the occupied territories or have been deported or expelled therefrom to return to their homes;

4. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to settle the occupied territories, including occupied Jerusalem, are completely null and void;

5. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;

2. Resolution 10 (XXVI) Condemning Israeli Violations of the Geneva Conventions,<sup>(38)</sup> dated March 23, 1970, said *inter alia* :

*The Commission on Human Rights,*

*Mindful* of the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of

<sup>(37)</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly*, 26th Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/8429).

<sup>(38)</sup> *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council*, 48th Session, Supplement No. 5 (E/4816), pp. 79-82.

Human Rights recognizing the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of peoples to justice, freedom and peace,

*Recalling* resolution I of the International Conference on Human Rights of May 1968 in which the Conference requested the Commission on Human Rights to keep the question of respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories under constant review,

*Recalling also* Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) and 259 (1968) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V), in which the Council and the Assembly called upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities, and General Assembly resolutions 2535 B (XXIV), which reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, and 2546 (XXIV), in which the Assembly expressed its grave concern at the continuing violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel and called upon Israel to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

*Recalling further* its resolution 6 (XXV) by which it decided to establish a special working group of experts to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of that Convention,

*Bearing in mind* that the said Convention is binding upon Israel,

*Recalling* its resolution 5 B (XXVI) in which it considered violations of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as war crimes and an affront to humanity in addition to being crimes,

*Gravely concerned* about the deteriorating conditions of human rights in the militarily occupied territories in the Middle East,

*Gravely disturbed* about recent reports of the planned mass deportation of the Palestinian refugees (numbered 300,000) from the occupied Gaza Strip by the Israeli occupying authorities,

*Having received and studied* the report of the Special Working Group established under resolution 6 (XXV) to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in the territories militarily occupied by Israel,

1. *Notes with dismay* the refusal of Israel to co-operate with the above-mentioned Working Group established by the Commission on Human Rights;

2. *Endorses* the conclusions of the Working Group concerning:

(a) The applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to all the occupied areas including occupied Jerusalem,

(b) The existence of violations of that Convention in the Israeli occupied territories;

3. *Condemns* Israel's refusal to apply that Convention and its violation of the provisions of that Convention, in particular the following violations:

(a) The total or partial destruction of villages and cities in the occupied territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements in the militarily occupied Arab territories;

(c) The unlawful deportation and expulsion of civilian population;

(d) The coercive acts to compel the civilian population under its military occupation to collaborate with the occupying Power against their will;

(e) The abrogation of the national laws in occupied territories contrary to the Convention and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;

(f) All policies and measures of collective punishment;

4. *Deplores* all policies and actions aiming at the deportation of the Palestinian refugees from the occupied Gaza Strip;

5. *Expresses its grave concern* over:

(a) The use of means of coercion to extract information and confession in violation of the relevant provisions of the Convention;

(b) The ill-treatment and killing of civilians without provocation;

(c) The detention of people by virtue of administrative orders for periods that are automatically renewed *ad infinitum*;

(d) The deprivation of those detainees of any guarantee concerning the length of detention and fair trial;

(e) The deprivation of the accused persons of having counsel of their choice, and the prevention of the counsel, in the cases where a counsel was chosen, from discharging their duties satisfactorily;

(f) The destruction and usurpation of movable and immovable property;

6. *Calls upon* Israel once more to observe strictly that Convention in the occupied territories;

7. *Further calls upon* Israel immediately:

- (a) To rescind all measures and to desist forthwith from taking any action prejudicial to the national laws, systems and practices in the occupied territories;
- (b) To refrain from establishing settlements in the occupied territories;
- (c) To cease immediately from compelling the inhabitants of the occupied territories to collaborate with the Israeli occupying authorities;
- (d) To ensure the immediate return of deported and transferred persons to their homes without any formalities the fulfilment of which would render their return impossible;
- (e) To refrain from demolishing houses in contravention of the relevant provisions of the Convention;
- (f) To restore the property confiscated or otherwise taken from its owners in contravention of the provisions of the Convention;

8. *Also calls upon* Israel to desist forthwith from deporting the Palestinian civilians from the Gaza Strip;

9. *Commends* the Special Working Group for its work and decides that the Working Group should continue to investigate and report the Israeli violations of that Convention which occur in the militarily occupied Arab territories since the outbreak of hostilities and to examine in particular:

- (a) The evidence concerning the cases of torture taking place in the Israeli prisons against prisoners in the occupied territories;
- (b) Other cases of violation of the Convention in the occupied territories which it has not yet investigated, including those that took place during the period investigated by the Group;
- (c) The establishment of settlements in the occupied territories in contravention of the provisions of the Convention; . . .

*Adopted at the 1082nd meeting.*

3. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a third resolution, Resolution 9 (XXVII),<sup>(39)</sup> on March 15, 1971, which stated *inter alia*:

*The Commission on Human Rights,*

.....  
*Having studied* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli

<sup>(39)</sup> *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council*, 50th Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4949), pp. 79-82.



## Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,<sup>(40)</sup>

*Gravely concerned* by the fact that Israel's violations of human rights in the occupied territories continue unabated, in total disregard of the appeals and resolutions adopted by the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968 and the XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross held in Istanbul in September 1969,

*Alarmed* by the fact that Israel continues the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories including occupied Jerusalem, while it refuses to permit the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes, a right the denial of which by Israel constitutes an affront to humanity and a grave violation of international law,

1. *Condemns* Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, including policies aimed at changing the status of these territories;
2. *Condemns* specifically the following policies and practices of Israel:
  - (a) Denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;
  - (b) Resort to collective punishment;
  - (c) The deportation and expulsion of the citizens of the occupied territories;
  - (d) Arbitrary arrest and detention of the citizens of the occupied territories;
  - (e) Ill-treatment and torture of prisoners;
  - (f) Destruction and demolition of villages, town quarters, houses and confiscation and expropriation of property;
  - (g) Evacuation and transfer of sections of the population of the occupied territories;
  - (h) Transfer of parts of its own civilian population into the occupied territories;
3. *Strongly deplotes* Israel's policies in the occupied territories aimed at placing the population in a general state of repression, fear and deprivation, and particularly deplotes:
  - (a) Requisition of hospitals and their transformation into police stations;

<sup>(40)</sup> A/8089.

(b) Abrogation of the national laws and interference with the judicial system;

(c) Refusal to allow the text books approved by the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for schools in the occupied territories, and the insistence on forcing upon school children an alien system of education;

4. *Calls upon* Israel once again to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949;

5. *Again calls upon* Israel to enable forthwith the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;

6. *Once again calls upon* Israel to heed and to implement the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations organs and the specialized agencies for the safeguarding of human rights in the occupied territories;

7. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to colonize the occupied territories including occupied Jerusalem are completely null and void;

8. *Declares* that Israel's continued and increasing violations of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and its deliberate and persistent refusal to abide by its legal obligations under the United Nations Charter, international law, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, indicate the necessity of collective action on the part of the international community to ensure respect for the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

9. *Urges* the International Committee of the Red Cross to co-operate with the United Nations organs, and particularly with the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories in the fulfilment of its task to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to inform the Commission on Human Rights at its twenty-eighth session of the steps it has taken in this regard;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give wide publicity to United Nations documents dealing with the violations of human rights in the occupied territories, and in particular to the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population in the Occupied Territories, and to use United Nations media of information in disseminating information on the conditions of the population of the occupied territories, the refugees and displaced persons;

11. *Decides* to include the question of the violation of human rights in the

territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East as a separate item of high priority on the agenda of the Commission's twenty-eighth session.

*Adopted at the 1120th meeting.*

4. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a fourth resolution, Resolution 3 (XXVII)<sup>(41)</sup> on March 27, 1972, which stated, *inter alia*:

*The Commission on Human Rights,*

*Gravely concerned* with all acts and policies that affect the status or the character of those occupied territories and the basic rights of the inhabitants thereof, such as:

- (a) The declared intention to annex certain parts of the occupied Arab territories,
- (b) The establishment of Israeli settlements on those territories and the transfer of parts of its civilian population into the occupied territories,
- (c) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the inhabitants of occupied territories,
- (d) The destruction and demolition of villages, quarters and houses and the confiscation and expropriation of property,
- (e) The denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes,
- (f) Collective punishment and ill-treatment of prisoners and detainees,
- (g) Administrative detention and holding prisoners incommunicado,

*Noting with regret* that the aforementioned acts have not been rescinded in spite of the numerous resolutions adopted on the subject,

*Deploring* the persistent defiance and disregard by Israel of all United Nations resolutions on the protection of human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories and on the preservation of the demographic composition and geographic character thereof,

*Taking note* of the fact that article 147 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 has considered unlawful deportation or transfer, unlawful confinement, deprivation of the rights of fair and regular trial, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property as grave breaches of the Convention,

<sup>(41)</sup> U.N. Document E/CN. 4/L. 1195.

*Noting* that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg as confirmed by General Assembly resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946, has considered as war crimes the 'grave breaches' later enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,

*Recalling* its resolution 5 B (XXVI) adopted at its twenty-sixth session which considered violations of the Geneva Conventions as war crimes and an affront to humanity,

1. *Strongly calls upon* Israel to rescind forthwith all measures and to desist from all policies and practices affecting the demographic structure or the physical character of the occupied Arab territories and the human rights of their inhabitants;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to permit all persons who have fled the occupied territories or who have been deported or expelled therefrom to return to their homes without conditions;

3. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to annex or settle the occupied territories are null and void;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel—once more—to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;

5. *Also calls upon* Israel once more to respect and implement the resolutions adopted by the Commission and other competent organs on the question of the protection of human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories;

6. *Requests* all States Members of the United Nations and all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects the principles of human rights and fulfils its obligations under that Convention;

7. *Considers* that grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention committed by Israel in the occupied Arab territories constitute war crimes and an affront to humanity;

8. *Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session (in 1973) as a matter of high priority the item entitled 'Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East.'

*Adopted at the 1161st plenary meeting.*

## CHAPTER VII

### PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE TO ZIONISM AND ISRAEL

#### 105. DOES ZIONISM PROFIT FROM ANTI-SEMITISM?

The reactionary nature of Zionism manifests itself in its reactions to anti-Semitism. Both movements agree that the persecution of the Jews is natural and inevitable. Zionism sees anti-Semitism as something innate and thus never to be eliminated. The anti-Semite similarly views prejudice against and persecution of the Jews as due to their racial characteristics. The Zionist answer to persecution of the Jews was in harmony with anti-Semitism, since both aimed at expelling the Jews from Europe.

But beyond this ideological conveyance between Zionism and anti-Semitism there is also a long tradition of implicit and explicit practical understanding between the two. This similarity extends beyond the ideological level, they collaborated in practice. Theodor Herzl conducted negotiations with Plehve, the notorious anti-Semitic Tsarist Minister of the Interior, who promised the Tsarist government's 'moral and material assistance' to the Zionist movement. Arlossorof, the Secretary of the Histadrut, conducted, in 1934, similar negotiations with the Nazis. Perhaps the most infamous were the negotiations that took place between the secretary of the Zionist committee in Budapest (Ralph Kastner) with Adolph Eichmann, who permitted 1,000 wealthy Jews to escape to Switzerland in return for coaxing 800,000 Hungarian Jews to board the trains to Auschwitz. This tradition has been continued by Israel in its support of neo-racist spokesmen (such as Jaques Soustelle in France, Franz Joseph Strauss in Germany, and Enoch Powell in Britain) and in the type of international relations it has with countries practising racialist policies, such as South Africa.

## 106. DID THE ZIONISTS ESTABLISH ANY RELATIONS WITH THE NAZIS?

After Hitler's taking power in Germany, when all anti-fascist forces in the world and the great majority of the Jewish organizations proclaimed a boycott against Nazi Germany, contacts and collaboration existed between Zionist leaders and the Hitlerite government. The deceased Meir Argev, when he was the chairman of the Knesset Commission for Foreign and Security Affairs, justified the Compensation Agreement with West Germany, claiming that Zionism had always acted like this, since 'Herzl went to see Plehve, the anti-Jewish pogromist who led the slaughter against Jews in Russia, in order to negotiate with him about a secure shelter' and since 'Haim Arlossorof, the head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency concluded the transfer agreement [with Nazi Germany]'. (From the Protocol of the Knesset, 30/6/59.)

When the Nazis crossed from an extreme racist anti-Semitic line to the physical extermination of the Jewish masses in Europe, the Zionist leaders, too, joined the war front against the Nazis. At the same time, the facts prove that during the Second World War, the Zionist leadership sought for a way to the Nazi leaders in order to realize Zionist aims even at the expense of the Jewish people.

The trial involving Rudolph Kastner, which was held in Jerusalem in 1952, revealed the collaboration between the Nazi hangman, Eichmann, and the leader of Hungary's Zionists, Rudolph Kastner, at the time of the Second World War. Kastner and his friends knew well enough that the Nazis were sending the Hungarian Jews to the gas chambers; but they preferred to keep this fact a secret from the Jews, in exchange for the promise of the hangman, the Nazi Eichmann, that some hundreds of Jews, mainly Zionist leaders and rich pro-Zionist people, would be allowed to emigrate to Palestine. The evidence given in court proved that Kastner and his men concerned themselves with 'calming' the Jewish masses. Thus they damped their vigilance and made easy the work of the Nazis who sent them to the extermination camps. If the Hungarian Jews had known what Kastner knew, it may be assumed that they would have mutinied or escaped and joined the resistance.

But not only in the case of the Hungarian Jews did the Zionist leadership take such a line of action. It concealed for a long time from public opinion the fact of the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis. At a symposium organized by the newspaper *Maariv* in 1966 under the

title 'The Chiefs of the Hagana, IZL and the FFI at the Round Table', Member of Knesset Haim Landau pointed out:

It is a fact that in 1942 the Jewish Agency knew about the extermination. Even though the tempo was not known, the fact of the extermination itself was known to the leadership of the Agency and to Jewish circles in the U.S.A. and the truth is that they not only kept silent about it, but also silenced those who knew. [*Maariv*, 24/4/66.]

At the same symposium, Eliezer Livne, the Zionist leader who was the editor of the organ of the Haganah at the time of the Second World War, said that for the Zionist leadership, the rescue of the Jews was not an aim in itself, but only a means. Otherwise the Zionist leaders would have taken another line of action. Livne said:

At that time (the years of the holocaust), the main national task should have been to save the Jews in the diaspora. To save them, not precisely in order to bring them to this country; not in order to blacken the face of the British, but in order to save Jews just for the saving. [*Maariv*, 10/4/66.]

Livne said further:

I wish to say what we ought to have done, if we had considered as the main objective the rescue of the maximum of Jews in their places. The centres of action were the partisan (guerrilla) bases. Partisans were in Poland, Lithuania, in the areas of Russia occupied by the Nazis, in Yugoslavia and a bit later in Slovakia, too. If we had considered the main thing the disruption of the extermination, and if we had made contact with those centres—we could have saved many. [*Maariv*, 24/4/66.]

#### 107. DID THE PALESTINIANS DISTINGUISH BETWEEN JEWS AND ZIONISTS BEFORE 1948?

They (the Palestinian Arabs) disputed the Zionist claim based on the 'historical connection' of the Jews with Palestine and refused to recognize that the Jews had any rights but those of individuals. It was their policy to make a sharp distinction between Jews of the old *Yishuv*, with whom they had lived on good terms—as they alleged—under the Turkish regime, and 'Zionist Jews' who were represented as making all the trouble by introducing the political concept of the Jewish national home. While they were ready to cooperate with Jews in business, and their general attitude was not unfriendly to Jews as individuals, they

absolutely refused to meet the Zionists as a group or to negotiate with them in political matters.<sup>(1)</sup>

108. HAS THE ARAB RESISTANCE TO ZIONISM BEEN A RACIST ONE?

The Palestine Royal Commission reported in 1937:

Nor is the conflict in its essence an interracial conflict, arising from any old instinctive antipathy of Arabs towards Jews. There was little or no friction, as we have seen, between Arab and Jew in the rest of the Arab world until the strife in Palestine engendered it. And there has been precisely the same political trouble in 'Iraq, Syria and Egypt'—agitation, rebellion, and bloodshed—where there are no 'National Homes.' Quite obviously, then, the problem of Palestine is political. It is, as elsewhere, the problem of insurgent nationalism. The only difference is that in Palestine Arab nationalism is inextricably interwoven with antagonism to the Jews. And the reasons for that, it is worth repeating, are equally obvious. In the first place, the establishment of the National Home involved at the outset a blank negation of the rights implied in the principle of national self-government. Secondly, it soon proved to be not merely an obstacle to the development of national self-government, but apparently the only serious obstacle. Thirdly, as the Home has grown, the fear has grown with it that, if and when self-government is conceded, it may not be national in the Arab sense, but government by a Jewish majority. That is why it is difficult to be an Arab patriot and not to hate the Jews.<sup>(2)</sup>

109. HOW DID THE ARABS TREAT THE JEWS THROUGHOUT HISTORY?

Writing in *Les Temps Modernes*, Nissim Rejwan (Israeli citizen, born in Iraq) said:

The contacts between Jews and Arabs, before as well as after the advent of Islam, on the whole were happy and beneficial to both. . .

Thus, wherever the empire of the Crescent was being established, the lot of the Jews was ameliorated. It was so especially in the case of Palestine and Egypt, where the Byzantine emperors had interfered in all aspects of Jewish life. . .

It was in the Middle Ages that the meeting between Jews and Muslim Arabs had the most interesting and fruitful results. . . When the Muslims

<sup>(1)</sup> ESCO *Palestine Study*, p. 472.

<sup>(2)</sup> Palestine Royal Commission *Report*, London, 1937, p. 131.



arrived in Spain, not only did they liberate the Jews from their oppressors but also—according to Dr. Isidore Epstein—they encouraged among them a culture which equals, in richness and depth, the most brilliant in all countries at any epoch.’

At that epoch, the greatest part of the Jews lived under Arab domination, and thus began the long and interesting epoch of Arab-Jewish symbiosis . . . In his book *Judaism and Islam*, Dr. Erwin Rosenthal, Cambridge historian and orientalist, affirms that ‘the Talmudic epoch excepting, there has doubtless been no other period more creative and more positive in our long history of ups and downs than the centuries when the Muslim empire extended from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.’ (London Popular Jewish Library, Thomas Yoseloff, 1961).

.....  
At that epoch, as Dubnov says, the Jewish people ‘abandoned their misanthropy and their isolationist tendency. The Jews embraced all sorts of careers . . .’ (*Jewish History: An Essay in the Philosophy of History*).<sup>(3)</sup>

#### 110. DOES ZIONISM PROFIT FROM ANTI-SEMITISM?

Zionists have nothing to lose from the creation of a feeling of insecurity among world Jewry. Dr. Nahum Goldman, President of the World Zionist Organization warned Jews that ‘a current decline of overt anti-Semitism might constitute a new danger to Jewish survival. . . . Jews nearly everywhere are equal citizens, both politically and economically . . . However, the disappearance of anti-Semitism in its classical meaning, while beneficial to the political and material situation of Jewish communities, has had a very negative effect on our internal life . . .’ (From a speech given at the opening of the World Jewish Congress in Geneva, July 23, 1958 and reported in *The New York Times*.)

Another warning came from Rabbi Mordechai Kershblum of New York, who told the Zionist General Council, ‘I always fear lest the anti-Semites have adopted a new method. Instead of torture and persecutions, they say, “Give them peace and they will disappear of their own accord.”’ (*Jerusalem Post*, January 14, 1966, p. 8.)

Perhaps the most important exploitation of anti-Semitism, as a device to achieve Zionist ends, was revealed in an article in *Davar*, the official organ of the Socialist Labour (Mapai) Party, the newspaper of Israel’s governing party. Editor Sharun wrote:

<sup>(3)</sup> ‘La grande époque de la coexistence judéo-arabe,’ *Dossier sur le conflit israëlo-arabe*, pp. 824-828.

I shall not be ashamed to confess that, if I had the power as I have the will, I would select a score of efficient young men—intelligent, decent, devoted to our ideal and burning with desire to help redeem Jews—and I would send them to the countries where Jews are absorbed in sinful self-satisfaction, plague these Jews with anti-Semitic slogans, such as ‘Bloody Jew,’ ‘Jew go to Palestine’ and similar intimacies. I can vouch that the results, in terms of considerable immigration to Israel from these countries, would be ten thousand times larger than the results brought by thousands of emissaries who have been preaching for decades to deaf ears. [Quoted in *Kemperer*, New York Yiddish paper, July 11, 1952.]

### 111. IS ARAB RESISTANCE OF ZIONISM ANTI-SEMITIC IN NATURE?

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee was asked by the Anglo-American Commission (1946) about the attitude of the Arabs towards anti-Semitism. He answered: ‘It is our enemy. Had it not been for anti-Semitism, Jews would not have come here. Jews were good neighbors to us before there was any Zionism.’<sup>(4)</sup>

On the other hand Nissim Rejwan, as well as many other Israelis and Jews, concedes that in Israeli schools and kindergartens the term ‘Arab’ is an insult and that Israeli society in general treats its Arab members with reserve, suspicion and often hostility.<sup>(5)</sup>

Sabri Jiryis, a very balanced Arab writer living in Israel, mentioned in his book *The Arabs in Israel* that Israel’s rulers are very anti-Arab:

Among them is David Ben Gurion himself, who is one of the men who devised the nervous system of the State of Israel, basing it on a concept that has long been dear to him and which is dear to many of today’s Israeli leaders—hatred of the Arabs and all things Arab. No other intelligent political leader has been so completely dominated by an idea as he has been by this.

On April 30, 1958 the newspaper, *Haaretz*, published a report which revealed Ben Gurion’s real attitude to the Arabs. ‘Ben Gurion,’ it said, ‘refused the identity card issued to him because it was written in Arabic as well as Hebrew.’ Commenting on this report in the periodical, *Haolan Hazeh*, on 7 April 1958, Uri Avneri wrote: ‘Ben Gurion has always been utterly reactionary in his opposition to anything Arab.

<sup>(4)</sup> Jamil Shukairi, *Collection of Testimonies and Memoranda Presented to the Anglo-American Commission*, p. 73.

<sup>(5)</sup> ‘La grande époque de la coexistence judéo-arabe,’ *Dossier sur le conflit israélo-arabe*, p. 824.

The Prime Minister of Israel has never visited an Arab town or village since the establishment of the State. (In July 1959 he visited the Druse village of Julis in a helicopter). When he visited the Jewish town of Upper Nazareth, he refused to visit Arab Nazareth, only a few hundred metres away from the Jewish town. . . .

When he visited the Negev, he insisted on the immediate removal of a signpost bearing the Arabic name, Ain Ghadban, saying that he found this Arabic name disagreeable. And when he was asked, in the colony of Bir Ora in the Negev, what the old Arabic name of the site of the colony was, he replied: 'I don't know and I don't want to know.'

His refusal of the identity card was just another illustration of David Ben Gurion's fanatical hatred of the Arabs. For we have never heard of him refusing a passport because it was written in French as well as Hebrew. But French is certainly a foreign language whereas Arabic is an official language in Israel, however much Ben Gurion may despise it.<sup>(6)</sup>

## 112. DO THE ARABS PROPAGATE THE ELIMINATION OF THE JEWISH RACE?

1. The way the Arabs treated the Jews throughout history, even after the creation of Israel and despite all the grievances that the Arabs have against them, is a vivid proof of the tolerance of the Arabs.

2. The Palestinian resistance movement groups have declared that they are not against the Jews and that they welcome the establishment of a unitary democratic Palestine where Jews, Christians and Moslems would be equal in rights and obligations.

3. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, said in an interview with *al Anwar* (Arabic, Beirut, June 23, 1968): 'Moslems and Christians are living side by side in the Arab countries. I believe the Jews have the same choice. In the past they have lived peacefully in Arab Palestine without being subject to any racial or religious discrimination. This situation remained till the emergence of Zionism. We intend to build our country with no racial or religious discrimination.'

In another interview with *Paris Match* (January 11, 1969), Arafat said: 'The Jews are one thing and Zionism, embodied in the state of Israel is another. Resistance to Zionism is beginning to be manifested

<sup>(6)</sup> Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, pp. 175-176.

among them. Two of our officers, now in captivity, were Palestinians who had Jewish mothers. Each week the Israeli police arrest anti-Zionist Jews. Last week there were four arrests in Nazareth.'

In a third interview with *The Arab World* (New York, May, 1969), Yasser Arafat said:

The goals of Al Fatah and Arab nationalism are humanitarian in principles and method, unlike Zionism which uses Nazi-like tactics in achieving its ends. Our revolution is aimed at the liberation of man from all kinds of discrimination. We reject the techniques of brutality and murder used by the Zionists. Arabs have never discriminated against the Jews; historically, many Jews found a haven in the Arab homeland when they were being persecuted by Europeans. We also sympathized with the suffering of the Jews under the Nazis, but this sympathy does not mean that we ought to pay the price for Hitler's crimes. Why do we, as Palestinians, have to suffer terror, hunger, deportation for what someone else has done? Our aim is to bring an end to the concept of a Jewish Zionist state, a racist expansionist state. Our aim is to destroy this state, this concept—not its people. We want a democratic Palestinian state. We will not force anyone out who is willing to live under the banner of this state as a loyal Palestinian. It does not matter whether he is Christian, Moslem, or Jew.

4. E.H. Hutchison, who was the second chief of staff of UNTSO, wrote in his book *Violent Truce*:

An unescapable impression of the traveller in Israel is that the military takes precedence over everything. The youth groups; the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen, the vast military reserve standing fully equipped, highly trained, and cleverly concealed in the settlement systems bracing Israel's borders; the frontier patrolman; the police; all indicate that the nation places its greatest emphasis on the machinery and weapons of war. And as the 'activists' become more solidly enthroned, the danger of this machinery being put into action increases.<sup>(7)</sup>

Hans Kohn wrote:

Many of the young Israeli generation in Palestine not only look down on the native Arab; they have turned also, with pride in their own valor and in bitter disgust, from the two thousand years of the diaspora, from the life of their fathers and grandfathers, which they reject. They have cut themselves off from the 'ghetto' and they try to restore a link with a far-

<sup>(7)</sup> E. H. Hutchison, *Violent Truce* (New York: The Devin-ADAIR Company, 1958), pp. 141-142.

off primitive past. Over thousands of years they stretch out their hands to reach the zealots who died defending Bethar, Massada and Jerusalem; the Maccabees who threw off the foreign yoke; the proud kings who conquered neighboring lands and against whom the prophets rose, and the desert tribes who subjugated and exterminated the natural population of Canaan. Out of opposition to the spiritual foundation of prophetic Judaism and Jewish life in the diaspora, the youth wishes to be the more 'valiant,' the more thorough-minded. From one extreme they have gone to the other.<sup>(8)</sup>

### 113. HOW DID THE ARABS LOOK UPON THE JEWS AT THE HEIGHT OF THE STRUGGLE IN PALESTINE BETWEEN 1918 AND 1948?

1. The Syrian Congress, composed of delegates elected by the Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians, declared unanimously on July 2, 1919: We reject the claims of the Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that part of southern Syria which is known as Palestine, and we are opposed to Jewish immigration into any part of the country. We do not acknowledge that they have a title, and we regard their claims as a grave menace to our national, political and economic life. Our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities which are ours in common.<sup>(9)</sup>

2. Lord Peel, head of the Royal Commission for Palestine, asked the head of the Arab High Committee what the Arabs intended to do with the 400 thousand Jews living there. The latter answered: 'This is not the first time the Jews have been under the protection of an Arab state since the Arab states were in the past the most tolerant to them of all other states. . . .'<sup>(10)</sup>

3. The Arab League Secretary-General, testifying in front of the Anglo-American Investigation Committee (1946), said:

Our brother has gone to Europe and to the West and come back something else. He has come back a Russified Jew, a Polish Jew, a German Jew, an English Jew. He has come back with a totally different conception of things, Western and not Eastern. That does not mean that we are necessarily quarrelling with anyone who comes from the West. But the Jew, our old cousin, coming back with imperialistic ideas, with materialistic ideas, with reactionary or revolutionary ideas and trying to imple-

<sup>(8)</sup> Hans Kohn, 'Zion and the Jewish Idea', *Menorah*, Autumn-Winter 1958.

<sup>(9)</sup> Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 441.

<sup>(10)</sup> *The Basic Testimonies in Front of the Royal Inquiry Commission*, 1937, p. 44.

ment them first by British pressure and then by American pressure, and then by terrorism on his own part—he is not the old cousin, and we do not extend to him a very good welcome.<sup>(11)</sup>

#### 114. IS THERE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE JEWS LIVING IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES?

We will restrict our answer to the present situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries.

In *Iraq*, the government invited foreign correspondents to visit the country. They met Rabbi Khaddouri, who stated that Jews worshipped freely and went about their daily life without interference. The reporters then visited the Jewish community and went to see synagogues and schools. They saw no evidence of the Zionist allegations of discrimination or persecution against the Jews.<sup>(12)</sup>

In *Syria*, the government has invited foreign correspondents to visit the country and investigate the conditions of Syrian Jews.

The Jewish community in *Lebanon* are treated as Lebanese citizens and accorded full citizenship rights. They have a better and much higher status than the Palestinians who have been in Lebanon since 1948. The Palestinian cannot work in a public office, cannot join the army, and does not have the right to vote. He cannot work in a private firm unless he gets a special work permit. It is a fact that it is near to impossible to obtain such a permit. The Palestinian cannot start an independent business. On the other hand, the Lebanese Jew is entitled to all of these rights.

In *Egypt*, journalist Peter Hopkirk met Chief Rabbi Haim Durake and other prominent Jews and came to the conclusion that the Jews, like other minorities, enjoy full citizenship with equal rights and duties. The Rabbi told him further, that except for passing incidents, which can take place anywhere, even in England, Jews have not been exposed to any manifestations of antagonism directed against them. The government does everything in its power to prevent such incidents, and those who are found guilty of such acts are punished. The Rabbi affirmed that he had not heard of any anti-Jewish incidents

<sup>(11)</sup> Quoted by Roland Puccetti, 'The Last Ghetto, A Liberal's View of Zionism and Israel,' *Palestine Collected Papers* (1963), p. 89.

<sup>(12)</sup> *The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* (February 14, 1969), p. 7.

since the beginning of the crisis, adding that the majority of Egyptian Jews have Moslem friends and neighbours.

Peter Hopkirk went on to say that though Jewish children went to government schools, they were free to worship. The 2,600 Jews living in Egypt can worship in any of the 26 synagogues there. On the other hand how are those who preferred to emigrate to Israel in 1948 living now? (London *Times*, June 4, 1967.)

*The New York Times* (June 30, 1969) quoted Mr. Lazare Conquy, a previous headmaster of a Jewish school, as saying that *Morocco* was unique in its stand vis-a-vis the Jewish minority; for discrimination by the authorities against Jews is non-existent. While this is the case, Shaul Ben Sim Shion, a Moroccan-born Jew, told a *Maariv* reporter in March 1971 that: 'I was born in Fez, in Morocco. Today there remain in that city less than 4,000 Jews. But, in spite of this, that city graduates more Jewish university students in a year than the number of university students of North African background who graduate in all of Israel.'

#### 115. IS ISRAEL'S CALL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS EXPRESSIVE OF A TRUE WISH TO ESTABLISH PEACE?

1. While Israel declares its desire for, and insistence upon negotiations, it simultaneously takes a series of measures which indicate it has no intentions of ever withdrawing from all the territories it occupies:

- a) it annexed Jerusalem, in defiance of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council decisions that it desist from taking such a step;
- b) it is building a series of fortified colonies in the newly occupied territories;
- c) it refused to allow the Palestinians who fled from their homes in the wake of the June 1967 war to return;
- d) instead, it is calling for more immigrants to fill its newly acquired territories.

2. Israel refuses to state publicly the limits of its territorial ambitions. It has introduced a new expression into the lexicon of the crisis—'secure borders'. Levi Eshkol seems to think that the Suez Canal is the best natural frontier between Israel and Egypt, and Moshe Dayan believes the Jordan river is the best dividing line between it and the Hashemite kingdom, while various Israeli leaders insist that the Golan Heights

should be retained. On what basis are the Arab states to negotiate with Israel?

3. There can be no doubt that the sort of peace Israel hopes to impose on the Arab states is not practicable and therefore cannot be lasting. It would be closer to the truth to say that Israel's present insistence upon direct and bilateral negotiations is expressive of her fears of the re-emergence of the Palestinian people on the scene as the main party concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The present Palestinian resistance movement, led by Fateh, constitutes an ever-growing danger to the Israeli presence on the Palestinian soil. Israel waged the June 1967 war, among other things, as a first step towards destroying this movement. Now she simply desires to finish off the job through negotiations, without having to contend with the Palestinians.

#### 116. CAN ISRAEL AVAIL HERSELF OF THE CONCEPT OF ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?

According to international law, the conditions for acquisitive prescription are:

1. Possession must not be clandestine and not carried out on behalf of others.
2. Possession must not be accompanied by force.
3. Possession must be uninterrupted and uncontested.

The mere fact that the Palestinian people, ever since the beginning of the Zionist conquest, have not submitted to force, and have urged a continuous armed and political struggle against Zionism and Israel, and the fact that they have persisted in their right of return to their usurped homeland, interrupt prescription.

Likewise, the United Nations resolutions recognising and reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to return to its homeland, are acts which interrupt prescription.

#### 117. WHY DO THE ARABS REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL?

1. The land on which Israel stands is an occupied territory. The present occupiers did not possess or buy this land. Israel is an imperialist phenomenon created on the soil of Palestine to the prejudice of the



Palestinian people who remain the sole possessors of the right of sovereignty over Palestine. The Arab refusal to recognize Israel is a negative response to the refusal of Israel to recognize the people of Palestine.

2. The United Nations General Assembly, by passing the Partition Resolution, has denied the basic right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (i.e., it has violated the U.N. Charter), and exceeded the limits of its competence.

3. The establishment of Israel on the basis of the right of conquest is totally rejected by Article 4, para. 4 of the U.N. Charter which prohibits recourse to the use of force in international relations.

For these reasons the Arab states have refused to recognize Israel in spite of its admission to the United Nations.

#### 118. IS NOT A COMPROMISE SOLUTION BEST TO END THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

A compromise solution may be possible when the problem to be solved is a passing conflict over relative rights, or partial interests, or side issues, i.e., when the conflict arises within a larger framework of agreement on what remains of rights and interests.

.....  
A compromise solution is not permissible when the dialogue runs between right and wrong. If two people argue and one says, '2+2=4,' while the other says, '2+2=6' and a mediator reconciles them on the basis of a compromise solution saying, '2+2=5' such a solution will not be midway between right and wrong... In other words that solution is not half right and half wrong; it is all wrong.

.....  
The call for a compromise solution in the case of the Palestine problem is not permissible ... for in essence the Palestine problem is the holding of a people onto its right and its national destiny, on the one hand, and the usurpation of this right by an intruder on the other hand. Thus a compromise solution between absolute right and absolute usurpation is a punishment for the owner of the usurped right and a reward to the intruder, no matter how varied the proposed compromises are, or how small or large the area occupied. What is required to both parties is to accept that this area remain occupied.<sup>(13)</sup>

<sup>(13)</sup> Fayez Sayegh, *A Fistful of Fog* (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1966), pp. 14-16.

119. IS NOT THE ARAB REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL A NEGATIVE STANDPOINT?

The truth is that every rejection involves also an acceptance, and every acceptance a rejection. In every choice between two opposites, the rejection of one is by necessity an acceptance of the other . . .

The person who rejects wrong out of insistence on the right, or who opposes injustice out of love for justice is not essentially negative though he may seem so outwardly.

In the light of these principles, we say 'no' to Israel because we say 'yes' to Palestine.

Because we are positive, truly positive, we say 'no' to the Israeli existence, its perpetuation, and all that Israel symbolizes and all it embodies.<sup>(14)</sup>

120. IS THERE AN ARAB DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL?

In default of *de jure* recognition, Israel, in an attempt to find a legal basis for her existence, might hope to avail herself of eventual *de facto* recognition by the Arab states as such a legal basis. But this has not come about, as a result of the continuation of the state of war which, in this case, is of a specific nature, inasmuch as it constitutes a fundamental refusal on the part of the Arab states to recognize any right on the part of Israel to create a State.

It is generally conceded that an armistice does not put an end to the state of war; it does no more than suspend war operations by an agreement between the belligerent parties; the local or general nature of the armistice, and its duration, do not modify its effects.<sup>(15)</sup> Only a peace treaty or failing that, an express statement, puts an end to a state of war existing between the belligerents after the cessation of hostilities . . .

Moreover, all the Armistice Agreements clearly indicate that 'they do not in any way constitute peace treaties' and that they shall not prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.<sup>(16)</sup>

<sup>(14)</sup> Fayeze Sayegh, *A Fistful of Fog*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>(15)</sup> Article 36 of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907; P. Guggenheim, *Traité de droit international public*, Vol. II, note 1.

<sup>(16)</sup> Article XI of the Armistice signed between Egypt and Israel on Feb. 24, 1949. The above is noted from The Seminar of Arab Jurists on Palestine (Algiers, 1967), pp. 100-101.

121. DOES ADMISSION TO THE U.N. NECESSARILY AND AUTOMATICALLY ENTAIL RECOGNITION BY THE OLD MEMBERS (THE ARAB STATES) OF THE NEW MEMBER (ISRAEL)?

As to whether the recognition of a state is affected by its admission to the United Nations, Brownlie<sup>(17)</sup> observes that it is wrong to hold that such admission involves *ipso jure* recognition of the new member by all the old members of the Organization regardless of how they voted on the question of admission. He points out that there is nothing in the Charter, or in the rules of international law outside the Charter which obliges a State withholding recognition, to grant political recognition to the new members and to establish with it bilateral relations, which remain entirely discretionary.<sup>(18)</sup>

.....  
The obligation to withhold recognition from new States falls upon the members of the international community when the creation of these new States is accompanied by manifest irregularities or by acts of violence...<sup>(19)</sup>

122. DOES THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL INCLUDE ALL GOODS PRODUCED BY JEWS WHEREVER THEY MAY BE?

There are in the provisions of the Arab boycott of Israel no articles which point to the exclusion of any product simply because the manufacturer is Jewish. The condition which brings about the boycott is the fact that the manufacturer is either an Israeli or a Zionist. The boycott is lifted when the manufacturer adheres to the boycott provisions. The reason for this practice is the prevention of economic and political support the goods or the manufacturer supply to Israel.<sup>(20)</sup>

123. WHAT IS THE JURIDICAL STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE UNDER THE CRITERIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?

A. *Organized Resistance*

A lawful resistance movement must be comprised of individuals who

<sup>(17)</sup> *Principles of Public International Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 85-90.

<sup>(18)</sup> Cf. *Memorandum of the U.N. Secretariat General*, Document S/1466, and Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations*, p. 4946.

<sup>(19)</sup> All above quoted from *The Seminar of Arab Jurists on Palestine* (Algiers, 1967), pp. 98-99.

<sup>(20)</sup> For a full text of boycott provisions see, Joseph Maghaizel, *Arab Boycott and International Law* (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1968).

are privileged combatants under the international law of war. According to that law, a privileged combatant is one who is entitled to the benefits and protection of prisoner of war (P.O.W.) status if he is captured. Attention should, therefore, be directed to that part of international law which identifies these individuals. The applicable international agreement is the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1949<sup>(21)</sup>, and all of the states which have participated in the recurring Arab-Israeli hostilities are parties to it. The P.O.W. Convention provides that it 'shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict' which may arise, 'even if the state of war is not recognized by one' of the parties to the Convention. It is clear beyond any doubt that the Convention applies to armed forces involved in the Arab-Israeli hostilities whether these hostilities are regarded as 'war' or 'armed conflict'. It is an established principle of international law that a ceasefire or an armistice does not terminate a war or conflict.<sup>(22)</sup>

Article 4A(2) of the P.O.W. Convention, after specifying that members of regular armed forces are privileged combatants and are therefore entitled to P.O.W. status if captured, deals with the status of 'organized resistance movements'. It provides that the following persons are also privileged combatants who are entitled to P.O.W. status if captured:

'Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of *organized resistance movements*, belonging to a Party to the conflict and *operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied*, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:

- (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
- (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
- (c) that of carrying arms openly;
- (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.'

The requirement of 'belonging to a Party to the conflict' does not mean the subordination of the resistance movement to a state which is a party to the conflict or the dependence of such a movement upon such a state. The authoritative official commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross on this provision of the P.O.W. Convention emphasizes

<sup>(21)</sup> 75 U.N. Treaty Series 135, 6 U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 33/6, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3364.

<sup>(22)</sup> 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, *International Law: Disputes, War and Neutrality*, 546-47 (7th ed. 1952).

that an informal or *de facto* relationship between the resistance movement and the state party to the conflict is sufficient. The commentary provides: 'It [the requirement] may find expression merely by tacit agreement if the operations are such as to indicate clearly for which side the resistance organization is fighting.'<sup>(23)</sup>

The relationship between the Allied Armies in Europe and the French Forces of the Interior provides an example of such an informal relationship. A similar relationship existed between Marshall Tito's partisan forces and the Allied Armies. This provision of the P.O.W. Convention was designed merely to codify the requirement of an informal relationship which developed in customary international law during World War II. It is apparent that a similar relationship has existed for some time between the organized Palestinian guerrilla forces and a number of the Arab government armies.

The negotiating history of this article of the Convention makes it clear that there was no intention to impose a higher standard upon guerrilla forces than that applied to regular armed forces. The requirements set forth as (a) through (d) above are designed to apply to guerrilla fighters the same basic criteria which are applicable to regular armed forces. The organized character of units of the Palestinian guerrilla forces, including the fact that they are 'commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,' is well known. Even the Government of Israel has recognized their status and Ambassador Tekoah of Israel has referred to 'the organized military character' of the Palestinian guerrillas in statements made to the United Nations Security Council. The contemporary uniforms of regular armed forces are designed to provide effective camouflage, and guerrillas may, consequently, wear a similar uniform with 'a fixed distinctive sign' which may, for example, consist of a particular type of cap or headgear. In the same way, guerrilla forces may carry weapons such as automatic pistols and hand grenades attached to belts under coats and comply with the requirement of 'carrying arms openly.' With respect to the requirement concerning complying with 'the laws and customs of war', it should be recognized that guerrillas have the same obligations as regular armed forces.

The most innovative or 'law-making' feature of article 4 is that the 'organized resistance movements' are given a legal right to conduct their guerrilla activities even if their own territory is occupied by the enemy. Such forces are entitled as a matter of law to conduct operations 'in or outside their own territory', without regard to the question of whether or not the military occupant is adhering to the international law of war

<sup>(23)</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross, 3 Commentary on the P.O.W. Convention 57 (1960).

including the Geneva Civilians Convention of 1949.<sup>(24)</sup> This absolute right to military resistance stands in striking contrast with earlier international law which undertook to prohibit resistance movements by postulating a 'duty of allegiance' owed by the inhabitants of occupied territory to military occupants. The experience of the Second World War, which was carefully taken into account in writing both the Prisoner of War Convention and the Civilians Convention, indicated clearly that it was impossible to separate resistance forces from the civilian population. Article 68 of the Civilians Convention also emphasizes this change in the pre-existing law by laying it down flatly that a civilian protected person in the occupied territory 'is not a national of the occupying power' and 'is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance'. Since civilians who are not participating in the resistance have no duty of allegiance to the military occupant, it is clear, *a fortiori*, that organized guerrilla forces who comprise the military resistance have no such duty to the occupying power, without regard to whether or not the occupant adheres to its obligations under the Civilians Convention.

It should be emphasized in summary that the P.O.W. Convention gives to organized resistance forces exactly the same status as privileged combatants under international law which it accords to regular armed forces.

#### *B. Unorganized Resistance*

Article 4A (2) of the P.O.W. Convention does not specifically deal with the juridical status of unorganized resistance forces. The Report of Committee II at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 made it clear, however, that participating nations at the Conference did not, in specifically according P.O.W. status to captured members of organized resistance movements, attempt to restrict or deny basic international law protections to guerrilla-type resistance undertaken by inhabitants of occupied territories against an occupant's violations of international law limitations on his authority. The Report states that the Danish Delegation 'asked that the Summary Record should mention that no objection had been raised, during the discussion in the Special Committee, against his view that Article (4) [of the P.O.W. Convention] could not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive persons not covered by the provisions of Article (4), of their human rights or of their right of self-defence against illegal acts. . . . .'

The outcome of this authoritative interpretation of the work of the 1949 Conference which adopted the P.O.W. Convention is that unorganized resistance may be lawfully conducted by the civilian population

<sup>(24)</sup> 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287, 6 U.S. Treaties and other Int'l Agreements 3516, Treaties and other Int'l Acts Series No. 3365.

providing that the military occupant commits 'illegal acts' in violation of the Geneva Civilians Convention of 1949 and other applicable provisions of law. The unorganized resistance fighters must be accorded status as privileged combatants, even if they do not meet all of the requirements which are specified for organized resistance forces in article 4 of the P.O.W. Convention. If such unorganized resistance fighters or guerrilla forces are not accorded the benefits of P.O.W. status under the P.O.W. Convention, the Civilians Convention requires that they must be classified as 'protected persons' who are entitled to a large number of procedural and substantive protections including all of the elements of a fair trial.

Thus the legality of the acts of unorganized resistance fighters is dependent on the occupying power's failure to act in accordance with international law. The principal law on this subject is contained in the Geneva Civilians Convention. This Convention, it must be recalled, was written in the shadow of the Second World War when the overwhelming majority of states in the world community were determined to prevent a repetition of the terrible acts carried out under the Nazi occupations in Europe and the Japanese occupations in Asia. The State of Israel and all of the Arab States which have been involved in the recurring hostilities with Israel are parties to the Geneva Civilians Convention and there is no question but that it is applicable, at least in territories occupied since 1967. Even the United States Government has taken the position that the Civilians Convention applies to and limits the actions of the Government of Israel. Ambassador Yost stated this in the U.N. Security Council on July 1, 1969 and added that the U.S. Government has 'so informed the Government of Israel on numerous occasions since July, 1967.'<sup>(25)</sup> Since international law is not self-enforcing, it is regrettable that the U.S. Government did not follow its words with actions designed to implement them.

For an appraisal of the Government of Israel's role in the more recently occupied territories since the 1967 hostilities, several reports of United Nations investigations (made without the cooperation of the Government of Israel) and the resolutions of various organs of the United Nations are available.<sup>(26)</sup> A recent example is the United Nations Human Rights Commission resolution of March 23, 1972. It states, in part, that the Human Rights Commission is:

'Gravely concerned with all acts and policies that affect the status or the character of those occupied territories and the basic rights of the inhabitants thereof, such as:

<sup>(25)</sup> 61 U.S. Dept. State Bulletin. 76, 77 (July 28, 1969).

<sup>(26)</sup> U.N. Human Rights Commission, 28th Session, 116 1st Meeting; U.N. Press Release HR/812.

(a) The declared intention to annex certain parts of the occupied Arab territories,

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements on those territories and the transfer of parts of its civilian population into the occupied territories,

(c) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the inhabitants of occupied territories,

(d) The destruction and demolition of villages, quarters and houses and the confiscation and expropriation of property,

(e) The denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes,

(f) Collective punishment and ill-treatment of prisoners and detainees,

(g) Administrative detention and holding prisoners incommunicado.'

Each of the above quoted portions of the Commission's Resolution deals with an express violation of one or more provisions of the Geneva Civilians Convention of 1949. It follows that, in view of the illegal character of the Israeli military occupation, there is ample authority in international law for the Palestinians to conduct unorganized military resistance. This legal authority is further strengthened by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution of December 6, 1971, considered in a later question which recognizes the legality of the fight for basic rights of the people of Palestine and of specified African peoples.<sup>(27)</sup>

## 124. WHAT IS THE JURIDICAL STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL-LEGAL RESISTANCE?

In appraising both military and political-legal resistance, it must be recognized that there are many close relationships between the two and that it would be inaccurate to attempt to draw a rigid distinction between them. It is generally recognized that military resistance has significant political-legal impacts. It is not as widely recognized, but it is equally true, that political-legal resistance has significant military impacts. It is difficult to see how military resistance can be a significant factor

<sup>(27)</sup> W.T. Mallison, Jr. & S.V. Mallison. *An International Law Appraisal of the Juridical Characteristics of the Resistance of the People of Palestine: The Struggle for Human Rights*. Second Printing published by the Palestine Research Center with the permission of NEEBII: Beirut, 1973, pp. 13-20.



unless it is connected with a viable entity and an accompanying political institution. If status in law can be obtained for the entity and the institution, the entire resistance is strengthened.

*A. The Subjects of International Law: Public Bodies*

It is well known that the subjects of international law are no longer limited to national states. Among the subjects of international law, international public bodies or organizations are of particular importance. One definition of a public body is that it is a non-territorial government. Although particular public bodies may be, in effect, governments-in-exile, this is not a necessary characteristic of public bodies as a group. In general, the group comprises entities established for public purposes which, like states, are subjects of international law. A memorandum of the Secretary-General of the United Nations has described the current situation as follows: 'Practice has abandoned the doctrine that States are the exclusive subjects of international rights and duties.'<sup>(28)</sup>

Public bodies are usually constituted or created as subjects of international law through the explicit multilateral agreement of states, that is, through conventional law. Such bodies may, on occasion, be constituted by necessary implication drawn from an appraisal of their substantive powers. The United Nations, in spite of its preeminent position as the principal general function public body, is not explicitly constituted as a public body by its Charter. The International Court of Justice in the *United Nations Reparation Case*,<sup>(29)</sup> however, determined that the United Nations has juridical status as a subject of international law by necessary implication from the substantive powers which are granted to it by the Charter. It would have been unsound to allow the substantive grants of power to be frustrated through the failure to find the necessary ancillary juridical status. The Court found the United Nations to be a 'subject of international law and [a public body] capable of possessing international rights and duties. . . . .'. The present significance of the case is that it illustrates the empirical analysis which must be made in an inquiry concerning status as a public body-subject of international law. Professor Hersh Lauterpacht has provided these succinct criteria: 'In each particular case the question whether a person or a body is a subject of international law must be answered in a pragmatic manner by reference to actual experience and to the reason of the law as distinguished from a preconceived notion as to who can be subjects of international law.'<sup>(30)</sup>

<sup>(28)</sup> Memo of Sec. Gen. U.N. Survey of Int'l Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of Int'l Law Comm., A/Cn. 4/1/ Rcu 1, p. 19 (Feb 16. 1949).

<sup>(29)</sup> [1949] I. C.J. 174.

<sup>(30)</sup> Int'l. Law of Human Rights/2 (1950).

These empirical tests must be employed in determining the public body status of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

*B. The Palestine Liberation Organization as a Public Body in International Law*

Palestinian leaders have recognized that even the most elementary and well established human and political rights are not self-fulfilling and that there is a practical need for a public institution to achieve such rights. The Palestine Liberation Organization was established in 1964 with the assistance of other Arab groups and through the multilateral authority of the League of Arab States as a public body to represent and act for the people of Palestine.<sup>(31)</sup> The League of Arab States has recognized its public and representative capacities from its establishment to the present. The overwhelming majority of the Arab States recognize it in the same capacities. It maintains offices in a number of Arab States and these offices and the Palestinian officials who serve in them are accorded diplomatic status and privileges.

Some states outside of the Arab world also recognize the public body status and the representative capacity of the P.L.O. It is particularly important that one of the great powers which is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the People's Republic of China, is one of these states and that it has extended recognition since 1965.

The United Nations has accorded unofficial observer status to the P.L.O. and its delegation in New York City works with the delegations of states in seeking Palestinian objectives. The preeminent objectives are to achieve first the recognition and then the implementation of the rights of the Palestinians and of other oppressed peoples. By working with states and with other peoples for common goals, the P.L.O. has demonstrated the universal characteristics of its own goals. Through the P.L.O., the Palestinian people have an institution of their own to speak and act for them in national and international affairs. Its character as a public body provides the indispensable juridical status to achieve their political and legal objectives.

*C. The Recognition of the People of Palestine by the United Nations*

Until 1969, the United Nations referred to the Palestinians as 'refugees' and dealt with them in that capacity. There is no doubt, as a factual matter, that many Palestinians have been refugees since the establishment of the State of Israel as a Zionist State. The Palestinians, nevertheless, have insisted upon the maintenance of their status as a people. On December 10, 1969, in a resolution adopted by more than the two-thirds majority required by the Charter for important questions, the General Assembly of the United Nations stated that:

<sup>(31)</sup> The Palestinian National Covenant.

*'Recognizing* that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [the General Assembly of the United Nations is]

*'Gravely concerned* that the denial of their rights has been aggravated by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of homes and property, deportation and other repressive acts against the refugees and other inhabitants of the occupied territories, [and it]

.....  
*'Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine.'<sup>(32)</sup>

Thus the General Assembly of the United Nations, the same organ which adopted the ill-fated Palestine Partition Resolution of 1947, has recognized that the Palestinians are a people under international law and that they are entitled to the same inalienable rights as other peoples.

Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter require all member states to promote and to take action to achieve 'universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.'

The individuals comprising the people of Palestine are Palestinians of Moslem, Christian, or Jewish religious identification consistent with the quoted non-discriminatory requirements of the United Nations Charter as well as with the Palestinian objectives of democracy and secularism. The people of Palestine, as recognized by the U.N. General Assembly, comprise a distinct nationality entity which, for the time being, exists without a national state.

This recognition of the Palestinian people as a national entity provides a firm juridical foundation upon which the Palestinian people under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization can effectuate the same rights which have been achieved by other peoples under the United Nations Charter. This recognition of the Palestinians as a people is equally as important as the establishment of the P.L.O. as a public body.

It is well known that the Government of Israel does not recognize the status of the Palestinians as a national entity. The consistent Zionist-Israel position is reflected in the official statement of Mr. Galili, the minister of information of the Government of Israel, in 1969: 'We do not consider the Arabs of the land an ethnic group nor a people with a distinct nationalistic character.'<sup>(33)</sup> International law, as manifested

<sup>(32)</sup> U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 2535 B.

<sup>(33)</sup> Quoted by Prof. Jacob Talmon of the Hebrew Univ. in an Open Letter to Y. Galili, 15 Arab World, no. 9, p. 3 (1969).

by the December 10, 1969 Resolution of the General Assembly, has rejected this position.<sup>(34)</sup>

125. ARE THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE RECOGNIZED UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER?

The factual characteristics of the people of Palestine as a national entity entitle them to inclusion among the peoples who are accorded rights as such under the U.N. Charter. It is, nevertheless, an essential step to the practical implementation of these rights to have them specifically and officially recognized by the United Nations rather than relying upon their recognition by implication from the provisions of the Charter.

On December 8, 1970, the General Assembly of the United Nations, by more than the two-thirds vote required for important questions, decided that the people of Palestine are entitled to self-determination:

*'Bearing in mind* the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations and more recently reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among Nations, [the United Nations General Assembly]

*'Recognizes* that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.'

It is thereby made clear that among the rights of the Palestinians is the preeminent right to self-determination. Specialists in legal theory will, of course, produce arguments and counter-arguments as to whether resolutions of the General Assembly enacted by the two-thirds majority required for important questions are international law in themselves or merely evidence of a world community consensus as to the existence of international law. Whichever argument is accepted, it is evident that the people of Palestine now have the legal right to their national state. It is well established in international law that a successful revolution thereby becomes a legal revolution. It is significant that the General Assembly of the United Nations, after careful consideration, has decided that some revolutions which are as yet unwon are legal revolutions because of their consistency with the basic principles of the United Nations. On December 6, 1971 the General Assembly, again by the more than two-thirds majority required for important questions (and again against the consistent opposition of the Governments of Israel and the United States) decided that it:

<sup>(34)</sup> Mallison and Mallison, *An International Law Appraisal*, pp. 21-25.

*'Confirms* the legality of the peoples' struggle for self-determination and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation, notably in southern Africa and in particular that of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), as well as the Palestinian people, by all means consistent with the Charter of the United Nations;

*'Affirms* man's basic human right to fight for the self-determination of his people under colonial and foreign domination;

*'Calls upon* all States dedicated to the ideals of freedom and peace to give all their political, moral and material assistance to peoples struggling for liberation, self-determination and independence against colonial and alien domination'.

The Palestinian people's resistance and 'struggle for self-determination and liberation', along with that of the specified African peoples, is thereby accorded a legal status in international law. In addition, the right to fight for self-determination is declared to be a 'basic human right'. This right may be most constructively interpreted as embracing a wide variety of methods including the implementation of the Palestinian rights through political-legal techniques. It is significant that the resolution calls upon states which are committed to the ideals of freedom and peace to provide both moral and material assistance. Such assistance, consequently, may not be interpreted as illegal acts of intervention.

In summary, these resolutions of the General Assembly provide the recognition of Palestinian rights and the basis in legal authority to take steps toward implementation.<sup>(35)</sup>

## 126. WHAT DOES THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT PROPOSE TO DO WITH THE JEWS IN PALESTINE?

The highest and most authentic sources that express the positions of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a political embodiment of the Palestinian resistance movement are the Palestine National Charter and the resolutions of the Palestinian National Congress (which has held 11 sessions in the period between May 1964 and January 1973). The charter and the resolutions are binding on all Palestinians and their organizations. There is not a single instance of deviation from them on the part of the Palestinian political and military organizations.

<sup>(35)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31-33.

The most important articles in the charter that shed light on this question can be summarized as follows: The charter proclaims Palestine as the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people and an indivisible part of the Arab homeland and emphasizes the genuine, essential and inherent characteristics of the Palestinian identity. Palestinians are defined as ‘those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine, regardless of whether they were evicted from it or stayed there’. The charter considers also as Palestinians all ‘the Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion’.

This article should not be taken to express the final and static opinion of the resistance movement. Indeed, the main body of the resistance, i.e. Fateh, made it very explicit that:<sup>(36)</sup>

All the Jews, Moslems, and Christians living in Palestine or forcibly exiled from it will have the right to Palestinian citizenship. This guarantees the right of all exiled Palestinians to return to their land whether they have been born in Palestine or in exile and regardless of their present nationality.

Equally, this means that all Jewish Palestinians—at present Israelis—have the same rights, provided of course they reject Zionist racist chauvinism and fully accept to live as Palestinians in the new Palestine. The revolution therefore rejects the supposition that only Jews who lived in Palestine prior to 1948 or prior to 1911, and their descendants, are acceptable.

Jews or non-Jews for that matter would have the right to practise their religion and develop culturally and linguistically as a group, besides their individual political and cultural participation. It is quite logical, for example, to have both Arabic and Hebrew as official languages taught in governmental schools to all Palestinians, Jews or non-Jews.

This does not mean that there are no differences among the various groups of the resistance movement about the nature of the future society in Palestine. They all agree that it must be democratic, non-sectarian, and progressive (i.e. anti-imperialist and anti-racialist) but disagree in one way or another as to the nature of its basic socio-economic structure.

This belief in the concept of a democratic, non-sectarian state in

<sup>(36)</sup> Fateh, ‘Relations between Palestinians and Jews’ (*Fateh Bulletin*: Beirut, January 19, 1970).

Palestine was observed explicitly and openly in the 'Political and Organizational Programme of the PLO', which was endorsed in the Extraordinary Session of the Palestine Congress held in April 1972 and confirmed in its 11th Ordinary Session held in January 1973.

The PLO has here a large number of tasks. Most of these can be summarised as follows:

– the continuation of the struggle so as to liberate the whole of the Palestinian homeland with the aim of creating a democratic Palestinian society which ensures the right of work and decent life for all its citizens. Such a society also ensures the interests of all social groups which participated, helped or sympathised with the revolution. The interest of all these groups which did not collaborate with the enemy and which did not facilitate its task of occupation and oppression are safeguarded in the new Palestinian democratic society as long as these interests do not exploit or oppress the large majority of the working people. The Palestinian democratic society guarantees the freedom of opinion, religion, gathering, demonstration and political parties, together with the establishment of patriotic political and trade union organizations. This Palestinian democratic society will form a part of the total Arab democratic society.

There are, as we noted earlier, several interpretations of the democratic state in Palestine. It is important to note, however, that the main body of the resistance stresses the following points:

1) The call for a nonsectarian Palestine should not be confused with a multi-religious or a bi-national state. The new Palestine is not to be built around three state religions or two nationalities; rather, it will simply provide freedom from religious oppression of any group by another and freedom to practice religion without discrimination. No rigidification of religious lines is desired by the revolution. The model of a society where a political-economic hierarchy divides jobs and offices on the basis of sectarian lines to perpetuate its domination is completely rejected by the Palestinian revolution.

Abu Ammar, [Yasser Arafat], for example, has reiterated several times that the president of liberated Palestine could be a Jew, a Moslem or a Christian, not because of his religion or sect, but on the basis of his merit as an outstanding Palestinian. Furthermore, religious and ethnic lines clearly cross in Palestine so as to make the term bi-national and the Arab-Jewish dichotomy meaningless, or at least dubious. The majority of Jews in Palestine today are Arabian Jews—euphemistically called Oriental Jews by the Zionists. Therefore, Palestine combines Jewish, Christian and Moslem Arabs as well as non-Arab Jews (Western Jews).

2) All the Jews, Moslems and Christians living in Palestine or forcibly

exiled from it will have the right to Palestinian citizenship. This guarantees the right of all exiled Palestinians to return to their land, whether they have been born in Palestine or in exile, and regardless of their present nationality. Equally, all Jewish Palestinians—at present Israelis—have the same right provided, of course, that they reject Zionist racist chauvinism and fully accept to live as Palestinians in the new Palestine. Fateh, for example, rejects the supposition that only Jews who lived in Palestine prior to 1948 or prior to 1914 and their descendants are acceptable. After all, Dayan and Allon were born in Palestine before 1948 and they—with many of their colleagues—are die-hard racist Zionists who obviously do not qualify for a Palestinian status; whereas newcomers may be anti-Zionists and work ardently for the creation of the new Palestine. It is reasonable to expect that the majority of the present Israeli Jews will change their attitudes and will subscribe to the new Palestine, especially after the oligarchic state machinery, economy and military establishment is destroyed.

3) The new democratic Palestine is not a substitute for liberation. Rather it is the ultimate objective of liberation. A client state in the West Bank and Gaza, an Avineri-style de-Zionized or pasteurised Israel, or a Semitic confederation are all categorically rejected by the revolution. They are all racist blueprints to delude Palestinians and other Arabs and continue Israeli hegemony and Palestinian subjugation. The *sine qua non* of the new Palestine is the destruction of the political, economic and militaristic foundation of the chauvinist, racist settler-state. The maintenance of a technologically-advanced military machine through a continuous Western capital flow and exchange of population has led the expansionist Zionist machinery to perpetuate one aggression after another. Therefore the liquidation of such a machinery is an irreplaceable condition for the creation of a new Palestine.

Although there is no fully developed picture of the type of political-economic-social organization of the liberated Palestine, there is general agreement that it will definitely not be a system of government that is theocratic, feudalistic, aristocratic, authoritarian or racist-chauvinistic. It will be a country that does not allow oppression or exploitation of any group of people by any other group or individuals; a state that provides equal opportunities for its people in work, education, political decision making, cultural, religious and artistic expression.

## 127. ARE THE PALESTINIANS SERIOUS ABOUT THIS CONCEPT OF A DEMOCRATIC STATE IN PALESTINE?

The Palestinian resistance movement has persisted ever since 1968 in propagating the idea of a democratic state in Palestine among the



Palestinian fighters and masses. The movement's publications in Arabic are full of explanations and comments on the idea. Despite all that has been inflicted upon the Palestinians (dispossession, misery, and terrorism) at the hands of the Israeli-Zionist state, this idea is still upheld and taught in the schools of the sons of the Palestinian martyrs run by the resistance, in the bases of the commandos, in the night schools arranged by the Palestinian students and among labor and women's unions in the camps.

It is quite significant to note that the Palestinian emphasis on and striving for the idea of a democratic state in Palestine did not evolve during the long period that preceded the present phase of Palestinian armed struggle, but was an offspring of the armed struggle itself. And it was not propagated by traditional Arab politicians and propagandists, but rather by the young, militant and new generation of Palestinians.